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ABSTRACT 
 
Food Redistribution during China’s Qin and Han Periods:  
Accordance and discordance among ideologies, policies, and their implementation 
 
by 
 
Moonsil Lee Kim 
 
 This dissertation analyzes the food redistribution systems of the Qin and Han periods, 
finding accordance and discordance among ideologies, policies, and their implementation. 
During the Qin and Han periods, food was given by the emperor to his subjects through 
various redistribution systems: salaries, rations, relief, gifts, and feasts. In chapters one to 
four, I introduce each form of food redistribution that directly or indirectly influenced food 
consumption and the dietary conditions of people of various statuses: officials, soldiers, 
elders, widows, victims of natural disaster, and convicts. Using recently excavated 
documents, received texts, and archaeological remains, I analyze what ancient Chinese 
people of various statuses experienced under the governmental food system, which pursued 
moral justification and political, social, and economic benefits both for the rulers and the 
ruled. 
The first chapter investigates the regulations on grain storage in the central and local 
governments, using the Shuihudi 睡虎地 Qin legal texts. The “Statutes on Granaries” (Cang 
lü 倉律) and the “Statutes on Food rations at Conveyance Stations” (Zhuan shi lü 傳食律) 
 vi 
 
are compared to administrative documents from Liye 里耶 and Xuanquan 懸泉 to prove that 
there were significant discrepancies between these statutes and the actual distribution of 
food.  
 Chapter two examines the reconstructed salary list and the “Statutes on Bestowals” 
(Ci lü 賜律) from Zhangjiashan張家山 to see how the idea of discriminatory distribution 
was reflected in the salary system of the Han and how the system was maintained in spite of 
the problem of too little salary for the lower officials. The military salary system, which was 
combined with the ration system, and imperial gift food are examined in the context of a 
solution to secure the food supply to military families on the frontier and to the lower salary-
grade officials.  
 Chapter three concerns the food distributed to commoners, especially those in 
distress or danger. This chapter analyzes the welfare food distributions for the aged, female 
heads-of-household, and victims of natural disaster. I suggest that comfort-food and relief-
food policies were actually geared toward pursuing social stability by saving able-bodied 
peasants and preventing social mobility, rather than having been designed simply to 
demonstrate filial piety in an emergency situation.  
 Chapter four deals with ancient Chinese feasting as a method of food redistribution. 
This chapter examines the two different styles of feasting, the yan 宴 feast and the pu 酺 
feast, by applying current anthropological theories of feasts to the roles of ancient Chinese 
feasts. After theoretical examination, the economy of leftover food after ritualistic feasting is 
analyzed based on recently discovered documents from Liye. I argue that by using the 
leftovers and byproducts, the rulers fed people of inferior status who suffered from poor 
dietary conditions.  
 vii 
 
 The food redistribution system in early imperial China was ideally designed to 
benefit all people under heaven “equally” within the framework of the social hierarchy, 
meanwhile providing extra resources to those of lower status and to people in distress. 
However, the ideology of the regulations and their actual implementation were frequently 
out of sync, as laws were applied flexibly and human greed worked every possible step of 
food redistribution. 
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Introduction 
1) The System of Empire of Food 
“Just as there is no life without food, so there is no civilization without a food empire.”1 
 
Early imperial China sustained itself by maintaining the mechanism of a “food 
empire,” signifying “what urban societies create to feed themselves.”2 In order to uphold the 
“food empire,” the rulers made great efforts to contrive ideal governmental food policies in 
terms of production, collection, and distribution/circulation.3 In order to increase production, 
they propagandized the “agriculture-first policy” (重農政策) and developed land systems 
and irrigation systems. New agricultural techniques and tools were invented and promoted to 
increase yields. The government often lent farmers tools, cattle, and seeds to help the 
cultivators produce a greater harvest.  
A taxation system was set up to collect a certain percentage of what the farmers 
produced. In order to transfer the goods from the provinces to the center, effective 
transportation systems on land and on water were designed. The policies regarding 
storehouses in local and central facilities were set up in order to keep the collected goods 
safe.  
                                                 
1
 Evan Fraser and Andrew Rimas, Empires of Food: Feast, Famine, and the Rise and Fall of Civilizations 
(New York: Free Press, 2010), 7. 
 
2
 Ibid. 
 
3
 Wu Bin 吴宾 categorizes the ancient food policies into four fields: production, storage, circulation, and 
other. Wu Bin, 中国古代粮食安全问题研究 Zhongguo gudai liangshi anquan wenti yanjiu (Research on 
Food Security in Ancient China), Diss. Northwest Agriculture and Forestry University, 2007, 114–122. 
 2 
 
The granary system was not only for storing grains, but also for controlling food 
circulation. During Emperor Wu 武’s reign (r.141-87 BCE), Sang Hongyang桑弘羊, 
(c.152-80 BCE) established the pingzhun平准 (“price stabilization”) and junshu均輸 
(“equal supply”) systems to enforce market prices and supply stabilization by buying goods, 
including food items, when these were cheap, and selling them when they were expensive.
4
 
As a specified pingzhun system for grains, a system for “ever-level granaries” (chang ping 
cang 常平倉) was set up mostly in border areas between the years 57 and 54 BCE to store 
grains for provisions against famine and to control prices.5 Even though contemporary 
Confucian scholars criticized that operating a pingjun system was to pursue benefits by 
abandoning agriculture, the system seems to have contributed to solving the food security 
problem by controlling supply and demand in the market.6 With the received historical texts, 
the research on the distribution/circulation of food of the ancient Chinese has been generally 
limited to the analysis of the effectiveness of governmental systems and policies that control 
the market price and supply and demand.   
In addition, there existed another significant policy regarding governmental food 
distribution and circulation during the Qin and the Han period: the redistribution of food 
from the rulers to subjects of various statuses. Since the rulers distributed to their subjects 
certain amounts of food that were originally collected from cultivators as tax or paid as 
tribute, I will name this system of food distribution “redistribution.” While the food flow 
                                                 
4
 Originally, the pingjun system was supposedly created by Li Kui 李悝 in the state of Wei during the 
Warring States period, and it was fully established and operated by Sang Hongyang 桑弘羊 during the reign of 
Wudi (141-87 BCE) of the Han period.  
 
5
 Han shu (24A:1141); Nancy Swann, Food and Money in Ancient China: The Earliest Economic History 
of China to A.D. 25: Han Shu 24 with Related Texts, Han Shu 91 and Shih-Chi 129 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1950), 195. 
 
6
 Wu Bin, Zhongguo gudai liangshi, 114–122. 
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from the cultivators to the rulers has been well examined under the topic of taxation 
systems, little attention has been paid to the food sent from the rulers to the subjects in terms 
of food redistribution and circulation. Also, scholars have generally focused on the 
macroeconomic policies of the state, such as the pingjun, junshu and chang ping cang 
systems, not on the issue of the food redistribution system, due to lack of evidence 
supporting the importance of redistribution as a means of solving food security problems. 
Therefore, in this dissertation, instead of examining each category of the food systems or the 
flow from the cultivators to the rulers, I will deal with a category of redistribution focusing 
on the flow from storage to subjects (Figure 1).   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Government Food Policies 
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2) The Concept of Fair Distribution 
 
 When the government redistributed food to their subjects, they did not give out food 
impromptu. The occasion, the amount and kind of food, the recipients, and the distribution 
process were all regulated in order to effectively achieve the purpose of redistribution, 
which will be discussed in the chapters that follow. Regardless of the reality of 
redistribution, the regulations concerning food redistribution were established according to 
leaders’ ideals. Therefore, ancient Chinese regulations on food redistribution are hard to 
understand apart from the concept of ideal distribution and the contemporary definition of 
fairness. In order to present the ideological foundation of the redistribution system, I will 
cover the economic views, specifically the notion of fair distribution, over which the 
representative ancient Chinese scholars argued.  
 Three major philosophies of ancient China, Confucianism, Legalism, and Daoism, 
offered different perspectives on the concept of fair distribution. From ancient Chinese 
literature, such as the Shangjun Shu 商君書 (Book of Lord Shang), Daode jing 道德經, 
Zhuangzi莊子, Lunyu 論語 (Analects), Mengzi 孟子 and Xunzi 荀子, we find that ancient 
Chinese scholars agreed that agriculture is the foundation of society, but they had different 
opinions on the ideal way to control and distribute agricultural products. The Daoists saw 
governmental food policies such as irrigation systems, taxation systems, controlling market 
prices, and redistribution as unnecessary actions straying far from the ideal of wuwei 無爲 
(literally “non-action”). Based on the concept of wuwei, they rejected any attempt to build 
human institutions that would be used to control. From the Daoist point of view, then, a food 
redistribution system set up by the government would not be ideal or fair at all. 
 5 
 
On the other hand, the Legalist Lord Shang (Shang Yang 商鞅, d.338 BCE) believed 
that institutional devices, laws, can idealize the system of production and distribution, and 
the resources should be distributed according to individual merit in order to forge a strong 
state. Therefore, he established a law that peasants could have land if they reclaimed the 
land, and they would be rewarded if they produced a bumper crop. If they killed many 
enemies, they were able to receive a reward regardless of social status. Equal opportunity 
and equal reward was the ideal concept of distribution, but the reward should differ 
according to the degree of contribution and merit. From the Legalists’ perspective, proper 
reward according to individual merit is “fair.” Therefore, as aristocratic rank in Qin was 
discriminatively bestowed based on one’s military achievement, distribution was different 
according to the degree of the recipients’ contribution to the state, which was reflected in 
one’s rank. Thus, discriminative distribution according to the recipients’ contribution to the 
state is “fair” from the Legalistic viewpoint.  
 Regarding Confucius’ 孔子(551-479 BCE) concept of ideal distribution, the 
passages from Lunyu (chapter 16, Jishi 季氏第十六) have been frequently discussed by 
commentators and scholars: 
 
(丘也聞有國有家者), 不患寡而患不均, 不患貧而患不安. 蓋均無貧,和無寡,安無
傾. 
 
(I have heard that those who have a country and family) do not worry 
about scarcity, but about inequality; not worry about poverty, but about 
disquietude. Under equality, there is no poverty; under harmony, no 
scantiness; under tranquility, no decline.   
 
  
 With these passages, it has been generally understood that Confucius stressed the 
importance of economic equality in order to control the people and maintain a stable and 
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strong society.  Contemporary Chinese scholars even relate the phrase “huan bu jun” 患不
均 (worry about the inequality of distribution) to the principal economic concept of 
socialism, believing that Confucius first introduced the concept of equal distribution of 
wealth, the foundation of socialism.7 In this context, in contemporary scholarship the phrase 
“bu huan gua er huan bu jun” 不患寡而患不均 has been generally interpreted as “not 
worry about the scantiness of wealth (or land) but the inequality of its distribution.”8   
 However, in ancient Chinese literature gua寡 has been generally used to indicate a 
lack of something not material, such as words, population, knowledge, and so on, while pin 
貧 in the next phrase can directly indicate material wealth.9 Some argue that the placement 
of gua and pin should be swapped for logical and grammatical pertinence as pointing out 
that in the latter sentence of the passage, pin is coordinated with jun 均無貧 in the context of 
equal distribution of wealth. They say if gua and pin switch places, the phrase “bu huan pin 
er huan bu jun” 不患貧而患不均 (“not worry about poverty but about its inequality of 
distribution”) clearly shows a concern regarding the distribution of wealth, whereas “bu 
huan gua er huan bu an” 不患寡而患不安 (“not worry about scantiness but about 
disquietude”) perfectly suits concerns regarding the population.10   
                                                 
7
 Zhao Longwen 趙龍文, 論語今釋 Lunyu Jinshi, vol. 3 (Taibei Shi: Zheng Zhong Shu Ju, 1967), 1604 
 
8
 Jichuang Hu, A Concise History of Chinese Economic Thought (Bei ing: Foreign Languages Press, 
    ), 4    im  y ng-tʼak,      논어,  pʼan. ed. (S ul Tʼ kpy lsi: Hanʼguk Chayu  yoyuk Hy phoe, 
1971), 417.; Kim interprets  gua as the lack of land and bujun as the unequal distribution of land. 
 
9
 Luo Zhufeng 羅竹風, 汉语大词典 Hanyu da cidian (Shanghai: Hanyu da cidian chubanshe, 1991), vols. 
11, 1589. 
 
10
 Yang Bojun 楊伯峻, 論語譯注 Lunyu Yizhu, 2nd ed. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980), 172–174. 
 
 7 
 
 In fact, many commentaries propose various meanings of the phrases. In Lunyu Jizhu 
論語集注 (Collected annotations on the Analects), penned in the twelfth century, Zhu Xi 朱
熹 explains that gua indicates the lack of people, while pin indicates the lack of properties 
(“寡謂民少 貧謂財乏”).11 Liu Bonan 劉寶楠 (1791-1855) and Liu Gongmian 劉恭冕 
(1821-80) commented that gua indicates that many people wander, or go into exile (“寡者民
多流亡也”).12 Because of the different interpretations on gua, there are also a variety of 
commentaries on the meaning of jun. Some scholars see jun as indicating equality or equal 
distribution, as shown above, while some explain that this phrase is about the concern of 
unevenly distributed population in the territory rather than a matter of equal distribution of 
wealth. James Legge’s English translation shows the differences clearly: 
 
“I have heard that rulers of States and chiefs of families are not troubled lest 
their people should be few, but are troubled lest they should not keep their 
several places; that they are not troubled with fears of poverty, but are 
troubled with fears of a want of contented repose among the people in their 
several places. For when the people keep their several places, there will be no 
poverty; when harmony prevails, there will be no scarcity of people; and 
when there is such a contented repose, there will be no rebellious upsetting.”13   
 
This interpretation indicates that the words of Confucius might be not about how the rulers 
manage the economy, as in distributing wealth equally for people’s material satisfaction, but 
how they control the population and people’s mental repose.     
                                                 
11
 Zhu Xi 朱熹, 四書章句集注 Si Shu Zhang Ju Ji Zhu (Taibei Shi: Taiwan shang wu yin shu guan, 
1968), 121. 
 
12
 Liu Bonan 劉寶楠, 論語正義 Lunyu Zhengyi (Taibei Shi: Taiwan shang wu yin shu guan, 1968), 30. 
 
13
 James Legge, The Chinese Classics, Confucian Analects (Lunyu), vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 1960), 308. 
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 No matter what Confucius originally meant and how later scholars variously 
understood his words, it seems that Han Chinese scholars in the second century generally 
understood the phrase as a matter of wealth and its equal distribution. This can be supported 
by the fact that Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (179-104 BCE), the Confucian scholar who 
facilitated the Han empire’s adoption of Confucianism as the ideological foundation of the 
state, quoted the phrase as “bu huan pin er huan bu jun” 不患貧而患不均 in his work 
Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn (Chunqiu Fanlu 春秋繁露): 
 
It is said by Confucius, “We are not troubled with fears of poverty, but are 
troubled with fears of a lack of equality of wealth.” (不患貧而患不均) 
Therefore, when there is here a concentration of wealth, there must be an 
emptiness there. Great riches make the people proud; and great poverty 
makes them wretched. When they are wretched, they would become robbers; 
when they are proud, they would become oppressors; it is human nature.  
From the nature of the average man, the sages discovered the origin of 
disorder. Therefore, when they established social laws and divided up the 
social orders, they made the rich able to show their distinction without being 
proud, and the poor able to make their living without misery; this was the 
standard for the equalization of society.14  
 
 According to Dong’s interpretation, jun does not mean the same amount, but 
“proper” distribution according to righteousness, which actually indicates unequal 
distribution by maintaining the good nature of the rich and the poor in order to preserve 
social peace. It is fair that people of the honorable/superior/ruling position have more wealth 
and opportunity than those of the mean/inferior/ruled position. Confucius is not concerned 
                                                 
14
Translated by Huan-Chang Chen, The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School, vol. 2 (New 
York: Columbia University, 1911), 463–4. 
 9 
 
with superior men who are “able to be content with poverty” and “to live a poor yet happy 
life,” but the inferior men who have an “unrestrained quest for profits” and therefore are 
discontented and “seldom refrain from making complaints.”15 Even though the inferior class 
does not expect to have more than their superiors, they easily complain and may create 
social disorder when they have less than what they are supposed to be able to get. Therefore, 
Confucius advises that the rulers should distribute wealth to their sub ects “equally,” which 
does not mean equal amounts, but proper amounts according to their status in order to 
provide equal opportunity, from which a person will be enabled to make the same amount of 
income as another person of his status.16  
 The meaning of jun and the concept of fair distribution were further developed by 
Mencius 孟子 (372-289 or 385-302 BCE) when he proposed the significance of hengchan 
恒産, a secured source of income, guaranteed by the government. 
 
民之爲道也, 有恒産者有恒心, 無恒産者無恒心, 苟無恒心, 放辟邪
侈, 無不爲已. 及陷乎罪, 然後 從而刑之, 是罔民也. 焉有仁人在位罔民
而可爲也.17 
 
The way of the people is this: If they have a certain livelihood, they will 
have a fixed heart; if they have not a certain livelihood, they have not a 
fixed heart. And if they have not a fixed heart, there is nothing which they 
                                                 
15
 Hu, A Concise History of Chinese Economic Thought, 48. 
 
16
 Chen, The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School, 2:460. 
 
17
 Mencius, 孟子注疏 Mengzi zhu shu (juan5A.5,  2:2702), 十三經注疏 Shi san jing zhu shu, ed. Ruan 
Yuan 阮元 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chu ban she,1997) 
 10 
 
will not do in the way of self-abandonment, of moral deflection, of 
depravity, and of wild license. When they have thus been involved in 
crime, to follow them up and punish them: this is to entrap the people. How 
can such a thing as entrapping the people be done under the rule of a 
benevolent man?18 
 
 
According to this paragraph from the Book of Mencius, Mencius believes that the sage 
rulers should guarantee people’s living by providing sources of income in order to keep 
them moral and prevent crime. The redistribution system can be understood as one of the 
income sources that the ruler can provide. This idea is comparable to the contemporary 
concept of social security. Therefore, it can be said that the concept of fair distribution was 
expanded by Mencius to the scope of considering the livelihood of the people.19  
 The concept of fairness in the context of social security is reemphasized by Xunzi 荀
子 (312-230 BCE), who addresses the ruler’s responsibility to distribute wealth to the people 
in need. He argues for a distribution that will benefit the people in the lower classes, but at 
the same time he asserts the significance of strict discrimination based on rewards and 
according to occupation. Based on the notion of li 禮 (propriety), which emphasizes 
discriminatory treatment according to status, Xunzi disputes the idea of rewarding all people 
                                                 
18
 James Legge, The Chinese Classics (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), vol. 2, 239-240. 
 
19 S ng-hye Kim, 유교의 뿌리를 찾아서: 논어, 맹자, 순자에 대한 해석학적 접근                    
                                                             ,  ae  ngpʼan. (Seoul: Chisik  i 
Pʼunggy ng, 2001), 241-248. 
 11 
 
equally. Instead, he sees it is fair when people receive different rewards based on the 
significance of their work:    
 
“The ancient kings accordingly established rites and  ustice for men in order 
to distribute wealth.  They distinguished the classes between the honorable 
and the mean, the difference between the old and the young, and the 
separation between the wise and the ignorant, and the able and the incapable. 
They made all men take up their work and get their justice respectively.  
Then, the different amounts of income either great or small, were all made 
suitable to everyone.  This is the principle of harmony and unity of a 
society…… Therefore, some receive income from the whole empire, [as an 
emperor], but they do not think that it is too much; and some receive it as a 
doorkeeper, or a waiter on a traveler, or a guard along the gate, or a 
watchman, but they do not think that it is too little.” 20   
 
 At the end of this statement, Xunzi says “although it looks unequal, it is 
equal; although it looks partial, it is  ust  although it looks different, it is uniform.” 
The character of jun at first glance seems to mean something equal, just, and 
uniform, but it actually indicates the unequal, partial, and differentiating nature of the 
redistribution system.       
 It seems that major philosophers from the Warring States Period to the Han period 
proposed various concepts of ideal distribution. However, their ideas were not contrary to 
each other but rather complementary within the big picture of the commonly held notion of 
fairness: “unequal but universal.” From the viewpoint of those directing the redistribution 
system, fair distribution did not indicate distribution of the same thing and the same amount 
to all people. Instead, it was commonly considered fair to distribute differently, guided to 
discriminate according to whatever they thought most important: status, ability, merit, or 
need. At the same time, they believed that all the people in the state should be included in 
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 Xunzi; Shuren Liang, 荀子約注 Xunzi Yue Zhu (Taibei Shi: Shi jie shu ju, 1962), 98-99; translated by 
Chen, The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School, 2:461. 
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the redistribution system as recipients. In other words, it is fair when everyone, including 
even the lowest members of the society, have the opportunity to benefit from the system 
although some are granted much less compared to others. In the following chapters on food 
redistribution systems, in the forms of salaries, rations, relief/comfort food, and feasting, we 
find that the concept of fair distribution shared in ancient Chinese society is clearly reflected 
in the regulations.        
 
3) Research Method   
 
 For this dissertation, I will use two kinds of written sources: received texts and 
excavated documents. Received texts such as historical and philosophical documents and 
literature will be used to analyze historical facts, ideological debates, and personal 
experiences. The Shiji, Hanshu, and Hou Hanshu are the main sources, not only for 
determining what happened in the past, but also for comparing historians’ perspectives of 
political and social events. Such historical documents convey detailed stories about the 
causes and results of the emperor’s gift-giving events.  
 In addition to these received texts, I will use newly-excavated documents in order to 
demonstrate the actual regulations and their implementation. Due to the development of the 
economy, archaeological research, and publication, tremendous amounts of bamboo strips 
from the Qin and Han period, which are called Qin jian 秦簡 or Han jian 漢簡, respectively, 
have been excavated since the 1970s in mainland China. While the bamboo strips previously 
discovered during the former half of the twentieth century from Dunhuang 敦煌 and Juyan
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居延 in Gansu Province largely concern military administration in the frontier garrison, 
recently found bamboo strips from the sites of Shuihudi 睡虎地, Liye 里耶, Zhangjiashan 
張家山, and Yinwan 尹灣 contain a wider variety of documents including personal writing, 
recipes, literature, administrative records, accounts, legal procedures, and the laws of the 
central and provincial governments. Among the various genres of the documents, 
administrative and juridical texts, in particular, are significant for revealing accordance or 
discordance among ideology, policy, and its implementation.      
 The 1,155 strips of Qin jian discovered in 1975 in the coffin of tomb No. 11 at 
Shuihudi, Yunmeng County, Hubei Province comprise the first actual Qin laws we have 
found beyond the received texts, although these are only a selection from a larger body of 
Qin laws. These select administrative rules and material on penal law were buried in the 
tomb of a Qin administrator named Xi 喜 (262-217 BCE), who was a government scribe, 
Prefectural Clerk, and was finally charged with trying criminal suits. These texts comprise 
several topics, such as Chronology (bian nian ji 編年記), Eighteen Qin Statutes (qin lü shi 
ba zhong 秦律十八種), Answers to Questions Concerning Qin Statutes (法律答問), and 
more. Among them, Eighteen Qin Statutes contains eighteen sections of rules, such as those 
for agriculture, livestock, granaries, coins, artisans, supervisors, treasuries, compulsory 
labor, and so on. The Answers to Questions Concerning Qin Statutes is about legal 
interpretation. These texts provide abundant information on Qin law for administration and 
criminal cases. In particular, the directions on agricultural work, granary systems, and food 
rations from these texts are significant sources for research on food redistribution.   
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 In 2002, more than 36,000 wooden slips and tablets were excavated from the city-
site at Liye in Longshan County, Hunan Province. These records contain the Qin 
administrative documents on household registration, accounts, food rations, and convict 
laborers of Qianling County in Dongting Prefecture from the 25th year of Qin  ing Zheng’s 
reign to the first year of the Second Qin Emperor’s reign (222-209 BCE).21 Since these texts 
are some of the most recently discovered, the complete report of the philological research on 
these slips has not been published in full yet. Nevertheless, with the scattered texts available, 
we are able to see the nature and process of administrative records and accounts written by 
the county’s officials in order to report to superior authorities. These administrative 
documents can be compared to the legal codes in order to discover the reality of the 
implementation of regulations. In addition, the Qin manuscripts from Guanju 關沮, Hubei 
Province, contain very new information on the economy of ritual food, which provided a 
significant reference concerning sacrifices to Xiannong 先農, the agricultural god, at the 
local level, by Qin officials. 
 The Statutes and Ordinances of the Second Year (Er nian lü ling 二年律令) text, 
among the legal texts discovered from Zhangjiashan tomb no. 247, is a major source of early 
Han legal tradition. This text consists of twenty-seven Han statutes (lü) and one ordinance 
(ling) that seemed to be promulgated in 186 BCE, the second year of Empress Dawger Lü 
呂 (d.  0 BCE). Among them, the “Statutes on Food Rations at Conveyance Stations” 
(Zhuanshi lü 傳食律) and the “Statute on Bestowals” (Ci lü 賜律) are especially significant 
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 Li Xueqin, “A Preliminary Study of the Qin Period Inscribed Slips from Liye,” Chinese Archaeology 4 
(2004):  5   Robin D.S. Yates, “Jiedu Liye Qin  ian- Qin dai difang xingzheng zhidu” 解讀里耶秦簡-秦代地
方行政制度, presented at the International Workshop on the Study of Chinese Manuscripts Written on 
Bamboo Slips and Silk 2012: Studies on Qin Manuscripts Written on Bamboo Slips and Silk 中國簡帛學國際
論壇 2012:秦簡牘研究, Wuhan University, November 18, 2012. 
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in this research, as they provide information on food distribution at local courier stations as 
well as on food bestowed by the Emperor. The articles from the Zhangjiashan manuscript, 
with their regulations on distributed food items and amounts according to circumstance and 
rank can be compared to the Qin legal codes from Shuihudi in order to examine similarities 
and differences.  
 The bamboo slips discovered at the site of the Han post station of Xuanquan 懸泉, 
Dunhuang includes information on the economy, foreign policy, legal system, ethnic 
relations, and transportation on the Han frontier. In particular, one of the account book 
discovered contains expenditures for treating officials who were dispatched from the central 
government or on business trips west and east is a great source for comparing actual food 
consumption of officials compared to regulations written in Han law. Also, the fragments 
discovered from Xuanquan provide us with the prices of various food items and the 
exchange rate in the far west area of Han over a long period of time, from the reign of 
Emperor Wu (r.141-87 BCE) to the end of the Han.   
 In addition, the Han documents from the Yinwan site contain detailed records of 
administrative work and regulations at the commandery level from 16 to 11 BCE, during the 
reign of Emperor Cheng 成帝 (r. 33-7 BCE). This included a statement of financial 
accounts, numbers of the registered population, figures for the land that was under 
cultivation and for that which had been reclaimed, and the total number of all types of 
subordinate units of Donghai Commandery among the regular eighty-three commanderies of 
the empire. This is a great source for understanding early Han China’s economic policy as 
well as its provincial land and tax system, which were closely connected to the central 
government through the Han bureaucratic system. In particular, the census records with the 
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age ranges of each county and the commandery can be utilized to find the number of food 
recipients during the Han period if the number can be relied upon.  
  These newly discovered legal codes and administrative documents provide abundant 
supporting evidence for what we had known earlier from the literature as well as new 
perspectives about ancient society.  However, some of this new evidence conflicts with 
previous knowledge built on the historical literature. For example, according to Lord Shang 
and Han Fei, a state should be ruled according to strict regulations that are equally applied to 
the people, with no exception, in order to strengthen the state.  However, penalties in the Qin 
laws were not only different between administrative wrongs and criminal acts, but also the 
same violation received different penalties according to the situation. Even though the 
theory of the Legalists was recognized by the rulers of Qin as the dominant ideology of the 
state, the formation of Qin law was a rather complicated process with some ideas and norms 
contrary to Lord Shang and Han Fei.22 Hulsewé also argues that there were light 
punishments for superiors, unlike in Lord Shang’s theory. He shows that they had different 
rules and penalties according to the crime, situation, and rank.23  
 For the study of agriculture and food distribution, I also can find some conflict 
between the situation described in literary texts and the formulated rules. For example, while 
the image of “cruel law of the cruel state” has continued to be supported by historical 
literature until recently, Shuihudi 睡虎地 Qin code shows that the state actively supported 
agricultural production practices such as lending tools and animals. Also, even though the 
regulation of the food rations distributed to Han convicts laborers guaranteed enough food to 
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 A.F.P. Hulsewé, Remnants of Ch’in Law : An Annotated Translation of the Ch’in Legal and 
Administrative Rules of the 3rd Century B.C., Discovered in Y n-Meng Prefecture, Hu-Pei Province, in 1975 
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survive, it seems that convict laborers suffered from lack of food, according to the situation 
described in the literature. Why the differences between these two? Can I fully rely on the 
discovered law in order to reconstruct the agricultural and food redistribution systems?  How 
do I use these sources correctly and effectively? This is another topic that I must deal with in 
this dissertation and the future research.     
 
4) Dissertation Object / Chapter Overview 
 
 This dissertation deals with the accordance and discordance among ideologies, 
policies, and their implementations by analyzing the food redistribution system during the 
Qin and Han periods, when China began to create an imperial state. As for examining the 
redistribution system, this dissertation attempts to answer several questions: How were food 
resources redistributed to officials, armies, peasants, and convicts after being collected as tax 
or tribute? What kinds of ideology or purposes were reflected in the food redistribution 
system and regulations? How were the regulations actually implemented in the 
administrative process? What caused discordance among the ideology, the regulations, and 
implementation?  
In order to answer these questions, each chapter is designed to introduce the purpose, 
process and features of a form of redistribution, focusing on its impact on a certain group or 
groups of people in society. The ideology that was the foundation of the system, the legal 
code and imperial edicts that defined the specific occasions, recipients, food amount and 
kind, and process, and the administrative documents and records that show the reality of its 
implementation will be utilized.  
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The first chapter starts with an investigation of the regulations on grain storage in the 
central and local governments, using the Shuihudi Qin legal texts. An analysis of the 
“Statutes on Granaries” (Cang lü 倉律) and the “Statutes on Food rations at Conveyance 
Stations” (Zhuan shi lü 傳食律) is compared to administrative documents from Liye and 
Xuanquan to see whether the established regulations regarding the granary systems were 
actually observed. Since a large part of the “Statutes on Granaries” concerns food rations to 
convict laborers, and the “Statutes on Food Rations at Conveyance Stations” are about the 
food given to officials, this chapter deals with the reality of food rations given to convict 
laborers and officials on business trips, who were supposed to be given food from local 
granaries.  
 Chapter Two focuses on salaries, which constitute the largest portion of redistributed 
items from the government. The redistributed amount of grain given to officials according to 
salary grade is analyzed with the recorded evidence in the historical literature. This chapter 
examines the reconstructed salary list and the “Statutes on Bestowals” from Zhang iashan to 
see how the idea of discriminatory distribution is reflected in the redistribution system of the 
Han and how the system was maintained in spite of the problem of too little salary for the 
lower officials. The military salary system, which was combined with the ration system, will 
be examined in the context of the solution to secure the food supply to military families on 
the frontier.  
 Chapter Three concerns the food distributed to commoners, especially those who 
were in distress and danger. During the Han period, Confucian beliefs were widely 
employed to design welfare policies as a means of effectively displaying the virtue of the 
ruler. However, ideal policies made with lofty ideology, such as tax exemptions and 
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bestowal of ranks, goods, and food to the aged and the distressed, were sometimes distorted 
or made invalid when the policies were actually implemented. This chapter analyzes the 
welfare food distributions for the aged, female heads-of-household, and victims of natural 
disasters and suggests that the comfort and relief food policies were actually aimed at 
pursuing social stability by preventing social mobility, rather than simply designed to 
highlight the Confucian virtue of rulers. Comparing recently excavated legal and 
administrative documents from Shuihudi, Zhangjiashan, and Liye to the historical literature, 
this chapter shows that the Han rulers were more interested in saving able-bodied peasants 
than in demonstrating filial piety when confronted with an emergency situation.  
 Chapter Four deals with ancient Chinese feasting as a method of food redistribution. 
This chapter starts with an explanation of the two different kinds of court feast during the 
Han period: the yan 宴 feast, the exclusive feast among the elite, and the pu 酺 feast, the 
inclusive statewide drinking party. The nature of these two different styles of feasting has 
been examined in the context of the food redistribution system and by applying current 
anthropological theories on feasts to understand the role of ancient Chinese feasts, in a 
universal context. After theoretical examination, the economy of leftover food after 
ritualistic feasting will be analyzed based on recently discovered documents from Liye. This 
shows that not only the feast itself, but also the disposal of food after feasting was 
systemically regulated in the laws and recorded in the accounts. Administrative documents 
show that the leftover food after feasting and rituals was sold to convict laborers. In this 
chapter, I argue that by using the leftovers and byproducts, the rulers fed people of inferior 
status who were in a poor dietary condition.  
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Under the one theme of the food redistribution system during the Qin and the Han periods, 
these four chapters cover the details of what ancient Chinese people of various statuses 
experienced under the governmental food system, which pursued moral justification and 
political, social, and economic benefits both for the rulers and the ruled. Each chapter covers 
topics regarding the ideologies involved in food redistribution practices, the problems 
inherent in the systems, and the possible reasons of disconnection between the ideal and the 
real. Utilizing newly-discovered ancient documents, the discordance between the laws and 
the administrative records is analyzed, revealing the nature of the legal system and the 
possibility of corruption therein.  
      
Table 1. Han Measurements
24 
Capacity  1 ge 合  19.968 cc 
1 sheng 升 = 10 ge 合 199.687 cc 
1 dou 斗 = 10 sheng 升 1.996 liters 
1 shi 石 (= 1 hu 斛) = 10 dou 斗 19.968 liters 
Weight  1 zhu 銖   0.64 g 
1 liang 两 = 24 zhu銖 15.24 g 
1 jin 斤 = 16 liang 两 244 g 
1 jun 鈞 = 30 jin 斤 7.32 kg 
1 dan 石 = 4 jun 鈞 29.3kg (= 64lbs, 8 oz.) 
Area 1 qing頃 = 100 mu 畝25 11.39 English acres  
(= 4.6 hectare) 
 
 
  
                                                 
24 Michael Loewe, Records of Han administration. Vol. 1. (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 161.  
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I. Granaries, Statutes, and Rations 
 
 The granary system is significant in food distribution research because taxes 
collected in the form of grain were stored in granaries, and the redistribution of grain to the 
people started from the action of “opening the granary (kaicang 開倉).” Therefore, this 
chapter will begin with an investigation into the nature of grain storage in the central and 
local governments during the Qin and Han periods using historical literature, laws, and 
excavated administrative documents.   
 Since research on storehouses based on available archaeological evidence such as 
images from tomb reliefs and models in pottery, wood, and bronze has been already fully 
discussed by many scholars,26 I will focus on the features of government granaries mostly 
based on textual evidence. I will examine the “Statutes on Granaries” from the Shuihudi睡
虎地 Qin legal texts in order to reveal the process of entering and issuing grain, the form of 
reporting to the central government, and the regulation on distribution in terms of amount 
and recipients. Then, the policies on the granary system and food distribution at the 
conveyance stations as written in the legal text will be compared to the actual administrative 
record. Also, this chapter will examine the administrative records of rations and the accounts 
of food expenditures of the local granaries from Liye and Xuanquan to see whether the 
established regulations were actually implemented. This research on the granary system 
based on the laws and administrative documents will reveal how the Qin and Han 
governments managed collected taxes, who was in charge of grain distribution, how the 
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process of redistribution occurred, how much grain was distributed and to whom, and finally 
what was the ultimate goal of establishing laws governing the granary system. 
  
1) Granaries in Received Texts and Excavated Documents 
 
“China has a shaped system of grain storage education and research. The 
state has invested in building advanced storage facilities, and most elevators 
have been equipped with power ventilation appliances, computer controlled 
temperature measuring systems and recycling fumigation devices…The 
Chinese government always places great importance on the grain storage of 
peasant households. It has appropriated earmarked capital for developing 
tools and preservatives adapting to specific stock requirements of farmers, 
and has sent professionals to rural areas to help farmers improve their storage 
capability and reduce losses.”27 
  
 This statement appears on the main page of the current website of the State 
Administration of Grain of the People’s Republic of China. It proclaims that the mission of 
the government is to maintain storage facilities and to improve storage capability in order to 
reduce the loss of property. Concerns about how to preserve collected grains safely so as to 
prevent losses may have existed since humans began to store surplus food garnered from 
cultivation and hunting/gathering. Increasingly compiling success derived ways of saving 
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 “State Administration of Grain” http://www.chinagrain.gov.cn/english/Grain%20Storage.html 
(4/8/2014) 
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food, managing a granary system, and distributing stored food. As state-level societies began 
to develop legal systems, these concerns gradually morphed into rules for a storage system 
and its management.  
 In China, as early as the Zhou period, there have existed guidelines for managing 
grains. The Liji emphasizes the significance of storing a surplus, arguing that a state cannot 
continue unless it keeps an accumulation of grain that would sustain the people for a 
minimum of three years. If there is not a surplus sufficient for six years, the state is in 
danger; in order to reach self-sufficiency, a state must accumulate sufficient food for nine 
years.28 Moreover, in order to enhance states’ economic power, ancient scholars proposed 
efficient ways of managing food resources that required the direct involvement of states 
controlling the price of grain. For example, it is known that the statesman Guan Zhong 管仲 
(c. 720-645 BCE) of the polity of Qi 齊 proposed that the government purchase large 
quantities of grain and store them in the state granaries when it was abundant and cheap, and 
sell it back to the people in times of shortage and high price. It is not clear if this proposal 
was actually practiced in the state of Qi, but, later, a similar policy, suggested by Li Kui 李
悝 (455-395 BCE), a minister at the court of Marquis Wen 文侯 of Wei 魏,  seems to have 
been practiced in the state of Wei.29 These ideas and policies on storage eventually 
influenced unique granary systems, such as Ever-level Granary (changping cang 常平倉), 
which was established during the Han period and lasted until the end of the Qing period.  
  Studies on ancient Chinese granaries have generally been conducted with the limited 
information from received texts and archaeological remains. While received texts provide 
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some details about the administrative structure and political function of granaries, 
archaeological remains, such as storehouse models in wood, pottery, and bronze, and images 
of grain storage units on Han tomb reliefs and mural paintings give us visual information on 
the architectural structure of the storage buildings. According to archaeological studies, the 
preferred style of storage buildings differed according to region during the Qin and Han 
periods. A rectangular building called jing 京, with a gate, windows, and a roof, sometimes 
placed on stilts, was a common style of small granary in Northern China, while qun 囷, a 
round, roofed wickerwork bin was widely used in Southern China.30 Cang 倉 indicates a 
larger rectangular storage facing generally managed by the government.31 In addition to the 
granary “buildings,” a large group of Han underground grain storage facilities have been 
discovered in the west suburb of Luoyang 洛陽, in Henan Province, where one square bin is 
3.44 meters long, 3.1 meters wide, and 1.4 meters deep, and a round bin is1.2 meters high 
with a diameter of 3.6 meters.32  Considering that the largest underground storage 
constructed during the reign of Emperor Yang of Sui 隋煬帝 (569-618) was capable of 
storing about 125,000 tons of grain in the 450,000 square meters of space measuring 612 
meter across from east to west and 750 meters across from north to south,33 we can assume 
that underground storage was not rare during the Han period.  
 The nature of the central granaries in or near the capital can easily be found in 
historical documents. The Han Shu states that a Great Granary (tai cang 太倉) was built 
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with the Weiyang palace 未央宫 in Chang’an 長安 in 200 BCE.34 According to the Han 
histories, the Great Granary was a department belonging to the Ministry of Finance (neishi 
内史). Among the nine ministers, the Superintendent of Agriculture (da nong ling 大農令, 
later named Grand Minister of Agriculture, da si nong 大司農) was responsible for both 
storing collected taxes in kind and cash and providing funds from the storehouse to maintain 
the civil service and the army.35 During the Eastern Han period, under the supervision of the 
Grand Minister of Agriculture, the Director of the Great Granary (tai cang ling 太倉令) took 
charge of the administration of the Great Granary in Luoyang, which served the needs of the 
court and the bureaucracy. 
 In addition to the Great Granary, the Han government established experimental 
storehouses called “ever-level granaries” (changping cang 常平倉) in the frontier 
commanderies in 54 BCE, so that when grain was cheap it might be bought at an increased 
price for storage by the government, and when grain was expensive it might be sold at a 
decreased price. Even though the Han Shu describes ever-level granaries as having 
benefitted the public as well as the government by stabilizing grain prices and making a 
profit for the government, the effectiveness of this system has been controversial.36 Whether 
it was effective or not, it seems that these ever-level granaries did not work as a food 
redistribution system throughout the Han period: only ten years after it had been set up, the 
system was abolished in 44 BCE, along with economies requested by Confucian officials. 
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Later, in  2 CE, an “ever-full granary” (changman cang 常滿倉) was established in the 
eastern suburbs of Luoyang, and the Director of Price Stabilization (ping zhun ling平準令) 
under the supervision of the Grand Minister of Agriculture controlled it for price 
stabilization by buying goods when these were cheap and selling them when they were 
dear.37 
 In addition to these large granaries run by the central administration, each provincial 
government managed their own storehouses of various sizes in order to keep collected taxes. 
Poll and land taxes in kind were paid by peasants at the village level, collected by sub-
prefectural officials, forwarded to provincial governments, and finally transported to the 
capital and stored in the Great Granary (tai cang 太倉). In the process of transfer from the 
peasants up to the emperor, a certain portion of collected taxes were retained by each level 
of local administration, such as county (xian 縣) and commandery (jun 郡), in order to be 
used for local bureaucratic expenses. The rest of them were sent to the next level of 
administration. Historical records sometimes describe the occasions of sending grain from 
the central granary to the provinces, from the provinces to the counties, and from one 
province to another province. Therefore, we can assume that there existed various sizes of 
governmental granaries in various styles all over the empire.  
 From the legal statements we can imagine the physical feature of granaries, as well. 
Qin legal documents discovered from Shuihudi imply that no matter what the style and size 
of the storehouses, the government was required to install wood and straw matting on the 
inside. The “Statutes on Agriculture” (Tian lü 田律), from the “Eighteen  inds of Qin 
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Statues (Qin lü shi ba zhong 秦律十八種)” discovered in Shuihudi, Yunmeng County, 
Hubei Province prescribes that wood and matting should be completely removed when the 
storage unit becomes empty.38 This demonstrates that wood and matting were used for 
preventing the decay of grain and hay, as these were placed on the bottom or used for 
making a certain wooden structure inside the storehouse for ventilation and controlling the 
humidity.  
 In addition, the unit of grain stocks appears in the “Statutes on Granaries” (Cang lü 
倉律) and the names of storage houses are found in the Liye document. Liye documents say 
that grain was withdrawn from units called kuai 廥, such as jing 徑 kuai (slip 
no.1239,1257,1321,1739), bing 丙 kuai (slip no.1545,1590,1690) and yi 乙 kuai (slip 
no.1647). Considering Qin rules on withdrawal of grains from the granary, it is possible to 
say that kuai indicates the unit of one ji 積, which usually means ten thousand shi of grain 
(about    ,  0 liters). According to “The Statutes on Granaries,” when grain is placed in a 
granary, one ji of grain should be grouped as one section, and each section should be 
separated by fences and gates made of straw. Officials were supposed to seal the individual 
door of each section, called a “house” (hu 户), together, and one responsible official was 
assigned to one section to issue grains. After the grains stored in the “house” were 
completely withdrawn, another “house” was allowed to open.39 The statutes regulate that 
after the distribution is done, the “house” should be replenished with one ji of grain, which 
usually means 10,000 shi. According to the Liye documents, officials withdrew a certain 
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amount of grain from a certain kuai, and the process of issuing grain from the kuai was just 
like the regulation on handling grain from the “house” of one ji of stored grain. Therefore, it 
is possibly to say that each kuai from the Liye document meant one “house” filled with one 
ji of grain, as is described in the Qin statutes.    
 The proper management of a granary facility was also enforced by the regulations on 
granaries. The “Statutes on Granaries” from the Shuihudi Qin legal manuscripts prescribes 
that chickens should be reared away from the granary.40 The “Statutes Concerning 
Checking” (Xiao lü 效律) indicate that if the stored grain decays due to rain drops leaking 
into the storehouse, the responsible official should pay for the loss of the grain in addition 
to paying a fine according to the amount of loss.41 A compilation of “Questions and 
Answers (Falü dawen 法律答問)” from the same legal texts also contains details on how 
the granary facility should be maintained: the wings of the door of the storehouse should be 
tight so that the grain cannot escape, and the lock of the granary should not be loosened for 
fingers or tools to squeeze into; otherwise, the officials will be fined. Also, for three or 
more rat holes the responsible official should be fined, and for two or less he should be 
berated. Three mouse holes were counted as being equivalent to one rat hole.42 These 
fragments of Qin legal codes indicate that granary facilities were supposed to be well-
maintained by law in order to prevent loss of property.    
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2) The Nature of Statutes on Granaries  
 
  Local granaries, from large to small, in each county, commandery, and province 
were placed under the management of each local administration, but this does not indicate a 
lack of central power controlling local grain storage. The legal statutes discovered at 
Shuihudi and Zhangjiashan indicate that the Qin had already established a detailed legal 
system to control governmental granaries across the state, and this legal tradition continued 
in to the Han dynasty.  
 By enforcing the law, the central government managed the local storehouses as well 
as the central granaries in order to maintain the required minimum stock of grain. Even 
though the discovered legal documents do not directly mention the issue of a required stock 
in a granary, the legal statute on filling each granary by the unit of one ji enforced the 
maintenance of minimum stock. As I mentioned above, the Cang lü stipulates that each 
section of the granary should contain one ji of grain, and it should be refilled after any 
distribution. If this regulation was well observed, it might have eventually resulted in 
keeping a certain amount of grain stable in the granary all the time. The statutes indicate 
that the unit amount of one ji is usually ten thousand shi of grain, but one ji was calculated  
differently in Yueyang  櫟陽 and Xianyang 咸陽, as twenty thousand shi and one hundred 
thousand shi, respectively.43 These amounts symbolized the wealth of Yueyang, capital of 
the state of Qin between 383 and 350 BCE, and Xianyang, the later capital of the Qin 
kingdom and empire, a boast indicating that these cities could maintain a larger amount of 
grain in their granaries. The unit amount of one ji in those two capitals seems to have been 
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 “Cang lü” slip no.27, Shuihudi Qin mu zhu jian zheng li xiao zu, Shuihudi Qin Mu Zhu Jian, 25–27. 
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planned based on population and the significance of the central granary to secure enough 
grain in these metropolitan areas. 
  Also, the central government supervised the local granaries by establishing an 
account reporting system. According to “The Statutes on Granaries,” county granaries were 
to report their store-register to the Minister of Finance (neishi 内史) when grain and hay 
entered the storage.44 Also, each county was to send their accounts to the Great Granary 
annually with a register of persons who had received rations as well as records of other 
expenses.45 Moreover, it is clearly indicated that when grain and hay of one ji were 
completely issued, and a surplus or shortage occurred, a report should be sent to the county 
court. Then the court would order the leading officials, who together had sealed the 
storehouse, to take part in examining so that they can report the figures to the court 
immediately.46 All of these records were directly presented to the central government, 
annually.  
 As each local administration was supposed to report the accounts of their granaries to 
the central administration, or the Minister of Finance, it was important for local 
administrators to record the flow of grains correctly, indicating the amount entered and 
expended as well as the remainders and the officials responsible in the process. During the 
Qin period, they already had a standardized reporting form. “The Statutes Concerning 
Checking” from Shuihudi indicates that the person who was involved in taking grain out as 
well as storing it in the granary should be recorded following the form of  “So and so many 
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 “Cang lü” slip no.28, Shuihudi Qin mu zhu jian zheng li xiao zu, Shuihudi Qin Mu Zhu Jian, 27  
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 “Cang lü” slip no.30, Shuihudi Qin mu zhu jian zheng li xiao zu, Shuihudi Qin Mu Zhu Jian, 27  
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shi of grain to/from granary X; the Granaries Overseer (cang se fu 倉啬夫) X, the Assistant 
(zuo 佐) X, the clerk (shi 史) X, the Storekeeper (bingren 禀人) X.”47 In particular, it was 
regulated to record annually the withdrawn amount of grain and the amount remaining in a 
storehouse following the regulated form, “So and so many shi of grain was issued from 
granary X, and so and so many shi of grain remained (某廥出禾若干石, 其餘禾若干石).”48  
 The identical form used for recording the amount of grain input, output, and 
remaining is observed in the Qin local administrative documents discovered in Liye in 
Hunan Province. Many fragments of bamboo slips contains information on the amount of 
grain issued from a certain storehouse (kuai 廥), the recipients, the officials who were 
involved in the process of issuing, and the person who checked if the amount was equal to 
the record. For example, the record written on slip number 800 from the sixth layer of Liye 
clearly followed the standardized form, indicating “One shi and two and a half dou of 
unhusked grain was issued from the storehouse of Jing on the day of xinmao of the second 
month in the thirty-first year. Granary Keeper (changshou 倉守) Wu, Clerk Jian, 
Storekeeper Tang withdrew…Prefectural Clerk (lingshi 令史) An checked that the amount 
is equal to the record.” (“徑廥粟 一石二斗半斗 卅一年二月辛卯倉守武史感禀人堂出…
令史犴視平…”49) The accounts regarding grain distribution to convict laborers commonly 
used the same format as the regulation shown above.  
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 Slip numbers 2  to 27 of the “Statutes on Granaries” from Shuihudi clearly shows 
that the process of entering and issuing was conducted by several persons together. It 
prescribes that when one ji of grain enters the granary, the granary gate should be sealed by 
the Prefectural Overseer (sefu 啬夫) or the Assistant (cheng 丞), and the Chief of Granaries 
(cang 倉) with the Chief of storehouses in the town (xiang 鄕) all together. Then, each 
granary unit was assigned to one official who was in charge of issuing. When the Overseer 
was dismissed, the granary should be opened by the controller, but it should be sealed again 
by several persons together after the remaining amount was checked against the record. In 
general, each granary unit was maintained by one assigned official, and he took charge of 
issuing grain until the grain was exhausted. If the official responsible for the unit was 
replaced by a new one, the remaining grain was to be recounted and compared to the record 
before the new official took charge of the unit.50  This accuracy, confirming the official 
responsible, was necessary for the rulers so they could pinpoint the person responsible for 
any loss and have them pay the penalty.       
 The regulation was well observed in the local granaries, as we can see from the 
administrative documents discovered at Liye. From the Liye documents, we can assume that 
the people at that time did not have a Granaries Overseer (cang se fu 倉啬夫) since it is 
observed that cangshou, xiangshou 鄕守,or guanshou 官守 substituted for the position of 
cang se fu in the process of issuing grain, and a lingshi (Prefectural Clerk) took charge of 
checking the amount of grain and the accounts. This practice also seems to have been 
followed in “Statutes for the Installation of Officials (zhili lü 置吏律),” saying that if the 
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Granary Overseer is absent, an aristocrat with no fault or a lingshi could substitute in the 
office.51  
  In addition to following this standardized format of reporting, recording specific 
items sorted by kind and quality was also required of local officials who prepared the 
account to present it to the central administration. For example, the statutes from slip 
numbers 33 to 36 of “The Statutes on Granaries” state that when the stock is counted and 
recorded in the books, legumes and millet should be counted separately; yellow, white, and 
green grains should be kept separate; and non-glutinous rice and glutinous rice should be 
distinguished.52 These regulations helped the central government recognize the condition of 
grain stocks specifically in terms of the kind and quality of grain stored in each county.  
 Moreover, the central government could observe whether the appropriate kind and 
amount of grain was given to the right person, as the Qin laws specifically regulated the 
amount and kind of grain officials were supposed to receive, which varied according to 
social status. For example, the surviving articles of the “Statutes on Food Rations at 
Conveyance Stations” (Zhuan shi lü 傳食律) discovered at Shuihudi clearly mention that 
messengers and officials who visit the county are served with different kinds of grain 
according to their ranks. According to the aristocratic ranks, different amounts of beimi 粺米 
and limi 糲米, which mean finely polished grain and roughly polished grain, respectively, 
were distributed.53 For this reason, it was significant for the local granaries to sort the grain 
according to kind and quality. The central government was also able to supervise the flow of 
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grain more precisely when the local officials reported the accounts with specific information 
following the rules of sorting. The existence of a reporting system with a standardized 
format demonstrates that the central government attempted to control the local granaries. 
This practice, seen in the Qin statutes, seems to have mostly succeeded, and was further 
developed by the Han administration. The accounts discovered on the site of Xuanquan zhi 
懸泉置 (Xuanquan Conveyance station) in Xiaogu 效穀 county of Dunhuang commandery, 
which will be discussed later in this chapter, confirm that different grains were sorted and 
counted separately during the Han period, as well.                
 The government regulated standardized measurements and converting formulas not 
only in order to obtain correct reports, but also to achieve accurate distribution. As I 
mentioned above, officials and messengers who visited the county conveyance station were 
served with different grain according to aristocratic rank. However, the terms of beimi and 
limi were very obscure since these indicate certain degrees of polishing. Therefore, the Qin 
statutes clearly define these terms using numerical measurements. For example, a fragment 
of a statute that when one shi and 6 and 2/3 dou is polished, it becomes one shi of limi 糲米 
(roughly polished rice); when one shi of limi is polished, it becomes nine dou of zanmi 鏨米 
(partly polished rice); when nine dou of zanmi is polished, it becomes eight dou of huimi 毁
米 (polished rice).54 
 Not only the polishing ratio, but also the conversion ratio of weight to volume was 
standardized in the Qin laws. Slip number 43 of the “Statutes on Granaries” defines one shi 
(in weight, nearly 30 kg) of untreated rice (dao 稻) as constituting twenty dou (about forty 
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liters)55 in volume; when pounded, this becomes ten dou of treated grain (mi 米); ten dou of 
refined grain (can 粲) becomes six and two-thirds dou of polished rice (huimi 毁米). Also, it 
defines fifteen dou of beans, peas, or hemp as equal to one shi in weight.56  
 All these regulations, such as establishing multiple layers of a checking system for 
the entering, storing, and issuing process, holding officials, and the standardized conversion 
ratio actually aimed to achieve one goal: to safeguard government property from 
embezzlement and misuse. For example, as I mentioned above, the “Statutes on Agriculture” 
(Tian lü 田律) prescribes that wood and matting should be completely removed from storage 
when the storage unit becomes empty.57 This regulation was aimed at preventing potential 
speculation as to whether there might be more grain left in the storage facility or hidden 
under the mat. The statute clarifying the official responsible and the penalty for abuse 
eventually worked to prevent potential corruption. The “Compilation of Questions and 
Answers” (Fa lü da wen 法律答問)” from Shuihudi explains the penalty that would befall 
the official responsible, lingshi (Scribe Director), for a case in which more than one shi of 
grain were discovered underneath the mat in the empty storehouse.58 The amount of grains 
that can be issued as seeds for sowing was also regulated. Per one mu 畝,59 for rice and hemp 
use two and two-thirds dou; for wheat and barley one dou; for millet and red beans two-
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thirds dou; for beans half a dou.60 We can say that this regulated amount of seeds, which can 
be interpreted as a kind of instruction or agricultural guideline, was actually aimed to 
prevent corruption and safeguard government property from abuse. 
 In the same context, in order to protect property from abuse, the Qin and the Han 
laws strictly and specifically regulate the amount and kind of grain distribution. Almost half 
of the laws on granaries discovered at Shuihudi describe regulations on the amount of 
rations given to convicts, officials, and messengers who could receive grain from the local 
granary during an official trip. The laborers varied according to their workload, gender, and 
age.61 We can see that the regulations on the rations are focused mostly on cases of giving 
food from the granary and the contingent punishment that the responsible officials should 
get if they were to give food to ineligible persons or distribute a larger amount to recipients. 
For example, slip number 45 of the “Statutes on Granaries” clarifies that a messenger who is 
on a trip to a military camp should bring food with him: he is not allowed to be given any 
from the county granary.62 The statutes also ensure that the official responsible should be 
punished according to the law when he gives convict laborers, who were involved in light 
workloads, more grain than the law prescribes.63 No regulation concerning distributing less 
than the prescribed amount to the recipients is seen. This feature of Qin law supports the 
assumption that the regulations were not for guaranteeing food rations to the laborers and 
officials, but for maintaining government property by preventing corruption. 
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3) Food Rations to Officials at Conveyance Stations 
 
 According to the “Statutes on Granary” from Shuihudi, there were regulations 
governing food rations given to the officials who were traveled on government business. 
The Han statutes from Zhangjiashan also contain regulations on food for officials who stay 
in the county’s conveyance station on an official trip. This section will deal with the statutes 
and administrative records concerning food served to officials who temporarily stayed in the 
local court in order to see the implementation of the legal statutes.  
 Since the Warring States period, each state established zhuan 傳 (or zhuanshe 傳舍, 
conveyance stations) where they provided board and lodging to the envoys from other states. 
During the Han period, zhuanshe or zhi 置 were established at the court of each county, not 
only to furnish room and board for officials and messengers, but also to feed the horses 
brought by these persons. Sometimes, the conveyance stations housed and cared for officials 
who were dispatched from the central government or other counties on extended matters.  
 The surviving articles of the the “Statutes on Food Rations at Conveyance Stations” 
(傳食律 Zhuan shi lü) discovered at Shuihudi as well as Zhangjiashan describe regulations 
concerning food rations for those who stayed in the zhuan of the Qin and the early Han 
period, respectively. The legal texts from Shuihudi describe the amount and kind of food 
rations given to messengers and officials, such as the subordinates (zuren 卒人) of the 
Secretary to the Imperial Counselor (yushi 御史),  messengers whose aristocratic ranks were 
bugeng (不更, 4th rank) and below, messengers whose rank was dafu (大夫, 5th rank) and 
above, the retinue of messengers, grooms, and those eunuchs who worked for the 
government, but did not hold official ranks. The statutes describe the food rations for the 
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officials and messengers who held lower statuses in detail, whereas they only mention that 
messengers whose rank were dafu and above are “fed according to their aristocratic ranks” (
爵食之). According to the Qin statutes, Qin officials and messengers were fed with different 
types and amounts of food based on their ranks and the jobs in the conveyance stations:64 
 
御史卒人使者, 食粺米半斗, 醬駟分升一, 采羹, 給之韭葱. 其有爵者,自官士大
夫以上,爵食之. 使者之從者, 食糲米半斗, 僕, 少半斗. (傳食律 180)65  
When a subordinates of the Secretary to the Imperial Counselor (yushi 御
史) goes on an official trip, [the conveyance station] provides him with 
half dou of beimi 粺米, finely polished grain, one quarter a sheng of 
fermented sauce, soup (made of meat, salt and vegetables), leeks and green 
onion per meal.  Those who possess higher ranks than dafu (5th rank) and 
guan dafu (官大夫, 6th rank), are fed according to their ranks. The 
retinues of the messenger are fed with half a dou of roughly polished grain, 
limi 糲米, and a groom with one third of a dou of roughly husked grain.66 
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不更以下到謀人, 粺米一斗, 醬 半升, 采羹, 芻稟各半石, 宦奄如不更.67 
From bugeng (4th rank) to mouren (某人, or zanniao 簪袅, 3rd rank), one 
dou of finely polished grain, beimi, a half sheng of fermented sauce, soup 
(made with meat, salt and vegetable), and a half sheng of hay and straw 
each (for horses). For eunuchs, same as that for Bugeng.       
上造以下到官佐∙史毋爵者, 及卜∙史∙司御∙寺∙府, 粺米一斗, 有菜羹, 
鹽卄二分升二.68 
From shangzao (上造, 2nd rank) and below till guanzuo 官佐 and shi 史 
who do not have ranks, and bu 卜, shi 史, siyu 司御, si 寺, fu 府, give 
them one dou of roughly husked grain, limi, soup (of meat, salt and 
vegetable) and two twenty-second sheng of salt.          
  
 However, the amount and kind of food rations seen in the Zhangjiashan statutes 
differ somewhat from those seen in the texts from Shuihudi. Unlike the Qin statutes which 
show the four different categories of food rations according to ranks, the statutes on food 
rations in the Zhuanshi lü from Zhangjiashan are related to the recipient’s  ob and situation, 
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not according to his rank. The Zhangjiashan statutes state that Han officials on official trips, 
or “chedafu 車大夫”, such as subordinates of Chancellor, Secretary to the Imperial 
Counselor and 2,000 shi officials, the dispatched officials from the central government, the 
newly appointed officials, those who are forced to move with the rank above the suowei and 
zuo, and the messengers who have urgent affairs from the military and the provincial 
government, received the same amount of food three times a day regardless of their rank or 
salary grade: 1/2 dou of highly polished grain, beimi 粺米, 1/4 sheng fermented sauce, and 
1/22 sheng of salt.69 Only the retinues (congzhe 從者) were supposed to get less food: 1/2 
dou of roughly husked grain, limi 糲米, and 1/22 sheng of salt. Compared to the Qin statutes 
from Shuihudi, the Han statutes from Zhangjiashan show less discrimination according to 
ranks, when the officials were on trips conducting government matters.      
 
丞相, 御史及諸二千石官使人, 若遣吏, 新爲官及屬尉, 佐以上微若遷
徒者, 及軍吏, 縣道有尤急言變事, 皆得爲傳食.  車大夫粺米半斗, 
參食, 從者糲米, 皆給草具. 車大夫醬四分升一, 鹽及從者人各廿二分
升一……食從者,二千石毋過十人, 千石至六百石毋過五人, 五百石以
下至二百石毋過二人, 二百石以下一人…70 
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Subordinates of the Chancellor, Secretary to the Imperial Counselor and 
2,000 shi officials, the dispatched officials from the central government, the 
newly appointed officials, those who are forced to move with the rank above 
the suowei and zuo, and the messengers who have urgent affairs from the 
military and the provincial government all can get food from the conveyance 
stations.  Chedafu (those people mentioned above) can get a half of highly 
polished grain, three times a day, the retinues get 1/2 dou of roughly husked 
grain, and all the horses of them are fed. Chedafu are given one fourth of 
fermented sauce, and each person down to retinues get 1/22 sheng of salt.  
…… For feeding their retinues,  2000 shi officials cannot feed more than ten 
members of an entourage, 1000 shi to 600 shi officials can feed not more than 
five, 500 to 200 shi officials feed not more than two, and 200 shi and below 
can feed only one follower.    
 
 Considering that the food ration for a convict laborer who was involved in heavy 
work was a half dou of unhusked millet (禾 he) per day and a soldier and male adult of the 
military family received 1 to 1.11 dou of unhusked millet per day,71 the regulated amount of 
food for traveling officials, a half dou of highly polished grain with fermented sauce as one 
meal among three meals a day (canshi 参食), is not a small amount.72 Actually, the ration 
distributed in the Conveyance stations was more than what the lower officials would have 
been able to eat based on their salaries. Therefore, low-ranking officials whose salaries were 
not even enough to feed themselves and their family ate better meals, in terms of the amount 
of grain, during trips, if they were fed at conveyance stations according to the statutes. 
                                                 
71
 Shuihudi Qin mu zhu jian zheng li xiao zu, Shuihudi Qin Mu Zhu Jian, 32–33; Loewe, Records of Han 
Administration., vol. 2, 68. 
 
72
 The meaning of canshi is controversial.  While the editors of the Zhangjia shan slips interpret it as three 
meals a day, the editors of the Shuihudi qin jian previously explain this as 1/3 dou. See Shuihudi Qin mu zhu 
jian zheng li xiao zu, Shuihudi Qin Mu Zhu Jian, 33–34; Zhangjiashan, Zhangjiashan Han Mu Zhu Jian, 40. 
Yun, Suhoji Jinmyojukgan Yeokju, 121–122. 
 42 
 
 However, this does not mean the statutes were established to guarantee good food for 
officials and messengers who were on trips required for government matters. Rather, as I 
mentioned, they were likely designed to protect against the abuse of government property. 
According to “The Statutes on Granaries” from the site of Shuihudi, if an official or a 
messenger who is dispatched from the central government to the province was already given 
their monthly portion of food from his commandery, he cannot receive the food from the 
zhuanshe.73 This was to prevent double disbursement. Also, if the travelers were on military 
business, or they were traveling to a subordinate county of the commendary (jun) where they 
were from, they also did not receive food from the zhuanshe, but had to supply it 
themselves.74 In other words, an official dispatched by a jun of which he is a resident to 
another county within the jun cannot ask for food in the county’s Conveyance station by 
law. This may have been to protect against abuse from officials who were sent from a higher 
governing unit. 
 The Zhuanshi lü from the site of Zhangjiashan also goes into great detail in stating 
the restrictions and the conditions of the recipients, clarifying the penalty. The statutes limit 
the size of retinue of officials receiving rations according to salary grade and rank: 2000 shi 
officials cannot feed more than ten members of an entourage, 1000 shi to 600 shi officials 
can feed not more than five, 500 to 200 shi officials feed not more than two, and 200 shi and 
below can feed only one follower.75 Also, it restricts the length of time that the officials and 
his retinue can be served with cooked food in the Conveyance stations. If they stay more 
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 “Cang l ” slip no.44, Shuihudi Qin mu zhu  ian zheng li xiao zu, Shuihudi Qin Mu Zhu Jian, 30. 
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 “Cang l ” slip no.45, Ibid., 3 .  
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 “Zhuanshi l ” slip no.235-6, Zhangjiashan, Zhangjiashan Han Mu Zhu Jian, 40. 
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than ten days, they were supposed to cook for themselves with the given grain. If they just 
stay in the region without doing any business, which maybe means if they pass through the 
region, they could not be served more than two meals.76 The statutes say that if the rules are 
violated, for example, if ineligible people, officials with excessive numbers of attendants, or 
travelers with personal affairs received food in the Conveyance stations, everything they ate 
should be counted as stolen goods and they should be regarded as robbers. If they used the 
horses and the food improperly, they should pay the average cost in cash.77  
 While the Zhuanshi lü from Shuihudi and Zhangjiashan describe the established 
rules on what and how officials travelling on business should be served, the bamboo slips 
discovered from the site of Xuanquan zhi (懸泉置, Xuanquan Conveyance station) in 
Xiaogu 效穀 county of Dunhuang commandery give a clearer picture of what and how 
officials actually ate at the zhuanshe. The Xuanquan zhi, an important post for foreign 
relations with the northwest in Dunhuang, seems to have been established around 116-111 
BCE under emperor Wu and abolished at the end of Eastern Han.78 From the fragmentary 
account written and submitted by the chuse (廚嗇 Kitchen Supervisor) we can see that food 
was given to roughly more than 110  messengers, military officials, envoys and revenues 
who stayed there or passed by while traveling to the west and east.79 They generally had one 
to three meals at a stay.   
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 “Zhuanshi l ” slip no.234, Ibid.  
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 “Zhuanshi l ” slip no.230, Zhang iashan, Zhangjiashan Han Mu Zhu Jian, 39–4 .  Oh, “Janggasan Han 
Gan <Yi Nyeon Lyul Lyeong> Jeon Sik Lyul 張家山漢簡 <二年律令> 傳食律(228簡-238簡).” 
 
78
 Hu and Zhang, Dunhuang Xuanquan Han jian shi cui, 2. 
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 Ibid., 148–9. The number of recipients excludes the cases of the distribution to 300 xingshi 形士 at the 
stay of the party of Marquis of Changluo 長羅侯. The document says that they released 28 shi and eight dou of 
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 According to the records, the regulated policies from Zhuanshi lü, such as the 
maximum number of meals and the restriction on the number of eligible attendants were 
well observed in regards to the food that was served; however, there are several 
discrepancies in the records from Xuanquan when compared to the Shuihudi and 
Zhangjiashan statutes. First, the ration of grains was less than the amount that was 
prescribed in the statutes.  According to the Zhuanshi lü from both Shuihudi and 
Zhangjiashan, even the attendants were supposed to receive at least a half dou, or five sheng 
of polished grain.  The amount of food prescribed in the statutes is regulated differently 
according to rank or status. However, the Xuanquan slips show that the food recipients from 
the posts mostly had three, sometimes four sheng (or 0.3 and 0.4 dou) of grain. (see Table 2)  
 Also, in terms of the kind of grain, the Zhuanshi lü mentions grains according to the 
degree of polishing, finely polished grain, beimi 粺米 and roughly polished grain, limi 糲米, 
whereas the Xuanquan records mostly use two different species of grain, su 粟, various 
millets, and mi 米, rice. The two characters of su and mi are sometimes interpreted as 
unhusked and husked grain, but in this record it would be more reasonable to see than as 
indicating two different kind of grain for two reasons. First, according to the Cang lü from 
Shuihudi, the book keeper should record the amount of grains separately according to the 
species, not according to the degree of polishing.80 Second, in addition to the two characters 
su and mi, the Xuanquan record contains the character of mai 麥, which indicates a specific 
                                                                                                                                                      
rice to the Chief of an official’s courier station Fengde and  the Assistant for the Supervisor of Field Xuan, to 
feed three hundred xingshi. As the Chief of an official’s courier station and the Assistant for the supervisor 
belonged to the xian, it seems that xingshi means the local residents who worked as guards or policemen to 
ensure the security of the villages and the courier stations during the stay of the party of Changluo hou.  This 
shows that the chuanshe also fed the local staffs of xingshi, maybe temporary position, with grain and soybean 
paste during the special event of Changluo hou’s visiting.  
 
80
 “Cang l ” slip no. 33, 34, 35,Shuihudi Qin mu zhu jian zheng li xiao zu, Shuihudi Qin Mu Zhu Jian, 25; 
Yun, Suhoji Jinmyojukgan Yeokju , 104–107. 
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species, wheat.81  There is no reason to believe that su and mi indicate unhusked and husked 
grain, but two different grains. Therefore, we can say that they distributed two actual 
different species of grains unlike in the statutes from Shuihudi and Zhangjiashan. 
 The statutes also clarify that different types and amounts of food that should be given 
according to the rank, job or status of an individual, but the account shows that there was no 
actual discrimination among the messengers, attendants and slaves. Also, it seems that there 
were no significant differences in terms of the social and political ranks between the 
recipients who were served with millet and those who were given rice in Xuanquan. For 
example, a “pass holder”, or a messenger, and his attendant received the same amount (0.3 
sheng) of millet four times (no. 5). Even a noble’s wife and her three slaves were all given 
same amount of rice (no.86).82    
 
 
Table 2. Food Ration and Recipients from Xuanquan slips 
 
Recipients (ranks) Food Amount 
(dou) 
No. of 
recipients 
No. of 
meal 
Amount(dou) 
/person/meal 
Assistant of Liquan xian, Dan 
Men an (doushi) and one 
Attendant 
Millet 2.4 2 4 0.3 
Jincheng Yun Wuwei Luojian 
and one attendant 
Rice 1.2 2 2 0.3 
The wife of Jincheng Qi yang 
Chang zhang jun and three 
slaves 
Rice 1.2 4 1 0.3 
M ssenger of Da yue shi and 
others 
Millet 1.8 6 1 0.3 
Soushu Gaobou..? Millet 0.6 1 2 0.3 
                                                 
81
 Slip no. 180, Hu and Zhang, Dunhuang Xuanquan Han jian shi cui, 130. 
 
82
 Ibid., 73–74. 
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Three messengers Millet 2.4 3 2 0.4 
Messengers and others ? ? 3 1 0.4 
? Millet 6.3 7 3 0.3 
? ? ?2.4 2 4 0.3 
Hu Qian du li Lixiang  and 
servant 
Rice 0.8 2 ? ? 
Zhu qian shi Li Xiang and 
one attendant 
Rice
83 0.6 2 ? ? 
Two of the leaders of Qiang 
tribe 
Pork 10 jin    
Suo shuJia..and Marquis of 
Xihan 
Millet 1.8  Total  
6 
0.3 
 
  
 The same lack of discrimination can also be found in the records of chicken 
purchases and expenditures from Dunhuang, which shows how many chickens were 
acquired and served to each official who visited the post in Xianquan county in Dunhuang 
during 62 BCE (no.113-131, Table 3).84 Based on these documents, table 3 shows the 
recipient’s official position, the number of the meals and the number of chickens they had in 
this Conveyance station. The visitors ranged widely and were mid to low ranking officials 
from 100 shi to 1,000 shi. However, regardless of their rank, they were equally served with 
one chicken per meal, except the Senior Scribe on slip no.113, who was served with two 
chickens at a meal. Although no statute on meat distribution at zhuanshe has yet been 
discovered, the Xuanquan records clearly show that meat, such as chicken and pork (rou, 肉
) were served to certain groups of officials or messengers. However, given the surviving 
                                                 
83
 with one jin of pork 
 
84
 This is the record from January to December 14th in the 4th year of Yuankang (元康四年). Hu and 
Zhang, Dunhuang Xuanquan Han jian shi cui, 77–80. 
 47 
 
textual sources, it is impossible to find any pattern or rules regarding the recipients, amounts 
or circumstances of the foods they were given except the trend that there was less 
discrimination based on rank in the amount of meat given those who were served meat. 
 
 
Table 3. Registration of chicken expenditure and acquisition in Xuanquan, Dunhuang in 62 BCE. 
 
Slip No. Documents illustrated 
113 Expended one brace (雙) of chicken for one meal for Senior Scribe in the east hall. 
114 Expended one brace of chicken for two meals for Attendant of Messenger Wang 
staying overnight in the east hall. 
115 Expended two braces of chickens for four meals for Clerk of the Superintendent of 
Agriculture Tien during the round trip in the east hall. 
116 Expended one brace of chicken for two meals for Clerk of the Counselor-in-chief Fan 
during the round trip in the east hall. 
117 Expended two braces of chickens for two meals for Senior Scribe during the round 
trip in the east hall. 
118 Expended one chicken for one meal for Palace Physician Wan Qiu in the east hall. 
119 Expended one brace of chicken for one meal for Attendant Official of Regional-
inspector and one Retainer clerk of the Regional-inspector in the east hall. 
120 Expended one brace of chicken for two meals for the Clerk of the Superintendent of 
Agriculture Feng during the round trip in the east hall. 
121 Expended one chicken for one meal for the Messenger Mr.Wang in the east hall. 
122 Acquired two braces of chickens on October 27th.  Assistant Zhang Fu received from 
the court. 
123 Acquired one brace of chicken on October 10th.  Kitchen Supervisor Mr. Shi 
received from the Clerk of the Wu Qiong neighborhood. 
124 Acquired one brace of chicken on December 9th.  Kitchen Supervisor Mr. Shi 
received when he met the Assistant of the Yu Li Township. 
125 From October 12th to December 14th stored three braces of chickens buying myself 
with 240 coins.  The County supplied 80 braces of chickens. 
126  Registration of chicken's expenditure and acquisition in Xian Quan County from 
October to December 14th. 
127 No chicken in September 
128 No chicken at present 
129  In sum, 40 braces of chickens.  From January to December 14th, we received 28 
braces of chickens from the county.  From January to December 14th, we paid 1215 
coins to buy 31 chickens by ourselves 
130  Registration of chicken's expenditure and acquisition in Xian Quan County from 
January to December 14th in 62 BCE. 
131 In December 15th, Xian Quan Kitchen Supervisor dare to speak that I sincerely 
transmit a volume of chicken registration from January to December 14th. I dare to 
speak. 
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Table 4. Chicken Expenditure
85
 
 
slip 
no. 
Recipient 
no. of 
person 
no. of 
chickens 
no. of 
meals 
no. of 
chicken 
/person, 
meal 
Salary 
grade 
(shi) 86 
113 長史君 Senior Scribe 1 2 1 2 1,000 
114 使者王君 Messenger Wang 1 2 2 1  
115 
大司農卒史田卿 
Clerk of the Superintendent of 
Agriculture Tian 
1 4 4 1 100 
116 丞相史范卿 
Clerk of the Counselor-in-chief Fan 
1 2 2 1 1,000 
117 長史君 Senior Scribe 1 4 4 1 1,000 
118 太醫萬秋 Palace Physician Wan 
Qiu 
1 1 1 1 600 
119 
刺史 Attendant Official of 
Regional-inspector, 
 
從事史一人 One Retainer clerk of 
the Regional-inspector  
2 2 1 1 
600 
 
100 
120 
大司農卒史馮卿 
Clerk of the Superintendent of 
Agriculture Feng 
1 2 2 1 100 
121 使者王君 Messenger Mr.Wang 1 1 1 1  
 
  
 In addition to these ordinary distributions, there were special circumstances of food 
distribution which are not addressed in the statutes, including food that was given to the 
Marquis of Changluo (長羅侯 changluo hou) and his staff and for the leaders of the Qiang 
羌 tribe.  According to the Xuanquan record, before 61 BCE the conveyance station gave the 
                                                 
85 
This chart is based on the record of Dunhuang bamboo slip in Ho, Dunhuang Xianquan, 77-80. 
 
86 Charles Hucker, A dictionary of official titles in imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1985),112,528; Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 8,11,60,90,92. 
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Marquis of Changluo, Changhui 常惠, and his attached staff an exceptionally large amount 
of food.87 They were given five lambs, three shi of yeast, ten fish, one shi and two dou of 
soybean malt for making soybean paste, twenty-one chickens, 180 jin of beef, four dou of 
millet for making soup, twenty shi of liquor and forty-eight shi of rice in order to serve the 
Marquis, officials, military clerks, patrols and other staffs.88 According to the record, except 
for the chicken, beef, millet, rice and liquor which were prepared by the Conveyance station, 
the county supplied the lamb, yeast, fish, soybean malt and additional liquor for this special 
group of people. The items the Conveyance station received from the county were mostly 
used up except for the soybean malt.89 In another record, the Conveyance station of 
Xuanquan bought ten jian of meat with sixty qian in order to serve two heads of the Qiang 
tribe. These records indicate that Conveyance stations in Dunhuang served special groups of 
envoys with special food, which are not addressed in the Shuihudi and Zhangjiashan strips. 
 From the comparison of the statutes from Shuihudi and Zhangjiashan and actual 
records of food distribution from Xuanquan, we can see how imperial ideology based on 
hierarchical discrimination was supported by the legal statutes, but that there were 
significant discrepancies between these statutes and the actual distribution of food at the 
conveyance station in Dunhuang. First, the statutes regulated both the quality and amount of 
grain given to individuals, but at Xuanquan, no one was actually given the amount of grain 
prescribed in the statutes. Perhaps, this was acceptable under the law if they generally 
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The eighteen slips (no.61-no.78) are the register of food served to the Marquis of Changluo, Changhui 常
惠 and the attached staff.  Chang Hui was enabled as Changluo Hou in 70 BCE.  He was deeply engaged in the 
problems of foreign relations with people in northwest. In either 64 or 60 Chang Hui was sent on a mission to 
escort a Chinese princess who was intended to be the bride of a future leader of Wusun.  see Michael Loewe, A 
Biographical Dictionary of the Qin, Former Han and Xin Periods, 221 BCE - AD 24 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 25-
26.  
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 Hu and Zhang, Dunhuang Xuanquan Han jian shi cui, 148–150. 
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 The record says, “three dou of soybean malt remained” after this event.   
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understood that the statutes were intended to protect the property of government rather to 
ensure the food supply for those who worked for the government. Even though there were 
some special occasions of serving special food to certain parties, food distributed in the 
conveyance stations never exceeded the amount or quality of grain established by the 
statutes.  Second, when officials and messengers were served in the conveyance station, 
there was no discrimination according to rank or job. Whereas the statutes prescribe 
different treatment based on bureaucratic or aristocratic ranks, the Xuanquan records prove 
that there was no such discrimination in the actual distribution of food in amount and kind. 
Every member of one party was given the same amount and kind of grain.  When the 
conveyance station fed the officials with chickens, there was no difference in the amount of 
chicken given to those holding different ranks. 
 There existed discordance between the ideology of the government, as manifested in 
the statutes, and their implementation shown in the practice of food rations in the officials’ 
conveyance station. The Qin and Han rulers tried to establish their ideal social order by 
enacting discriminatory laws based on ranks. The actual implementation of food distribution 
at Xuanquan, however does not show any of these discriminatory practices actually taking 
place.  
 
4) Food Rations for Convicts and Bondservants 
 
 A large part of the “Statutes on Granaries” from Shuihudi tomb no.    is about the 
food rations for convict laborers who were sentenced to work for the government during the 
Qin period. Since the legal tradition of the Han was generally inherited from the Qin, the 
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Shuihudi Qin laws are an important source for the regulations on food rations for convicts 
laborers not only during the Qin, but also during the Han period.  
 During the Qin and Han periods, there were several groups of convict laborers, 
categorized according to their penalty. The heaviest of the hard labor punishments was that 
of the “Tattooed Wall-Dawn” (qing chengdan 黥城旦) or, for women, “Grain Pounder” 
(qing chong 黥舂). They were generally sentenced to five or six years. The next group was 
the “Intact Wall-Dawn” (wan chengdan 完城旦) or, for women, “Intact Grain Pounder” 
(wan chong 完舂). They served four years.  All these groups could also be shaved, tattooed, 
or mutilated. The next group of hard labor convicts were sentenced for three years as 
“Gatherers of Firewood for the Sprits” (guixin 鬼薪), and their female counterparts, the 
“Sifters of White Grain” (baican 白粲). One degree lower again were the “Shaved 
Bondservants” and “Shaved Bondwomen” (nai li chen 耐隷臣 and nai li qie 耐隷妾) for 
three years. “Shaved Robber-Guard” (nai sikou 耐司寇) for women and “Work like Robber-
Guard” (zuo ru sikou 作如司寇) were the next group, and they were to be sentenced for two 
years. The last two groups were the “Forced Labor” (fu zuo 復作)for both male and female 
who worked three months to one year, and the “Frontier Labor Fine” (shu fazuo 戍罰作) 
sentence of one month to one year for men.90        
 These titles indicating the work they were involved in, like “Grain Pounder” and 
“Gatherers of Firewood for the Spirits,” had already become meaningless by the Qin period.  
Except for a few amnestied convicts who joined the frontier defense force, convicts of all 
grades often worked together in China on public works projects or in factories for the state. 
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 Anthony J Barbieri-Low, Artisans in Early Imperial China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2007), 228–9. 
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For example, hard-labor convicts worked on building roads, digging canals, preparing 
imperial tombs, building the Great Wall, transporting army provisions, and toiling in state 
mines or in government iron bureaus. Female convicts also could be condemned to hard 
labor, but their tasks were different – to hull and sift grain.91 A group of documents titled 
“Registers of convict laborers performing their tasks” (zuotubu 作徒簿) discovered at Liye 
describe the details of the day-to-day work  the convict laborers were involved in under the 
supervision of officials at Qianling 遷陵 County in the Dongting 洞庭 Commandery of Qin. 
For example, it says that “wall-builders” were forced to repair suits of armor, overhaul the 
cart, or gear up the wagon, and “grain pounders” were to weave the silk on the yiyou 乙酉 
day of the eighth month in the 29
th
 year (218 BCE).92 
 
  
 “Convicts” (tu 徒 or xingtu 刑徒) were of the lowest status, with “slaves” (nubi 奴碑
), in Qin and Han society. These two groups are frequently mentioned together in historical 
documents because they were treated similarly if they were involved in the same public 
works or another construction project. However, convicts were those who were sentenced to 
servitude for a definite period of time, whereas slaves were those who served for life. 
Usually, convicts were sentenced to hard labor for one to six years even though some were 
sentenced as much as 12 years. Convicts were treated very similarly to, or worse than, 
government slaves during their sentence, but, if they could survive their sentence, they were 
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 A.F.P. Hulsewé, “Ch’in and Han Law,” in The Cambridge History of China. vol. 1, Edited by Denis 
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 Slip no.8-686, Hunan sheng wenwu Kaogu yanjiusuo 湖南省文物考古研究所, ed., Liye Qin Jian, 98; 
Maxim  orolkov, “Convict labor in the Qin Empire: A preliminary study on the ‘Registers of convict laborers’ 
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freed and became commoners when the term was completed.93 In spite of the differences 
between the two groups, since they were often involved in the same work, it is still 
controversial to identify some terms and the nature of the status as “bondservants” (lichen 
隷臣) and “bondwomen” (liqie 隷妾). Thus, it is not clear whether these terms indicated 
sentenced criminals or hereditary bondservants.94 However, no matter what their status was, 
in terms of food distribution, unless they were loaned to commoners, convicts, and 
governmental slaves were all fed by the government by the law as we can see from the 
articles from “The Statutes on Granaries” from Shuihudi.95   
 According to Cang lü, food rations were distributed two different ways: a grain 
ration given monthly or a ration of porridge twice a day. Grain was distributed once a month 
to those who worked for the government (cong shi gong從事公) according to the work 
load, age, and gender, whereas cooked grain, perhaps in the form of porridge, was 
distributed to feed (shi 食) those who were engaged in hard labor for construction, according 
to workload. For example, “bondservants” (lichen 隷臣) and “bondwomen” (liqie 隷妾) 
were supposed to receive rations of two shi and one and a half shi of unhusked grain (he 禾 ) 
per month, respectively, if they were engaged to work at the court; if they did not work for 
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 Even though convicts were guaranteed their freedom once the sentence period ended, they were not 
superior in status to slaves. It seems that convicts were treated as men who deserved to die. Usually they had to 
work clad in a felon’s dress, often shackled and with shaven heads, sometimes even tattooed on the face or 
shoulder. C. Martin Wilbur, Slavery in China During the Former Han Dynasty, 206 B.C.-A.D. 25, (New York: 
Russell & Russell, 1967), 41. 
 
94
 Robin D.S. Yates, “Bureaucratic Organization of the Qin County of Qianling 遷陵 in the Light of the 
Newly Published Liye Qin jian (yi) and Liye Qin jiandu jiaoshi (diyi  uan),” a paper presented at the Fourth 
International Conference on Sinology, June 20-22, 2012, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan. 
 
95
 “In case commoners wish to borrow bond-women who are not yet employed and who are clothed and 
fed by the government, they are to be loaned; they are to be clothed and fed by them. The officials will in every 
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the court, they could not receive rations from the government.96 “Small Wall-Dawn” (xiao 
chengdan 小城旦) and “Small Bondservants” (xiao lichen 小隷臣) who were not fully five 
feet and five inches (c. 1.50 m) received one and a half shi of unhusked grain regardless of 
the workload if they worked at the court, whereas one shi was given when they were not 
engaged in court work. The rations for their female counterparts, “Small Bondwomen” (xiao 
liqie 小隷妾) and “Small Grain Pounder” (xiao chong 小舂 ) whose height is five feet and 
two inches (1.43m) were one and a quarter shi of unhusked grain if they worked in the 
yamen and one shi if they did not work. Infants who have no mother or whose mother is 
assigned to work for the government received a half shi of grain per month. “Grain 
Pounders” received one and a half shi monthly.97 
 However, “Wall Builders” (chengdan 城旦) and others, such as “Grain Pounders,” 
“Grain Pounder Robber Guards” (chong sikou 舂司寇) and “Sifters of White Grain,” who 
worked to build the Great Wall or a similar project with a similar workload, were supposed 
to receive food twice a day in different amounts according to their gender: for men a half 
dou in the morning and one-third dou in the evening (for a total of 5/6 dou daily); for 
women one-third dou each in the morning and evening (for a total of 2/3 dou). If a “Wall 
Builder” worked as a guard, he received the same as women, one-third dou per meal.98 
According to the statutes, the government “fed” (shi食) these hard laborers involved in 
construction work twice a day. It seems that the form of grain the hard-labor convicts 
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97 Hulsewé, Remnants of Ch’in Law, 3   Shuihudi Qin Mu Zhu Jian, 32. 
 
98 Hulsewé, Remnants of Ch’in Law,  7:32–33; Shuihudi Qin Mu Zhu Jian, 33–34. 
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received was not grain, like that received by those who worked for the government, but 
cooked grain or porridge.  
  If we assume that their daily ration of food was grain, like it was for others who 
worked for the government, the total amount of their ration per month could amount to more 
than that given to ordinary convicts – two and a half shi for men, two shi for women – which 
would be enough to survive.99 However, as a form of cooked grain or porridge, it could 
increase to at least three times or more in capacity. This means the dietary condition of hard 
labor convicts depended on the degree of thinness of the porridge. If they received food by 
cooking with a reasonable amount of water, the actual grain amount they consumed was 
about a third of what other convict workers in the court had, but if they added much water, it 
could be less than 10%. In any case, it would be easy to understand if we remind ourselves 
that the daily food the hard-working convict laborers received as cooked grain or porridge 
was about double the amount for those who were sentenced “to starve” with a ration of one-
third dou per day.100  
If the distributed cooked grain was prepared properly with a reasonable amount of 
water, the overall dietary condition would have not been so severe as to endanger survival. 
However, literature and archaeological remains show a different picture. Cai Yong (蔡邕 
132-192), a scholar and later a hard labor convict in 159 CE, wrote about the starvation of 
the convict laborers, saying, “because of the freezing and starvation, the number of those 
who did not survive to live out their fated years was very great.”  ong Rong (孔融153-208), 
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 Moonsil Lee, “Dietary Conditions and Differential Access to Food Resources among the Various 
Classes during the Han Period” (University of Pittsburgh, 2004), 50–54. Hulsewé, R m       f C ’   L w  32–
33. 
 
100 Hulsewé, Remnants of Ch’in Law,34  Shuihudi Qin Mu Zhu Jian, 34–35. 
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a high official at the end of the Eastern Han, also mentioned the high mortality rate of 
convict laborers caused by malnutrition, accident, and disease.101  
 The possibility of thinning the porridge and giving less food can be supported by two 
clues from the statutes. First, the statutes say, “When feeding chengdan (Wall Builders) by 
the day, at the end of the month one takes the surplus to serve as rations for the later ninth 
month.”102 This means the court could have a surplus of grain after they fed the convicts, 
even following the regulated daily amount. In order to make more surplus, they could make 
thin porridge, which was not against the law. Second, according to the law, “Those who are 
ill will be fed in consideration of the circumstances, letting the officials decide.”103 
Therefore, the official who was in charge of feeding those who were sick was not violating 
the law even if he reduced or stopped feeding them. So far, no statute that mentions a 
penalty for officials who distributed less than the stipulated amount of food to the convicts 
has been found, whereas the statutes expressly forbid giving them too much food: “For 
increasing their food when the chengdan perform easy tasks, the officials in charge will be 
judged according to the statute on infringing the ordinances.”104 The possibility that officials 
could provide less food than expected without breaking the law could explain the high 
mortality rate at the convict workers’ camp. 
 This can be supported by the fragments of court accounts discovered in the Liye 
documents, which show that convict laborers actually received a lesser amount of rations 
than the regulation stipulated. Since many of the records are missing fragments containing 
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 Yan Kejun, Quan shanggu, 1:852, 1:924; Barbieri-Low, Artisans in Early Imperial China, 241. 
 
102  Hulsewé, Remnants of Ch’in Law,33  Shuihudi Qin Mu Zhu Jian, 34. 
 
103  Hulsewé, Remnants of Ch’in Law,32  Shuihudi Qin Mu Zhu Jian, 33. 
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 “Cang l ” slip no. 5 , Shuihudi Qin Mu Zhu Jian, 34. 
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significant characters, it is hard to generalize or theorize the reality of grain distribution. 
Fortunately, several perfectly preserved records on the grain ration to “adult bondwomen” 
(daliqie 大隷妾) suggest that there were discordances between the statutes and their 
implementation, particularly in the aspect of the distributed amount. The wooden slips 
numbered 760, 762, 763, 766, 1557, and 2249 contain the name of the issuing storehouse, 
the amount and kind of grain, the date of distribution, the officials responsible for the 
granary, the inspector, the convict’s name and sentence. From the readable slips, it is 
detected that in the 31
st
 year of Yingzheng’s reign (r. 24 -210 BCE), 216 BCE, unhusked 
grain, su 粟, was distributed to several daliqie or liqie. Multiple officials were involved in 
the process of issuing, and a lingshi was in charge of inspection, as the legal codes from the 
“Statutes on Granaries” prescribe. However, the recorded amount each bondwoman received 
was not one and a half shi, or one shi and five dou, as in the statutes, but one shi and two and 
a half dou or less (see Table 5). Even though this is not according to regulation, there seems 
to be no penalty applied to the officials who were involved in the process of distribution. In 
addition to the case of these bondwomen, we can find a slip record that a “Small 
Bondservant” (xiao lichen 小隷臣) named yi 益 received two dou of unhusked grain (no. 
1551) even though the Qin law discovered in Shuihudi prescribes one and a half shi (or 
fifteen dou) of unhusked grain regardless of the workload if the convict worked at court, and 
one shi (or ten dou) when a convict was not engaged in court work.105 Nevertheless, the 
officials who were involved in this issuing did not experience any problem or penalty for not 
observing the rule. In fact, we have not found any statute naming a penalty for a case of 
giving too little, while there are several laws naming the penalty for giving too much grain.  
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  Shuihudi Qin Mu Zhu Jian, 32–33. 
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Table 5. Distributed grain to bondwomen from Liye documents 
 
Slip no. Date  
(31
st
 year) 
Grain Recipient Amount 
760 3
rd 
month 
Bingyin day 
su 粟 
 
daliqie 大隷妾 X 1 shi 2 ½ dou 
762 12
th
 month 
Wuxu day 
su  daliqie yuan 援 1 shi 2 ½ dou 
763 3
rd
 month 
Guichou day 
su  daliqie bing 并 1 shi 2 ½ dou 
766 11
th
 month 
Bingchen day 
su  daliqie shi 始 1 shi 2 1/3dou 
1557 4
th
 month 
Wuzi day 
su  liqie隷妾 lian 廉 1 shi 2 1/15dou  
2249 2
nd
 month 
Jichou day 
su  liqie yuan 援 1 shi 2 ½ dou 
  
 In fact, there is an article regarding the reduction of rations for convict laborers. An 
article from “The Statutes on Currency” (Jinbu lü 金布律) says “when bondservants or 
bondwomen lose government tools or cattle, as from that date their issues of clothing and 
food are to be decreased, but not more than one-third is to be taken” (no. 77-78).106 With the 
fact that the bondwomen of Liye generally received 2.5 dou less, or one-sixth of the 
regulated amount, we can assume that possibly they received the reduction of their rations 
because they lost government tools or cattle. However, it is doubtful that every bondwoman 
in this record was involved in the incident of losing government property, and the 
government, therefore, decreased the overall rations. Moreover, from the Liye slips I cannot 
find any mention of the compensation withdrawn from their ration. Therefore, I can say that 
it seems that giving a smaller amount of rations than the regulation called for was not 
considered contravention of the law in the Qin legal system. Considering that it was legally 
acceptable to give less, it is reasonable to say that the highly-detailed articles on the issue of 
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the amount of food rations given to the convict labors were designed not to guarantee a 
certain amount of rations be supplied to the convicts but to suggest the maximum limit that 
the administration was allowed to disburse to them. This can be understood in the same 
context as the state’s effort to prevent the abuse of government property by enforcing the 
law for managing the government granaries as well as the rations at the conveyance stations.  
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II. Salaries, Rations and Gifts: Ideology of Food Redistribution  
 
“The ancient kings hated any disorder and hence established the rules of 
proper conduct, li, and justice to divide the people, to cause them to have the 
classes of poor and rich, of noble and inferior.”107 
 
 Li 禮 “propriety,” one of the key Confucian concepts, aims for the distinction of 
members of society according to their position and status. In ancient China, the social order 
based on li was highly respected in order to establish the ideal society, emphasizing not only 
the proper conduct of individuals, but also the right treatment of them. To maintain a stable 
state, lords were expected to demonstrate “expertise in providing clear principles for the 
orderly disposition of the people,”108 following the notion of li. 
 The salaries and rations that were part of food redistribution system of the Han also 
embody the concept of li by emphasizing distinctive treatment. The distinction of the 
classes, or the virtue of li, was realized in the scale of salary, which was given the half in 
grain and the other half in cash; and the system eventually resulted in huge differences of 
economic condition between the highest and the lowest officials. The examination of the 
salary charts in historical literature, such as the Shi ji 史記 and the Han shu 漢書, shows that 
the lower-ranking officials found it hard to live on their petty salaries while officials in high 
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positions received a more than adequate salary.109 Even though there were some adjustments 
to salary levels throughout the Han period, the overall structure of the salary system, which 
resulted in the poverty of lower ranking officials and large salary inequalities between the 
higher and lower officials, remain unchanged. Despite lower-ranking officials being unable 
to live on their government salaries, the highly discriminatory system was purposely 
maintained as a means of realizing the concept of proper treatment.  
 Benhabib and Przeworski mention that democracy cannot be sustained if 
redistribution is insufficient for the poor or excessive for the rich, and if no redistribution 
simultaneously satisfies the poor and the wealthy.110 The relationship between “fair” 
redistribution and political stability is an important matter not only for contemporary 
democracy, but also for any society, including ancient China. Considering the issue of food 
redistribution system in the context of political stability, the Han redistribution system 
through salaries seems to have been far from the ideal of satisfying all people of various 
statuses or caring for lower-ranking officials. Nevertheless, it has not been observed that the 
unsatisfying redistribution system which caused such inequality and the financial stress of 
lower-ranking officials threatened the structure of the Han government. How did the 
massive Han bureaucracy remain stable despite this problematic system and why was it not 
reformed even though the emperor knew of the economic problem of lower-rank officials?111 
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 I define the scope of lower-level officials as those who were below 600 shi of salary grade, following 
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who suffered from low income.  For example, in 48 and 44 BCE, Emperor Yuan（元帝, r. 48-33 BCE）who 
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What kind of supplementary redistribution system did the ruler use to make up for the 
deficiency caused by the salary system which was based on the ideal order of li? 
In order to answer to these questions, in addition to examining the regular salary 
system for officials, I propose to pay attention to the alternative salary system for military 
officers and their families on the frontier as well as irregular food distribution in the form of 
imperial gifts. These two supplementary systems worked to satisfy lesser military officials 
by guaranteeing food for the family in addition to the regular salary, and for supporting the 
low-rank bureaucratic officials by providing additional sources to feed their family as a 
means of displaying the emperor’s benevolence (ren 仁) and establishing loyalty (zhong 忠). 
Therefore, in this chapter, I will examine regular and irregular food redistribution from the 
court to officials, focusing on the salary and gift-giving systems in order to show how 
political ideology was embodied in the salary scale and imperial gifts, and how the ration 
system and the gift-giving worked as supplementary methods to establish a satisfactory 
redistribution system during the Han period. In the first section, the salary system will be 
examined based on historical literature, and then it will be compared to the administrative 
documents related to salary and rations for military officials discovered at Han sites in Juyan 
居延. Then, the statutes concerning imperial bestowals unearthed from the early Han site of 
Zhangjiashan 张家山 will be analyzed both in light of society’s ideological foundation and 
the realistic role that imperial gifts played in the context of the economic situation of the 
recipients.  
 
                                                                                                                                                      
already recognized the poor condition of low rank officials, kindly granted them beef and wine. See Han shu 
(9.279, 285).  
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1) Salary-grade and Food for Officials  
 
 During the Qin and Han periods, the most broadly executed form of regular food 
distribution was through official salaries, with both central and local officials being paid half 
of their salaries in grain—a massive feat considering that the total size of bureaucracy in 5 
BCE was 130,285 men.112 Although the preparation and distribution of such a large amount 
of food is impressive, the amount of grain and cash given to lower-level officials, who were 
below 600 shi of grade level, was not enough for one family to live on. Why did the Han 
government keep this salary system even though it could not supply the fundamental needs 
of lower level officials?  And, how did they maintain the bureaucratic system, without 
encountering any significant trouble, such as revolt and rebellion, from these officials?    
 All Han officials were ranked on a scale of eighteen salary grades. Among the eighteen salary grades, 
sixteen were identified by the ancient measure of shi 石, which indicates a volume measure of grain, from 
10,000 shi down to 100 shi. Below these, there were two grades which were not expressed in terms of shi, the 
officials “Whose Salaries are in Terms of Dou 斗” (doushi 斗食) and the Accessory Clerks (zuoshi 佐史).113 
The names of each rank, except the lowest one, used the unit for a capacity of grain. The scale must have 
originally expressed the salary in kind, but it became simply a tool for indicating the bureaucratic ranking, and 
the salaries that each man actually received did not match the title by the Han period. Instead, fixed amounts of 
grains or coins were given to the officials based on their salary grade.   
 No historical document provides a complete list of salaries for Western Han officials 
and only a rudimentary picture of the official salary system can be reconstructed based on 
passages in the Han shu. For example, during the reign of Emperor Wu the salaries of the 
Commander-in-Chief (dasima 大司馬 and  the General-in-Chief (dajiangjun 大將軍) were 
60,000 cash (qian 錢), and the salary of the Grandee Secretary (yüshi dafu 御史大夫) was 
                                                 
112
 This number includes the officials from the Chancellor down to the Accessory Clerks in central 
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40,000 cash per month.114 In 8 BCE, according to the edict of Emperor Cheng (成帝, r.33-7 
BCE) each of the Three Excellencies (sangong 三公), the Chancellor (chengxiang 丞相), 
the Commander-in-Chief and the Grand Minister of Works (dasikong 大司空), who each 
ranked 10,000 shi, had the same salary level of 60,000 cash per month.115 Another passage in 
the Han shu also indicates that officials with salary-grade equivalent to 2,000 shi received 
12,000 cash monthly, while official with salary-grades equivalent to 800 shi received 9,200 
cash during the Western Han period.116 With this dispersed information, it is hard to 
reconstruct a salary list for Western Han officials, but we can see that officials’ salaries were 
regulated in cash (qian 錢), although they may not have been paid fully in cash, and that 
there were frequent adjustments of salaries and official positions during the Western Han 
period.   
 The salary lists of Eastern Han officials are recorded in three different places: the 
Baiguan zhi (百官志, “Treatise on Bureaucratic Posts”) of the Hou han shu zhi 後漢書志, in 
the commentary to the “Basic Annals of Emperor Guangwu” (光武 r. 25-57 CE) in the Hou 
han shu ji 纪 and in the commentary to the “Table of Bureaucratic Posts” Baiguan gongqing 
biao 百官公卿表 in the Han shu.117 All three passages relate to an edict proclaimed by 
Emperor Guangwu in the fourth month of the twenty-sixth year of the Jianwu 建武 era (50 
BCE). It is known that the Baiguan zhi in the Hou Han shu zhi was not originally recorded 
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by the author of Hou Han shu, Fan Ye 范曄 (398-445 CE), but added in 1022 CE from Xu 
han zhi (續漢志, “Sequel to the Treatises of Han”) written by Sima Biao司馬彪 (between 
238 and 246 -306 CE) of the Jin 晋 period (265-420 CE).118 The commentary to the “Basic 
Annals of Emperor Guangwu” in the Hou Han shu by Li Xian (李賢, 653-684) of the Tang 
唐 Dynasty (618-907) also indicates that this list is from the Xu han zhi. The commentary of 
Yan Shigu (顔師古 581~645) to the Baiguan goingqing biao in the Han shu also seems to 
have been cited from the same source, when he introduced the general rule of official 
salaries during the Han period.   
 In spite of the same original source, the lists in these three different texts are not 
identical. In particular, the list in the Baiguan zhi, which was written in the main body of the 
Hou Han shu treatise, is relatively incomplete and erroneous compared to the others. Table 6 
shows the comparison of the salary lists from the three different sources with bold font 
numbers that are not identical. As we can see from the table, transcription errors are clearly 
evident in the Baiguan zhi as the same amount (40 hu) is recorded for both Equivalent 400 
shi and 300 shi officials.  I have reconstructed the salary list of 50 CE following Yan 
Shigu’s commentary, which seems most reasonable, and supplemented the missing parts 
from the other two lists. The reconstructed salary list of 50 CE and the graph of salary 
amounts from Figure 2 clearly show that the officials’ monthly salaries were systemically 
regulated in relation to a scale based on the amount of unhusked grain (gu 穀)with a large 
difference between the high and middle to lower-level officials.  However, in fact, the 
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salaries must have been given half in coin and half in grain, as clearly stated at the end of the 
list in Baiguan zhi (“凡諸受奉, 皆半錢半穀”).        
 
Table 6. Official Salary List of 50 CE 
 
 Baiguan zhi  
(HHS zhi 28)  
  Commentary to 
Guangwu di ji 
(HHS 1B)  
(from Xu han zhi) 
Commentary to 
Baiguangongqing 
biao (HS 19A, by 
Yan Shigu)  
Reconstructed 
Salary list of 
50 CE  
10,000 shi 350 hu 350 hu 350 hu 350 hu 
Fully 2,000 shi 180 180 180 180 
2000 shi 120 120 120 120 
Equivalent to 
2000 shi 
100 100 100 100 
1000 shi 80  90 90 90 
Equivalent 
1000 shi 
Missing 80 80 80 
600 shi 70 70 70 70 
Equivalent 600 
shi 
50  55  60  60  
400 shi 45  50 50 50 
Equivalent 400 
shi 
40  45 45 45 
300 shi 40 40 40 40 
Equivalent 300 
shi 
37 37 37 37 
200 shi 30 30 30 30 
Equivalent 200 
shi 
27 27 27 27 
100 shi 16 16 16 16 
Equivalent 100 
shi 
Missing Missing Missing (14?) 
Officials 
Whose Salaries 
are in Terms of 
Dou 
11 11 Missing 11 
Accessory 
Clerks 
8 8 Missing 8 
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Figure 2. Official Salary Chart of 50 CE 
  
  
With this salary list and the register of officials discovered from the late Western Han 
site of Yinwan 尹灣, it is possible to estimate approximately the total amount of grain, as a 
form of salary, given to local officials in Donghai Commandery (東海郡 Donghai jun). A 
wooden board from Yinwan (no. 1) records a total of 2,163 officials with twenty-two 
different official titles in thirty-eight sub-units, eighteen counties (xian 縣), two estates (yi 
邑) and eighteen marquisates (houguo 侯國) in Donghai commandery during the reign of 
Emperor Cheng.119 Although it is hard to say that these documents include all the officials 
working in the local government and provide the exact amount given to officials as part of 
their salaries, it is possible to estimate the minimum amount of grain that was distributed in 
each local administrative unit around the year of 10 or 9 BCE. For example, the records for  
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Xiapi 下邳 County , which had the largest number of local officials recorded includes one 
1,000 shi official (ling 令), three 400 shi officials (cheng 丞 and wei 尉), three of 100 shi 
(guan youzhi 官有秩 and xiang youzhi 鄕有秩), thirty-two of Doushi (lingshi 令史, yushi 狱
史, guan sefu 官啬夫, xiang sefu 鄕啬夫, youjiao 游徼 and laojian 牢監) and twenty-two of 
Accessory Clerks (weishi 尉史, guan zuo 官佐, xiang zuo 鄕佐, yu zuo 郵佐).120 If we 
assume that a half of each salary was distributed in unhusked grain, the total amount of grain 
used for their salaries was 408 shi per month or 4,896 shi per year. The total amount given 
to the 1,911 officials of the thirty-eight subordinate levels of local administrations under 
Donghai commandery, which does not include grain that would have been given to the 689 
Head of Courier Stations (tingzhang 亭長) whose salary rank is not known, is 7,038 shi of 
unhusked grain per month or 84,456 shi a year, which is about 140.5 kiloliter per month or 
1,686.4 kiloliter annually.121 The amount would be much larger than this if the salaries for all 
the subordinate administrative units and the Donghai commandery itself were counted in 
this record. Considering that the total number of commanderies and kingdoms were 103 at 
the end of Western Han,122 and the number of central government officials was larger than 
that of a commandery, the annual amount which the Han government paid for salaries can 
be estimated as more than nine million shi per year. Considering that the total amount of 
land under cultivation at the end of Western Han was known as 8,270,536 qing 頃 (or 
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827,053,600 mu 畝)123, and the estimated land tax on each mu would have been about four 
sheng (or 0.04 shi) per mu,124 the total amount of grain that the Han government collected as 
land tax would have been about 33,082,144 shi annually. With this estimation, we can say 
that approximately as much as 30% of collected land tax in grain was distributed to the 
officials for half of their salaries.  
 The salary list and the information about the prices of commodities and livestock 
make it possible to imagine the standard of living of Han officials. Based on the food prices 
recorded in the  Jiuzhang suanshu 九章算術, the earliest specialized mathematical work 
composed around 200 BCE, we have rough ranges for the prices of commodities and 
livestock.125 According to these records, a cow was valued around 1,200- 3,750 cash (qian), 
a pig 300-900, lamb 150-500, dog 100, chicken 70 and rabbit 29 (See Table 7). Moreover, a 
bamboo slip from Xuanquan, Dunhuang provide the records that one jin (斤, 245g) of meat 
(not beef, maybe pork or another animal) cost six coins, and one chicken (for meat) was 
bought with 40 coins.126 Considering the prices of commodities and food during the Han 
period, we can assume that high ranking officials were able to enjoy various food resources 
in their daily lives. It can be assumed that, with their salaries alone, high officials above the 
salary grade of “Equivalent to 2,000 shi” whose total monthly income in cash value was 
about 10,000 qian, were able to afford a variety of meats in daily meals, as much as those of 
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Lady Dai from Mawangdui tomb No. , whose family’s annual tax income was  40,000 qian 
(about 11,667 qian per month).127  (see Table 8 for discovered food remains from 
Mawangdui tomb no.1) 
 
Table 7. Prices of Commodities from the Jiuzhang suanshu 
 
Items Prices (qian) 
Land (/mu) 70~300 
Hemp (/shi) 70 
Barley (/shi) 40 
Bean (/shi) 30 
Red bean (/shi) 50 
Millet (/shi) 100 
Glutinous Millet (/shi) 60 
Wine (/shi) 100~500 
Fish (3chi=70cm) 50 
Horse (1) 5454 
Cow 1200~3750 
Pig 300~900 
Lamb 150~500 
Dog 100 
Chicken 70 
Rabbit 29 
 
 
 
Table 8. Foodstuffs from Mawangdui tomb no.1 
 
Grains 
and 
Beans 
 
·Rice (稻, Oryza sativa L.) 
·Wheat (小麦, Triticum turgidum L.) 
·Barley (大麦, Hordeum vulgare L.) 
·Glutinous millet (黍, 稷, Panicum miliaceum L.)  
·Millet (粟, 小米, 谷子, Setaria italica [L.] Beauve.) 
·Soybean (大豆, Glycine max [L.] Merr.) and Fermented Soybeans (豆豉) 
·Red lentil (赤豆, Phaseolus angularis Wight.) 
                                                 
127
 Sima Qian in the Shiji assumed that nobles collected on the average two hundred cash from each 
household per year.  Marquis of Dai had 700 households in his fief, which made 140,000 cash tax income 
annually. 
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Fruits 
 
·Melon (甜瓜, 香瓜, Cucumis melo L.) 
·Jujube (枣, Zizyphus jujuba Mill. var. inermis [Bunge] Rehd.) 
·Pear (梨, Pyrus pyrifolia Nakai) 
·Plum (梅, Prunus mume (Sieb.) Sieb. et Zucc.)  
·Strawberry (杨梅, Myrica rubra Sieb. et Zucc.) 
Vegetables 
 
·Malva (葵, 冬苋葵, 冬葵, Malva Verticillata L.) 
·Mustard (芥菜, 辣菜, 腊菜, Brassica cernua Hemsl.) 
·Ginger (姜, Zingiber Officinale Rosc.) 
·Lotus root (藕, Nelumbo nucifera Gaertn.)  
·Hemp (大麻, Canabis sativa L.) 
Mammal Meats 
 
·Hare (华南兔, 野兔 Lepus sinensis Gray) 
·Dog (家犬, 狗 Caina familiaris Linné) 
·Deer (梅花鹿, 花鹿 Cervus nippon Temminick) 
·Ox (黄牛, 牛 Bos taurus domesticus Gmelin) 
·Sheep (绵羊, 羊 Ovis aries  Linne) 
Bird Meats  
and 
Eggs 
 
·Wild goose (雁, Anser sp.) 
·Mandarin duck (鸳鸯, 匹鸟，官鸭 Aix galericulata L.) 
·Duck (鸭, Anas sp.) 
·Bamboo chicken (竹鸡, 泥滑滑, 竹鹧鸪 Bambusicola thoracica Temminck) 
·Chicken (家鸡, Gallus gallus domesticus Brisson) 
·Pheasant (环颈雉, 野鸠, 山鸡, 雉鸡, 项圈野鸡, Phasianus colchicus Linne)  
·Crane (鹤, Grus sp.) 
·Pigeon (斑鸠, Streptopelia sp.) 
·Owl (鸮, Athene sp.) 
·Magpie (喜鹊, 鹊, 飞驳鹊, 干鹊, 客鹊 Pica pica L.) 
·Sparrow (麻雀, 互雀, 家雀, 老家雀, 只只 Passer montanus L.) 
·Turtledove (火班鸠, 红鸠 Oenopopelia tranquebraica Hermann) 
· Eggs (蛋壳)  
Fish 
 
·Carp (鲤鱼, 鲤, 礼鱼 Cyprinus carpio L.) 
·Crucian carp (鲫鱼, Carassius auratus L.) 
·Bream (刺鳊, Acanthobrama simony Bleeker) 
·Silver Xenocypris (银鲴, Xenocypris argentea Günther) 
·Catfish (鳡鱼, Elopichthys bamausa Richardson)  
·Perch (鳜鱼, Spiniperca sp.) 
Spices and 
Medical Herbs 
 
·Lemon-grass (茅香, Hierochloë odorata [L.] Beauv.) 
·Galangal (高良姜, Alpinia officinarum Hance)  
·Cassia bark (桂皮, Cinnamomum chekiangense Nakai) 
·Chinese prickly ash (花椒, Zanthoxylum armatum DC. and Z.planispinum Sieb. et 
Zucc.)   
·Flower bud of lily (辛夷, Magnolia denudata Desr.) 
·Magnolia (藁本, Ligusticum cf. jeholense Nakai et kitagawa) 
·Ginger (姜, Zingiber Officinale Rosc.) 
·Wild ginger (杜衡, Asarum fargesii Franch.) 
·Fragrant thoroughwort (佩兰, Eupatorium fortunei Turcz.)  
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 It is therefore doubtful that high-ranking officials had trouble feeding their families, 
clients and servants. But, were lower-level officials, whose salary levels were below 
“Equivalent to  00 shi,” able to sustain themselves and their families with their salaries?  
Around 150 CE, an official, Cui Shi 崔寔 (ca.103-171 CE) who earned 20 hu of unhusked 
grain and 2,000 cash per month, wrote that he was suffering due to his low salary. Cui was 
at the time a lower level official of the rank of 300 shi, probably a County Magistrate in a 
minor county. He laments that with 2,000 cash of his salary, he had to spend 1,000 cash to 
hire one retainer, 500 cash to buy fodder for horses, oil for cooking or lamps, pork, and 500 
cash to buy firewood, coal, salt and vegetables. Also, he said that six shi of unhusked grain 
were needed to feed two adults for a month and the rest of the grain was used for horses. He 
complains that he does not have money to buy clothes and wine, nor to perform religious 
rites, and that he even cannot buy food, indicating he might starve to death. According to his 
complaint, he could barely feed his own family of two adults (and maybe some children) 
and that with the received grain he was able to purchase only pork and vegetables. Even 
though his essay is obviously exaggerated, his complaint seems realistic when we consider 
that he actually died penniless after spending all his money on his father’s funeral.128 His 
writing suggests that some lower-grade officials may have had difficulty ensuring quality 
food on a daily basis if they relied on their salaries alone.  
Needless to say, it was therefore impossible for officials of the two lowest salary 
grades, doushi and zuoshi, to experience good daily meals relying on their salaries. In fact, 
the condition of food security for the lowest officials was worse than for many peasants. 
According to a text attributed to Li Kui (李悝,4th century BCE), a small farmer owning a 
                                                 
128
 Hou han shu (52.1731-1733); Hsu, Han Agriculture., 1980, 59; Yan Kejun, comp., Quan shang gu San 
d   Q   H           L        w   Beijing: Zhong hua shu ju: Xin hua shu dian Beijing fa xing suo fa xing, 
1965), juan 46, vols. 1, 9.   
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100 mu plot of land (11.39 English acres) had an annual yield of 150 shi of unhusked grain 
from his own farm.129 Even if we consider that farmers did not always have a good harvest 
and that they were subject to all kinds of government taxes, we can assume that the income 
of the lowest two official salary grades, whose annual incomes were 96 shi (8 shi a month) 
and 132 shi (11 shi a month) respectively, was much less than the income of the prototypical 
small landowner, though their incomes had greater reliability.  
Based on the information that 10,281 soldiers who consumed 27,363 hu of 
unhusked grain (or 2.66 hu per soldier) did not live well, it has been assumed that the 
average monthly consumption of grain was 3 hu per adult male.130 The Juyan slips which 
show a soldier was given 3 or 3.3 hu of grain per month also support this. With this 
information, Wolfram Eberhard assumes that a normal family consisting of an old woman, a 
grown man, a grown woman, an older child, and a younger child, probably consumed about 
10.5 shi of unhusked grain per month during the Han period.131 Even though we assume that 
people who could raise domestic animals and cultivate crops and vegetables for themselves 
did not live on unhusked grain alone, so the average amount of consumed grain could be less 
than 3 hu per month,132  it seems that officials of the lowest two salary grades whose monthly 
salary were 8 shi and 11 shi of unhusked grain would find it hard to survive unless they or 
                                                 
129
 Han shu (24A.1125) 
 
130
 Han shu (  .2   )  Wolfram Eberhard, “Bemerkungen Zu Statistischen Angaben Der Han-Zeit,” 
T’     P   36, no. 1, Second Series (January 1, 1940): 7; Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 127, 194 n.17.  
 
131
 Eberhard, “Bemerkungen Zu Statistischen Angaben Der Han-Zeit”: 5-8. 
 
132
 Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 127. 
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other family members earned outside income, such as making cloth for the market. With the 
salary alone, it was not possible for them to ensure enough quality food for daily meals.133  
In addition to the list of 50 CE, another salary list is given in a commentary of the 
Hou han shu treatise.134 This commentary introduces the salary list of the Yanping 延平 era 
(106 CE) which lists amount in terms of husked grains and coins. Based on the commentary 
of the Jin Baiguan biao 晉百官表 by Xun Chao 荀绰, it records the following monthly 
allocations: 9,000 cash and 72 hu of husked grain (mi 米) for Fully 2,000 shi, 6,500 cash and 
36 hu for 2,000 shi, 5,000 cash and 34 hu for Equivalent 2,000 shi, 4,000 cash and 30 hu for 
1,000 shi, 3,500 cash and 21 hu for 600 shi, 2,500 cash and 15 hu for 400 shi, 2,000 cash 
and 12 hu for 300 shi, 1,000 cash and 9 hu for 200 shi, and 800 cash and 8 hu for 100 shi. 
We can certainly see the difference between  the salary list of 50 CE, which  provides almost 
a complete set of monthly salaries in the amount of unhusked grain with the list of 106 CE, 
which gives a partial list of salaries in coin and husked grain (mi 米). (see Table 9)  
However, because the two lists have different styles and use different kinds of grain, their 
analysis requires a detailed, rather than cursory approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
133 
It seems that the food security condition of mid-low rank officials during the early and mid Western 
Han period were much worse.  The salary amounts for mid-low officials were increased several times by edicts 
during the late Western Han period.   In 59 BCE, an edict ordered that officials ranking 100 shi or less had 
their salaries increased by 50% (Han shu 8.263), and in 7 BCE, salaries those of ranking 300 shi and less were 
increased (Han shu 11.336). 
 
134
See the commentary no.4 to Hou han shu (28.3633). 
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Table 9. The Salaries of Han Officials from 50 CE and 106 CE 
 
Rank CE50  CE106  
in unhusked 
grain 
in coin in husked 
grain 
10,000 shi 350 hu   
Fully 2,000 shi 180 9000 cash 72 hu 
2000 shi 120 6500 36 
Equivalent to 2000 shi 100 5000 34 
1000 shi 90 4000 30 
Equivalent 1000 shi 80   
600 shi 70 3500 21 
Equivalent 600 shi 60   
400 shi 50 2500 15 
Equivalent 400 shi 45   
300 shi 40 2000 12 
Equivalent 300 shi 37   
200 shi 30 1000 9 
Equivalent 200 shi 27   
100 shi 16 800 4.8 
Equivalent 100 shi (14?)   
Officials Whose Salaries 
Are in Terms of Dou 
11   
Accessory Clerks 8   
  
 
  In order to determine if the two lists describe identical salaries, we first need to 
consider two: the monetary value of grain and the conversion ratio from unhusked grain to 
husked. Even though the monetary value of grain varied throughout the Han period 
depending on the annual yield and economic situation, it is generally accepted that one hu of 
unhusked grain was equal to 70 to 80 cash for Former Han and 100 cash for Later Han on 
average.135 The reliable ratio of unhusked and husked grain of ten to six is provided by the 
Jiuzhang suanshu and Juyan Han jian, the Han wooden documents discovered in Western 
                                                 
135
 The lowest notion of the price of unhusked grain recorded is 5 cash in 62 BCE (Han shu 1.259; 
24A.1141), and the highest is 500,000 cash during a severe famine in 194 CE (Hou Hanshu 9.376).  This 
conclusion is reached by Lao Gan, Juyan Han jian Kaoshi kaozheng 1:20a-23a, and accepted by Yang Lien-
sheng, ‘notes on the Economic History of the Jin Dynasty’, 42, note 47 and by Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 126. 
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Gansu.136 Based on these premises, it is possible to convert the list of 50 CE to a half in coin 
and a half in grain as the edict describes. For example, the salary of 10,000 shi officials of 
350 hu of unhusked grain, can be converted to a half (175 hu) in cash value and a half (175 
hu) in the amount of husked grain:  
 
  175 (hu) unhusked    100 qian/unhusked (hu) = 17500 qian  
 175 (hu) unhusked   
 
  
 husked/unhusked = 105 husked (hu)  
 
 Table 10 shows the two different lists side by side, converting the unhusked grain list 
of 50 CE of into a similar list to that of 106 CE in which half is recorded in monetary value 
and a half in husked grain.  The two lists are fairly similar; however there are a number of 
discrepancies, especially in the salary grades of Fully 2000 shi to 1000 shi. Compared to the 
salaries of 50 CE, the salaries for Fully 2,000 shi and Equivalent 2,000 shi of 106 CE show a 
larger amount of husked grain and the 2,000 shi of 106 CE indicates more cash while the 
salary of 1,000 shi shows more grain but less cash (the total value is same as 50 CE) and the 
200 shi had less grain.         
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
136
 Jiuzhang suanshu 2.1a, Lao Gan勞幹, Juyan Han Jian Kaoshi Kaozheng Zhi Bu 据延汉简考释，释文
之部 (Xichuan: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1944): 2.30b–79a. Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 
130–131, 198; Lien-Sheng Yang, “Notes on The Economic History of The Chin Dynasty,” Harvard Journal of 
Asiatic Studies 9, no. 2 (June 1, 1946): 142, note 47. 
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Table 10. Comparison of the Converted List of 50 CE with the List of 106 CE 
 
 50 CE (converted) 106 CE 
In coin 
(qian) 
In husked 
grain (hu) 
In coin 
(qian) 
In husked 
grain (hu) 
10,000 shi 17500  105   
Fully 2,000 shi 9000 54 9000  72 * 
2000 shi 6000 36 6500 * 36 
Equivalent to 
2000 shi 
5000 30 5000 34 * 
1000 shi 4500 * 27 4000 30 * 
Equivalent  
1000 shi 
4000 24   
600 shi 3500 21 3500 21 
Equivalent  
600 shi 
3000 18   
400 shi 2500 15 2500 15 
Equivalent  
400 shi 
2250 13.5   
300 shi 2000 12 2000 12 
Equivalent  
300 shi 
1850 11.1   
200 shi 1500 * 9 1000 9 
Equivalent  
200 shi 
1350 8.1   
100 shi 800 4.8 800 4.8 
Equivalent  
100 shi 
    
Officials Whose 
Salaries Are in 
Terms of Dou 
550 3.3   
Accessory Clerks 400 2.4   
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 How can we interpret the differences between the two salary lists of 50 CE and 106? 
Rather than considering the differences between the two lists as “erroneous”,137 it is more 
reasonable to see their discrepancies as the result of the adjustments of official salaries or the 
fluctuations of grain prices. In fact, salary adjustments often occurred throughout the Han 
period, even after guidelines were established by Emperor Guangwu in the year of 50 CE. 
For example, during the reign of Emperor Ming (60 CE, 明帝,r.58-75), the salaries for 
gongqing (公卿, Dukes and Ministers), the highest official positions, were reduced by 
50%.138  Also, in 143 and 161, the salaries of all officials were reduced again.139  Certainly, 
the grain price which fluctuated with supply and demand could affect the cash value of their 
salaries.  The converted salary list of 50 CE is made based on the premise that one shi of 
grain was valued at 100 qian, which was the average price during the Eastern Han period.  
Therefore, it could not be unusual that half of officials’ salaries were also fluctuated 
according to the market valuation of grain.  The differences in salaries between the 50 and 
106 lists should be examined in this context.   
 The salary adjustment could be closely related not only to the annual yield and the 
market price of grains, but also to the political situation. Compared to the salaries in 50 CE, 
high officials in 106 CE saw an increase in salary and were given more husked grains or 
cash, while the salary of 200 shi officials was reduced. According to the commentary to Hou 
                                                 
137
 Hans Bielenstein sees the entries of more and less amounts of grain in 106 CE as erroneous.  After 
examining the two lists and applying his own formula, he argues that the two salary lists are identical and the 
principle of paying each official half in cash and the other half in grain was observed by both.  Then, he 
proposes a new ad usted salary list of  0  CE, as correcting some “errors” which do not correspond with the 
principles of the list.  He corrects the grain amounts and cash amount of 106 which are different from those of 
50 CE, and fills in the missing parts of the salaries in accordance with the salary list of 50 CE. See Table 6 in 
Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 131. 
 
138
 Hou Hanshu (1.107) 
 
139
 Hou Hanshu (2.273,309) 
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han shu (28.3633), the salary list of 106 CE was originally written in the commentary to the 
“Table of Bureaucratic Posts of the Jin” (Jin bai guan biao 晋百官表) by Xun Chao 荀绰 
(dates are not known).140  Xun Chao’s commentary indicates that the salary list is from the 
Yanping 延平 era, which was only one year of the reign of Emperor Shang (殤帝, early 105 
– August or September 106), the barely one hundred-day-old infant enthroned by the 
Empress Dowager Deng (鄧, 81-121). This received salary list was exactly from the very 
year of Emperor Shang’s reign under the Empress Dowager. During this time, there were 
several noted promotions, including the promotion of the brother of the Empress Dowager, 
as well as recorded natural disasters which both may relate to changes in the level of official 
salaries.      
Considering this political situation, the salary increase for high officials can be 
interpreted as the Empress Dowager’s tactic to acquire political support from the high 
officials who had considerable influence over both central and provincial government. The 
financial burden of increased salary for high officials could be compensated by cutting 200 
shi from certain officials’ salary rate. The 200 shi officials of the low upper salary grade 
were the best choice for salary reduction for compensating the loss of revenue due to the 
large number of lower salary grade positions. The government was able to save large 
amounts of revenue from the slight reduction of their salary. Even though the officials of the 
lowest ranks, like 100 shi, doushi, and zuoshi comprised the largest contingent in the Han 
officialdom, it must have been hard to reduce their salaries since they were already 
experiencing extreme difficulty in their livelihood with the little payment they received from 
the government.       
                                                 
140
Xun Chao 荀绰 is a historian during the end of the Western Jin period (265-317).   
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Even though there had been some adjustments in salaries, the overall structure of the 
salary list decreed under Emperor Guangwu had been well observed throughout the Eastern 
Han. The records on bamboo slips and wooden boards concerning the monthly payments to 
military officials, discovered from Juyan and Dunhuang areas, support that this salary list 
was valid even in northern frontier areas far from the central government during the Eastern 
Han period. According to the unearthed records, the highest rank in the company, a 
Company Commander (Hou, 候) whose official rank is known as 600 shi in general, 
received 3,000 coins of cash payment monthly which corresponds to the half of salary in 
cash for Equivalent to 600 shi from the established salary list.(slip no. 127.28) Lingshi (令史, 
Scribe Directors) whose rank is doushi received 480 coins per month, and Shuzuo (書佐, a 
 unior civil official in a commandant’s headquarters or Accessory Clerk for Documents) 
whose rank falls under Accessory Clerks was given 360 coins. (TD 5, nos.1,5,9)141 The cash 
amounts for these officials were a little bit lower than in the reconstructed salary list in 
general, but the differences are within the acceptable range considering the fluctuation in 
grain prices.  
 While the cash payments that the officers who worked in the military posts received 
was in accordance with the salary list, the other half of their salary, that in grain, seems to 
have distributed in a different way, by ration. According to the administrative records 
discovered from Juyan and Dunhuang, grain was distributed from official sources not only 
to conscripted soldiers and convicts, but also to officers and any of their family members 
living together with them in this area in the form of a monthly ration. The rations varied 
according to the status, gender, and age of the individual, and the type of grain that was 
                                                 
141
 Michael Loewe, Records of Han administration. (London: Cambridge U.P., 1967), vol. 1, 96. 
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being distributed.  For example, the officers and soldiers regularly guarding the watchtowers 
received 3.33 shi of unhusked grain, whereas officers and soldiers who served on the 
frontier for a short period received 3 shi of unhusked grain in a month.  For their family 
members, adult males aged from 15 to 67 received 3.33 shi, adult females and serviceable 
(aged 7~14) males received 2.16 shi, serviceable females and pre-service (aged 2~6) males 
received 1.66 shi, and pre-service females received 1.16 shi of unhusked grain in one month 
(MD 9, 10, see Table 11).142  
 
Table 11. Distributed amount of grain for soldiers and family members
143
 
 
 Job position and Age Amount of grain (shi) 
Soldiers 
guarding the watchtowers 3.33 
working on agricultural colonies 
serving on the frontier for short period 
3 
Families 
Da 大 adult male (15~67) 3.3 
adult female (15~67) 
Shi 使 serviceable male (7~14) 
2.16 
serviceable female (7~14) 
Wei shi 未使 pre-service male (2~6) 
1.66 
pre-service female (2~6) 1.16 
 
 
 Based on this information, it is possible to estimate that the total monthly income of 
grain that one military officer’s family of five with one female adult, one aged male (age 
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 Loewe, 2002. Han administration, vol. 2, 68-  . Yang, “Notes on Dr. Swann’s,” 550  Loewe, 1968, 
Everyday Life, 94.  
 
143
 Loewe, 2002. Han administration, vol. 2, 69. 
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under 67), one serviceable male (aged 7~14) and one pre-service female (aged 2~6) received 
was about 12.11 shi of grain in a month, which approximates the salary level in grain of a 
300 shi rank official (see table 10). Juyan slips which contain military officers monthly 
payment in cash prove that the Han military officers generally occupied the mid to low 
positions whose salary amounts were 300 shi to 100 shi or even below, except the Hou 
候,Company Commander, who received 3000 coins, equal to a salary grade of 600 shi. (see 
tables 10 and 12).  
 
 
Table 12. Official titles and monthly payment from Juyan slips
144
 
 
Official’s Title 
Monthly Payment (coin) 
Hou侯 Company commander 3000 
Hou chang侯長 Platoon commander 1200 / 1600 / 1800 
Sui chang 隧長 Section commander 900 
Sai wei 塞尉 Deputy company commander 2000 
Shi li 士吏 Officer serving in a company 1200 
Wei shi 尉史 Civil official in a company 600 
Shu zuo 書佐 
Junior civil official in a commandant’s 
headquarters 
360 
Ling shi 令史 Civil official in a company 480 
Hou shi 候史 Civil official in a platoon 900 
 
 
                                                 
144
 Loewe, 2002. Han administration, vol. 1, 96. 
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 This means that lower-level officers with family members in the military camp 
received grains comparable to the grain amount distributed to officials of 300 shi salary 
grade working in the central and provincial governments. Comparing to the central and 
provincial officials whose salary grades were under 300 shi, military officers of the same 
rank were treated better, with guaranteed amount of grain regardless of rank. With the ration 
in the military camp, even lesser officers did not have problems in food consumption 
because they were all guaranteed to receive an appropriate amount of grain, 3 or 3.3 shi a 
month for an adult, in addition to the cash. It seems that the Han government applied this 
alternative salary strategy for military officials to guarantee the required food amount 
considering the size of their family. Based on this salary system at the military camp, even 
the petty officials and their families were free from worrying about food, no matter the size 
of their family. This salary system combining rationing in military forts might have been 
installed because the government recognized the lack of salary for the petty officials and the 
importance of ensuring enough food for military officers to the lowest level. This alternative 
salary system for the military forts was possibly designed and worked to prevent potential 
danger by unsatisfied military officers and to stabilize the security of the frontier.   
               
2) Imperial Bestowals and Gifts of Food  
 
 In addition to the ration system for military officials, a system of irregular gift-giving 
fulfilled the needs of both the emperor, who wanted to maintain a solid bureaucracy based 
upon the loyalty of the officials, and those officials, who sought more income and food. A 
gift-giving culture was firmly established by the Western Zhou period (1046-771 BCE) in 
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order to strengthen the bonds between the king and the feudal lords by exchanging gifts and 
loyalty. During the Han period, this practice continued to ensure the relationship between 
the ruler and the ruled. In addition to this purpose, giving gifts to officials of both high and 
low ranks seemed to be used not only for strengthening political ideology, but also for 
feeding hungry officials who could not eat solely from the salary of their low income. The 
imperial gift of food can also be understood as a way to make up for the problem of the 
salary system, which, although founded on the virtue of li, failed to display the emperor’s 
benevolence (ren 仁) or to secure the loyalty (zhong忠) of lower officials who received 
petty salaries. In this section, officials’ food privileges will be examined in the context of the 
role of gifting food in Han officialdom.                
 Han officials had frequent chances to have extra income in addition to their salaries. 
In addition to the grants which were given to specific officials when they were appointed to 
an important position or when they died, historical literature frequently describes events 
during which the emperor bestowed unspecified quantities of wine, food, silk, gold and cash 
to all officials and his subjects. The emperor regularly gave out gifts during three annual 
festivals, the New Year, the Beginning of Spring and the La腊 festival, as well as on 
irregular occasions to celebrate imperial events such as enthronement, a birth in the imperial 
family, or when an imperial family member recovered from illness. The Hou Hanshu proves 
that sometimes the imperial gifts to officials caused huge expense to the government: 
I heard that the gift made on the La to officials of the rank of Gentlemen 
upward, and to the Lords, Ministers, Kings and Marquises downward, have 
reached the point where they empty the treasury and deplete the nation’s 
wealth.
145
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 Hou Hanshu (73.1583); trans. by Derk Bodde, Festivals in Classical China: New Year and Other 
Annual Observances During the Han Dynasty. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), 64. 
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 Hans Bielenstein also argues that Han officials benefited great from these imperial 
bestowals, providing an example of a minister ranking Fully 2,000 shi whose annual income 
was increased by over 50% due to the annual gifts of silk and cash alone.146  
 Even though received texts record many occasions of imperial gifts to officials, they 
rarely provide details regarding the amount distribute to men of specific salary grades. In 
general, the documents say that the gifts such as wine, food, and silk were granted to the 
officials, “to each proportionately” (各有差),147  with no details given regarding the exact 
proportions or amounts. Therefore, it has been impossible to estimate the amount of gifts 
officials in each position received at any one time in addition to their regular income. 
 Fortunately, the newly discovered wooden strips of early Han statutes, entitled, 
Ernian lüling 二年律令 “Statues and Ordinances of the Second Year” from the 
Zhangjiashan site describe detailed regulations on food distribution not recorded in received 
texts.148 Among the 1,236 slips, 23 strips ( no.282 – no.304) in the “Statutes on Bestowal” 
(Ci lü 賜律) contains regulations on the distribution of clothes, coffins and food.149 Except 
slip number 303, which indicates the title of “Ci l ”, these slips can be categorized into four 
groups according to the items, recipients and methods: 1) rules for bestowal of clothes and 
coffins to nobles and officials (282-285), 2) rules for bestowal to aid those who are in 
                                                 
146
 Bielenstein, Bureaucracy, 127. 
 
147
 The term of “to each proportionately (各有差)” can be seen frequently in Shi ji, Han shu and Hou han 
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Zhangjiashan Han Mu Zhu Jian 張家山漢墓竹簡 : Er Si Qi Hao Mu 二四七號墓, Di 1 ban. (Beijing: Wen 
wu chu ban she, 2006). For a complete translation of the Zhangjiashan slips see Anthony Barbieri-Low and 
Robin D.S. Yates, forthcoming. 
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 Zhagjiashan Han mu zhujian, Beijing: Wenwu chu ban she, 2006, 48-51. 
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distress (286-288), 3) rules for alternative methods using cash (289,290), and 4) rules for 
bestowal of food items (291-302). The statutes on clothes, coffins and relief food clarify 
when the government should bestow what items and to whom.  However, the rules for food 
items (291-301) do not indicate any situations or restrictions. They only indicate the 
prescribed amount, kind and quality of food for all the people from nobles down to convicts 
in the empire. Based on these statues, we shall assume that food distribution to officials “to 
each proportionately” occurred both regularly and irregularly and must have operated under 
the following regulations during the Han period:   
 
賜不爲吏及宦皇帝者, 關內侯以上比二千石, 卿比千石, 五大夫比八百石, 公乘
比六百石, 公大夫, 官大夫比五百(291)石, 大夫比三百石, 不更比有秩, 簪袅比
斗食, 上造, 公士比佐史. 毋爵者, 飯一斗, 肉五斤, 酒大半斗, 醬少半斗.(292) 
司寇, 徒隷, 飯一斗, 肉三斤, 酒少半斗, 鹽廿分升一. (293)  
For bestowals on those who are not acting as officials, as well as those who 
personally serve the Emperor at court: Lord within the Passes [rank] and above is 
comparable to [the salary grade of] two-thousand bushels; Ministerial [rank] is 
comparable to [the salary grade of] one-thousand bushels; Fifth Grandee [rank] is 
comparable to [the salary grade of] eight-hundred bushels; Royal Conveyance 
[rank] is comparable to [the salary grade of] six-hundred bushels; Grandee of the 
Realm and Grandee of the Bureaucracy [ranks] are comparable to [the salary 
grade of] five-hundred [291] bushels; Grandee [rank] is comparable to [the salary 
grade of] three-hundred bushels; Corvée Exempt [rank] is comparable to [the 
salary grade of] “stipendiary officials”  Embellished Horse [rank] is comparable 
to [the salary grade of] “fed by the dou”  Sovereign’s Accomplished and Knight 
of the Realm [ranks] are comparable to [the salary grade of] Assistant Scribes. 
[For bestowals on] those without rank: one dou (approx. 2 l) of cooked grain, 5  ī  
(approx. 1.24 kg) of pork; ⅔of a dou (1.33 l) of grain liquor, and ⅓ of a sheng 
(approx. 66.7 ml) of fermented sauce [292]. Robber-guards and convict laborers 
and servants:1 dǒ  (approx. 2 l) of cooked grain, 3 jin (approx. 744g) of pork, ⅓ 
of a dou (approx. 666.7 ml) of grain liquor, and 1/20th of a sheng (approx. 10 ml) 
of salt.[293]  
 
賜吏酒食, 率秩百石而肉十二斤, 酒一斗; 斗食令史肉十斤, 佐史八斤, 酒各一斗. (297) 
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For bestowals on officials of grain liquor and food: the rate is 12 jin (approx. 2.98 
kg) of pork and 1 dou (approx. 2 l) of grain liquor per one-hundred bushels of 
salary grade. For those Scribe Directors “fed by the d   ” 10 jin of pork (approx. 
2.48 kg), for Assistant Scribes, 8 jin (approx. 1.98 kg) of pork, and 1 dou (approx. 
2 l) of grain liquor, for each. [297] 
 
二千石食, 粲糯各一盛，醯，醬各二升，介（芥）一升 （298） 
For officials [with a salary grade of] two-thousand bushels: treated grains; one 
serving each of polished grain, polished, long-grain, non-glutinous rice, and 
[polished] glutinous rice, two sheng each (approx. 400 ml) of vinegar and 
fermented sauce, and one sheng (approx. 200 ml) of mustard [sauce]. [298] 
 
千石吏至六百石， 食二盛，醯，酱各一升 （299） 
For officials [with a salary grade of] one-thousand bushels to six-hundred bushels: 
two servings of treated grain and one sheng (approx. 200 ml) each of vinegar and 
fermented sauce. [299] 
 
五百石以下，食一盛，酱半升（300） 
For [officials with a salary grade of] five-hundred bushels on down: one serving 
of treated grain, and half a sheng (approx. 100 ml) of fermented sauce. [300] 
 
 食一盛用米九升 （301）  
 For one serving of treated grains, use nine sheng (approx. 1.8 l) of milled grain. 
[301] 
 
賜吏六百石以上以上尊，五百石以下以下尊，毋爵以和酒 （302）150 
For bestowals on officials [of grain liquor]: [for those with a] salary grade of six-
hundred bushels on up, use the “upper quality” [rice liquor]  [for those with a 
                                                 
150 Hao Peng, Er Nian L  Ling Yu Zhou Yan Shu : Zhangjiashan Er Si Qi Hao Han Mu Chu Tu Fa L  Wen 
Xian Shi Du 二年律令與奏讞書 : 張家山二四七號漢墓出土法律文獻釋 (Shanghai: Shanghai gu ji chu ban 
she, 2007), 211–214. 
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salary grade of] five-hundred bushels on down, use the “lower quality” [millet 
liquor]; for those without rank use adulterated grain liquor. [302]151 
 
These statutes on food bestowals not only provide information about the amount and 
type of food given, but also demonstrate the ideological underpinnings of Han society, with 
amounts given based on the social hierarchy, regulating the amount, type and the quality of 
food. First, meat, fermented liquor and grains were items commonly distributed to all 
people, but the amount of each item varied according to the social status and official 
position of the recipient. In particular, the amounts of meat and wine are regulated by the 
ratio, 12 jin of meat per 100 shi of rank and 10 dou of fermented liquor per 100 shi of rank, 
demonstrating highly systematized differences according to salary grade.  For example, the 
highest official receives thirty times more meat and fermented liquor than the lowest 
official. Commoners and convicts receive less meat and liquor than officials, but commoners 
received much more than convicts, also receiving double the amount of fermented liquor. 
Second, bestowals of sauces and spices show clear differences between the salary 
grades and among the lower statuses. Mustard was given only to the 2,000 shi officials. 
Vinegar was given to high (2,000 shi) and middle officials (from 600 to 1,000 shi).152 
Fermented sauce was given to all except convicts. Instead, convicts are given 0.05 dou, or 
0.1 litter of salt, which could be used for making fermented sauce. It shows that people with 
high social status enjoyed more varied spices from the imperial bestowals.                     
 Third, these statutes on food bestowals indicate not only the amount and sort of the 
food given, but also the quality of the food given, according to salary grade, rank, or social 
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 Translation from Anthony Barbieri-Low and Robin D.S. Yates, Law, State, and Society in Early 
Imperial China (unpublished manuscript) 
 
152
 The use of these three categories is also seen in the Zhuanshi lü 傳食律(232-237) of Ernian lüling. 
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status. For example, the quality of grain for 2000 shi officials is regulated as “refined grain, 
refined rice, and glutinous rice” (slip no. 2  ).153 It also mentions the different qualities of 
fermented liquor. The highest quality of fermented liquor was reserved for high and middle-
level officials, the low quality for low officials, and adulterated wine mixed with dregs and 
diluted with water for commoners and convicts. 
 By indicating differences in the amount and type of food given, based on rank, salary 
grade or social status, the statutes highlight the social belief in the importance of 
discrimination according to a hierarchical order.  This type of distribution had both symbolic 
and practical meaning. I will now focus on the food given to officials in order to examine 
the symbolic significance of the gift of food and the practical benefits of these gifts to the 
lower-ranking officials.   
 Treated grain was distributed using the unit of cheng 盛, which might indicate a 
serving bowl or container for food. High officials of 2,000 shi received three cheng, officials 
ranking 1,000 shi to 600 shi, two cheng, and officials ranking 500 shi and below one cheng. 
According to the statutes, one serving (cheng) of treated grain required nine sheng of husked 
grain, which is one and a half dou of unhusked grain. If we consider that a soldier and a 
male adult received about 3 to 3.33 shi of grain per month (daily 1 – 1.11 dou) as rations,154 
the distributed grain to low officials, one cheng, was at most about 50% more than the daily 
consumption of a male adult, or comparable amount necessary for one family of three adults 
to consume in a meal assuming that they ate two meals per day. The amounts of the 
distributed treated grain for mid and high officials were not significantly more than those of 
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 It does not indicate the quality and sort of the grain for middle to lower-level officials. 
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 Lien-sheng Yang, “Notes on Dr. Swann’s Food and Money in Ancient China,” Harvard Journal of 
Asiatic Studies 13, no. 3/4 (December 1, 1950): 550; Loewe, Records of Han Administration., vols. 2, 68. 
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low-ranking officials: one or two more servings. It seems that two and three cheng of 
cooked grain for mid and high-ranking officials must have been consumed by their family 
members and subjects for one or more meals. The amount and the form of the distributed 
grain imply that the gift of treated grain was symbolic, intended to be consumed 
immediately, not to be stored as additional income.    
 Unlike the treated grain, amounts of distributed meat and wine differed greatly based 
on salary grade. While the highest officials received three times more cooked grain than the 
lowest, they received up to thirty times more meat and wine than the lower-ranking officials. 
One jin of meat is about 244 grams or 8.6 ounces, which is a large portion for one person. 
The high officials, with a salary grade of 2,000 shi, were able to feed up to 240 people fully 
with the meat they received if they served one jin to one person.  This large amount of meat 
was possibly intended to be used for parties for a large audience or for several days. If they 
minced the meat and added vegetables and other ingredients, they could serve up to 500 
people at once a smaller number for several days. The mustard, exclusively distributed to the 
2,000 shi officials, seems to have not only been used to add flavor but also to preserve the 
food for several days.155 Otherwise, meats were probably smoked and hung over the stove, as 
depicted in Eastern Han tomb reliefs and murals (see Figure 3 and 4).   
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 Mustard was the essential condiment to preserve cooked food for several days, especially when the 
upper class had parties for several days, as in pre-modern Korea.  It can be assumed that the ancient Chinese 
also used mustard to preserve cuisines.   
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Figure 3. Food preparation scene from the Wuliang Shrine
156 
 
  
 
Figure 4. Kitchen scene from a late Eastern Han tomb at Pangtaizitun
157 
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 Xingzhen Liu and Fengxia Yue, H   D             R    f    T     F m                   d    
Province., 1st ed. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1991), 96. 
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 Chang, Food in Chinese Culture,   2., Lee, Wenxin. “Liaoyang faxian de san zuo bi hua gu mu,” Wen 
wu zhan kao zi liao. no. 5 (1955), 27-28. 
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Even Accessory Clerks, the lowest level officials, could enjoy exceptionally large 
amounts of meat as imperial gifts. Eight jin of meat, the amount given to Accessory Clerks, 
can feed one family for one or more days depending on how it is prepared. Rather than 
serving the meat as a single dish, low-ranking officials must have used the meat for making 
stew, geng 羹, which was the main food consumed in ordinary meals.158 With the distributed 
meat, they were able to enjoy meat geng, which was more a luxury than a daily necessity in 
Han China. Or, if they sold the meat, they might be able to buy more grain that they could 
use to sustain their family for a longer period of time. For example, if one jin of meat cost 
six coins as the Han wooden records from Xuanquan indicate, the lowest officials were able 
to buy more than one shi of bean or barley with eight jin of the distributed meat (see table 
7).                      
 Fermented liquor was given at the rate of one dou of fermented liquor per 100 shi of 
rank.  Accessory Clerks whose rank was below 100 shi were bestowed with seven sheng 
(0.7 dou) which is about 1.4 liters, or more than four bottles of the standard longneck bottles 
of North America (341 ml. capacity each).  The highest officials received 2000 dou, or 40 
liters of liquor, an amount that is more than 117 beer bottles. Like the meat, the amount of 
the distributed liquor to high officials was enough to have parties with a large number of 
guests, and the lowest officials were also given a significant amount of liquor, even though 
the quality was inferior. Unlike the symbolic treated grain, the bestowed meat and liquor 
could be practically used for having parties, feeding subjects, storing for future use or 
transferring for pecuniary need.   
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 Kwang-chih Chang, Food in Chinese Culture : Anthropological and Historical Perspectives (New 
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Table 13. Gift Food to Officials According to the Salary Grade 
 
Salary Grade Grain Meat Liquor Others (sheng) 
2000 shi 3 cheng 
(4.5 dou 
unhusked) 
240 jin
159
 
(58.56 kg) 
20 dou
160
 
(40liters) 
High 
quality 
Mustard (1),  
Vinegar (2), 
Fermented sauce (2)  
1000 shi  
2 cheng 
(3 dou 
unhusked) 
120 jin 
(29.28 kg) 
10 dou 
(20 L.) 
Vinegar (1),  
Fermented sauce(1) 
800 shi 96 jin 
(23.424 kg) 
8 dou 
(16 L.) 
600 shi 72 jin 
(12.568 kg) 
6 dou 
(12L.) 
500 shi  
1 cheng 
(1.5 dou  
unhusked) 
 
60 jin 
(14.64 kg) 
5 dou 
(10 L.) 
Low 
quality 
Fermented sauce(1/2) 
300 shi 36 jin 
(8.784 kg) 
3 dou 
(6 L.) 
Officials 
whose salaries 
are in terms of 
dou 
10 jin 
(2.44 kg) 
- 
Accessory 
Clerks 
8 jin 
(1.952 kg) 
0.7dou 
(1.4L.) 
 
 
Regarding the imperial distribution of wine, we need to pay attention to the legal statute 
on the quality of liquor, which differs according to status. 
 
賜吏六百石以上以上尊 ,  五百石以下以下尊 ,  無爵以和酒 .(302) 161 
For bestowals on officials: [for those with a] salary grade of six-hundred 
bushels on up, use the “upper quality”162 [for those with a salary grade of] 
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 One jin is about 244 or 245 grams which is about 8.6 ounce. Denis Twitchett, The Cambridge History 
of China, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), xxxviii.; Swann, Food and Money in Ancient 
China, 364. 
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 Hao Peng et al., Er nian l  ling yu zhou yan shu : Zhang iashan er si qi hao Han mu chu tu fa l  wen 
xian shi du (Shanghai: Shanghai gu ji chu ban she, 2007), 214. 
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five-hundred bushels on down, use the “lower quality”  for those without rank 
use flavored liquor. [302]163 
 
 The grain liquor grade shangzun “upper quality” appears in Hanshu (71.3051). 
According to the commentary written by Ru Shun, the three quality levels of liquor were 
determined by the type of grain fermented: rice (dao 稻 Oryza sativa) for upper quality, 
panicled millet (ji 稷 Panicum miliaceum) for middle quality, and foxtail millet (su 粟 
Setaria italica) for lower quality.164 Even though there is another interpretation by Yan 
Shigu, who states that quality depends on the process of manufacture and the level of purity, 
it is generally believed that the levels of liquor were determined by the raw materials.165     
 The meaning of hejiu 和酒 is still controversial: Yates and Barbieri-Low follow 
Peng Hao et al. (2007, 214n2), who see it as an adulterated liquor, probably an unfiltered 
type (with dregs), or one diluted (mixed) with water,166 while Zhangjiashan (2001, 2006) 
glosses hejiu as “liquor with mixed-in additives” (hunhe jiu 混合酒). In order to interpret 
this, we need to remember the nature of imperial gifts in terms of purpose and intention. An 
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 Zhangjiashan (2001, 2006) cites Han shu (71.3051), which mentions the grain liquor grade of 
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 Anthony Barbieri-Low and Robin D.S. Yates, “Statutes on Bestowals” in Law and Society in Early 
Imperial China (unpublished manuscript). 
 95 
 
emperor bestowed symbolic food, meat and wine, in order to manifest his mercifulness, not 
only to reconfirm the social hierarchy. In this sense, liquor adulterated with dregs or mixed 
with water seems inappropriate as a gift from the emperor. Considering the symbolic 
meaning of the imperial gift of wine, even though the wine was given to officials “without 
rank,” which might refer to those with a salary grade below one hundred bushels, such as 
“fed by the dou” officials and the Assistant Scribes,167 it is not reasonable that such low 
quality liquor was distributed as an imperial gift. Wine had been the most important item in 
offering rituals to the gods and spirits since ancient times.168 As Poo points out, the value of 
wine as a royal gift was very high, as wine was already a gift to the gods and ancestors.169 
People might have been expected to use the bestowed liquor for various rituals in their own 
places or communities first before consuming it for themselves. In this context, the 
assumption of giving poor quality liquor to his subjects does not meet the intention and the 
nature of the event which was to enhance the authority of emperors by distributing high-
value food. Even though the emperors gave food stuffs in different amounts or different 
forms according to their aristocratic and bureaucratic status in order to reaffirm the social 
hierarchy, adulterated wine or mixed with water would be far from a special gift from the 
emperor.  
 In addition to liquor made with grains such as rice and millet, the ancient Chinese 
seem to have enjoyed various kinds of flavored wine using pepper, ginger, honey, and other 
fragrant plants. According to the Qimin yaoshu text, a wine spiced with pepper (Jiao jiu 椒
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 Ibid.  
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 Mu-Chou Poo, “The Use and Abuse of Wine in Ancient China,” Journal of the Economic and Social 
History of the Orient 42, no. 2 (January 1, 1999): 135. 
169
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酒) was popular at the La 臘 (the real New Year) and the lunar New Year.170 Also, in Shuo 
wen jie zi, the second-century lexicographer Xu Shen (c. 58-147 CE) recorded chang 鬯 as a 
wine brewed with certain fragrant grass mixed with steamed grain. The chang wine, which 
is believed to have been used as ritual wine during the Zhou period, may have been used as a 
royal gift during the Han period.171 As Yates and Barbieri-Low point out, this kind of wine 
could be too luxurious to be given to the lowest officials if it were made with rare fragrant or 
expensive ingredients. In other words, the quality of the wine could vary depending on the 
kind of raw materials used. Therefore, I incline toward the interpretation evaluating hejiu as 
a kind of flavored wine. In particular, I believe that the flavored wine distributed to the 
officials of low salary-grade would be made with easily obtainable or widely enjoyed 
fragrant grass or plants such as pepper, ginger, or other. This could be a proper form of wine 
from the emperor satisfying the goal of displaying imperial authority with a type of 
meaningful and valuable food.     
 In Han times, the gift-giving system was effectively manipulated in order to maintain 
the bureaucratic system, both symbolically and practically. The gift giving system 
proclaimed and perpetuated the social hierarchy and displayed the merciful care of the 
emperor as a father. By supplementing the inadequate salaries of lower-ranking officials as 
well as the income of commoners and convicts, the emperor was portrayed as a provider 
who generously fed his hungry subjects with luxurious food. Most of all, the salary grade 
system with poor pay for the low officials as well as Han society in general was able to be 
maintained without encountering serious social problems instigated by unsatisfied low 
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officials due to effects of the gift-giving system, which mitigated the difficulties of obtaining 
a livelihood and solidified the relationship between the ruler and the ruled.   
     In order to establish the ideal society, the Qin and Han emperors proclaimed edicts 
based on Legalism and Confucianism, upholding discrimination according to status. Food 
distribution was one of the most effective ways to manifest this ideology in the everyday life 
of subjects. With the salary system for officials, the emperors tried to demonstrate and 
reinforce the hierarchical order of society. However, the salary system based on the concept 
of li had realistic problems that could have caused social and political disturbances because 
of the inadequate amount of pay for lower officials. The gift-giving system was applied as a 
supplementary device, not only to solve the problem of the lack of sufficient salary for 
lower-level officials, but also to highlight the virtue of the emperor, who took care of the 
people in poverty with the symbolic and practical action of gifting them with special food. 
The alternative salary payment system for military officials on the frontier also worked to 
maintain social and political stability by guaranteeing enough food for those who lived in 
the military camps.  
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III.  Welfare Food Policies 
 
方春和時 ,草木羣生之物皆有以自樂 ,而吾百姓鰥寡孤獨窮困之人或阽於
死亡 ,而莫之省憂 .  為民父母將何如? 其議所以振貸之 .  
 
 Just now it is spring, when nature is harmonious, and the plants and trees and 
all living beings have means of enjoying themselves, yet among my subjects 
there are widowers, widows, orphans, and childless, distressed and suffering 
people, and some at the point of death, but no one goes to look after their 
suffering.  What should those who are the father and mother of the common 
people do about this situation?  Let it be discussed what are the means to aid 
and lend to them. 172     
 
 
This edict proclaimed by Emperor Wen (文帝, r. 180-157 BCE) in the spring of 179 
BCE indicates the purpose for and recipients of special treatment by the Han emperor and 
ministers. In order for society to be enjoyable and harmonious and without suffering, rulers 
wanted to discuss ways to aid “widowers, widows, orphans, and childless, distressed and 
suffering people, and some at the point of death….” This idea recalls a phrase from Mencius 
(Mengzi 孟子),  referring to the importance of governmental aid for the hungry: 
爲民父母,民飢而死,則曰,非我也,歲也,何異乎以刃殺之,則曰,非我也,兵也?173 
As parents of a sub ect, when people starve to death, if they say “It’s not 
my fault, but the bad harvest,” how is that different from saying, “It’s not 
my fault, but the weapon” when one kills someone with a knife? 
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Press, 1938), 236-237. 
 
173
 Lu Liehong 盧烈紅, 新譯鹽鐡論 Xin Yi Yan Tie Lun (Taibei Shi: San min shu ju, 1995), 487. This 
phrase was originally cited from Menzi. 孟子註疏 Mengzi zhu shu (1A:6, 2:2666) in Shisanjing zhu shu. 
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In fact, there were legal statutes mentioning aid for the sick and the weak by 
providing food and clothes, as seen in the early Han statutes discovered at Zhangjiashan 張
家山: 
吏各循行其部中,有疾病者收食,寒者假衣傳詣其縣.174 
When each official makes a thorough inspection of his post, those who 
have the appearance of becoming ill or are actually sick are to be taken in 
and fed, and those who are cold are to be lent clothing, and then they are to 
be transported through postal-relay stations to the county seat [of the 
inspecting official].175 
 
According to these imperial edicts and the statutes, the Han leaders recognized that 
government is responsible of taking care of the weak and people in need by providing food 
and clothing. This notion is far different from the legalistic view which prevailed during the 
Qin period. Han Feizi (韓非子, ca. 280-233 BCE) clarified the Legalist opinion that 
government relief makes people lazy, and, therefore, the government should not have to 
look after the poor because poverty is caused by each individual’s incapability or 
indolence.176 The Discourses on Salt and Iron (Yantie lun 鹽鐵論) is another source that 
addresses the conflict between the legalistic ministers and Confucian scholars on the issue of 
welfare policy. Therefore, the Han welfare policies have been explained in the context of 
Confucian ideology, contrary to the Qin’s legalistic policies.  
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However, an examination of welfare food policies and their implementation during 
the Han period reveals that the Han welfare policies are hard to understand only within the 
framework of Confucianism versus Legalism. It is certain that the Confucian beliefs were 
widely employed to design the most ideal welfare policies as a means of effectively 
displaying the virtue of the ruler of Han. However, Legalist beliefs sometimes were accepted 
without hesitation in order to establish and conduct certain policies effectively for social 
stability. Ideal policies made with lofty ideology were also sometimes distorted or made 
invalid when the policies were implemented in reality. In this chapter, rather than focusing 
on the two different ideologies, I will examine the accordance and discordance between 
ideology and regulation as well as between regulations and their implementation. In order to 
examine the accordance and discordance among ideology, regulation, and implementation, I 
will analyze the welfare food distributions by categorizing the recipients into three groups: 
the aged (gaonian 高年), female heads-of-household (nüzi baihu 女子百户), and victims of 
natural disasters.  
 Food was often distributed to the aged in order to comfort them as well as to 
demonstrate the ruler’s respect during the Han period. According to the Liji (Book of Rites 
禮記), persons fifty years and older in ancient China were regarded as the elderly (laoren 老
人): “At fifty, one began to decay, one kept his staff always in his hand in his family, and a 
common man was not employed in services requiring strength.”177 This classic also indicates 
that those over fifty should be supported with fine grain and meat according to their age. For 
example, for elders over fifty, fine grain distinguished from that of young people should be 
served; one should keep flesh in store for elders in their sixties; one should serve meat twice 
                                                 
177
  Legge, trans., Li Chi, Book of Rites, 241; Liji zheng yi (juan12.13, 1:1346) Shi san jing zhushu. 
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a day for those in their seventies; for elders eighty years and over, there should be a constant 
supply of delicacies, including meat; for those in their nineties, food, especially meat and 
wine, must always be in their chamber and must follow them wherever they go.178   
 It seems that the Emperor’s food distribution to the aged followed the idea of filial 
piety by feeding the elderly well. From the early Han period they already had rules for 
distributing grains to the aged in order to make gruel. However, the requirements for eligible 
recipients were not consistent throughout the Han period. The history of welfare food 
distribution to the aged and the reality of the regulation will be discussed in this chapter.  
 Another group to receive special care was a group of certain females, nüzi bai hu 女
子百户, literally means “females of one hundred households.” The exact meaning of nüzi 
bai hu is still controversial, but historical records clearly confirm that Han emperors 
distributed meat and wine to this female group at the moment when they bestowed 
aristocratic ranks to the male subjects. In this chapter, after examining the definition and 
nature of nüzi bai hu, I will discuss the importance and meaning of supporting this group 
with providing meat and wine in Han society. This will show that food distribution to nüzi 
bai hu was an aspect of the Han welfare system put in place in order to maintain social 
stability and to display the virtue of the ruler at the same time. 
 In addition, there existed a relief food system for victims of natural disaster, who 
suffered from hunger, illness, and cold. Until the reign of Emperor Yuan (Yuandi 元帝, r. 
48-33 BCE), the definition of “victims” was ambiguous, described in the Han shu simply as 
“those who are badly damaged by disaster” (被災甚者). Sometimes the victims were 
indicated as the poor and the weak (pinzi 貧者, ruozi 弱者, or pinruozi 貧弱者). In 
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  Legge, trans., Li Chi, Book of Rites, 240; Liji zheng yi (juan12.13, 1:1346) Shi san jing zhushu. 
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particular, guan gua gu du 鰥寡孤獨, which literally means “widowers, widows, childless, 
and orphans,” were considered the poorest groups: groups that needed special care not only 
after natural disasters, but also in normal situations. From the time of Emperor Cheng (成帝, 
r. 33-7 BCE), Han histories such as the Han shu and Hou Han shu begin to describe victims 
eligible for government assistance as those who have lost more than forty percent of their 
agricultural yield.179 Victims of natural disasters and the poorest of the poor in Han society 
were the most vulnerable to becoming bandits unless they were cared for with government 
assistance. The written histories on natural disasters and the relief policies for victims will 
be analyzed below in order to examine the purpose of relief food distribution in the Han 
period.  
    
1)  Comfort food for the aged 
 
老萊子楚人也: 事親至孝, 衣服斑連, 婴兒之態, 令親有驩, 君子嘉之, 孝莫大焉. 
 
Elder Laizi was a native Chu: 
He served his parents with the ultimate filial piety. 
Wearing multicolored clothes  
And imitating an infant,  
He made his parents happy. 
Gentlemen praise him  
Because his filial piety is greatest of all.
180
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 “師古曰,什四謂田畝所收十損其四.” Han shu (10.305). “More than 40% 什四以上” appears five 
times in Han shu and six times in Hou Han shu. This includes the record of the seventh year of Yongchu of 
emperor An (  3 CE), which exceptionally mentions  “more than 50% 十五以上.” Hou Han shu (5.220). Kim, 
Natural Disaster and the Confucian State, 225–229.  
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 Inscription of Wu Liang Ci wall carving, Wu Hung, T     L              T   Id        f       
Chinese Pictorial Art (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 280.  
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Figure 5. Story of Laizi from Wu Liang Ci wall carving
181
 
 
 
     During the Spring and Autumn period (春秋时代, 771-476 BCE), there lived a filial 
son whose name was Lao Laizi. The story of Lao Laizi, who served his parents sincerely, is 
depicted in the Han period stone relief of the Wu Liang 武梁 shrine in Shandong Province 
(ca. 50 CE). In this stone relief, Laizi’s wife serves food to the parents sitting on a platform 
as Laizi mimes the gestures of an infant kneeling in front of them. As this stone relief and 
his story imply, comforting one’s parents by serving savory food is believed to be one of the 
fundamental duties of filial sons under Confucian belief.  
     In the same context, serving food to and clothing the aged was adopted as a means of 
realizing the Confucian lesson of “ruling the sub ect with filial virtue 以孝治天下,” a topic 
mentioned in the Classic of Filial Piety (Xiao jing 孝经), as the edict of Emperor Wen 
implies: 
老者非帛不煖 ,  非肉不飽 .  今歲首 ,  不時使人存問長老 ,  又無布帛酒
肉之賜 ,  將何以佐天下子孫孝養其親? 182 
                                                 
181
 Xingzhen Liu and Fengxia Yue, Han Dynasty Stone Reliefs: The Wu Family Shrines in Shandong 
Province (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1991), 25. 
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Unless the aged have silk, they will not be warm; unless they have 
meat, they will not be well-nourished. Now at the beginning of the year, 
if we do not at the right moment send people to visit and ask about the 
health of the elders and aged, nor make grants of linen cloth, plain silk, 
wine, or meat to these people, in what way can we assist the children 
and grandchildren of the empire in filial piety to care of their 
relatives?183   
 
 The practice of the emperor taking care of the aged with food began with the idea of 
filial piety and was apparently regulated by law during the Han period. The Han Shu 
describes that the Emperor Wen, therefore, proclaimed a special ordinance in 179 BCE as 
follows: 
In the prefectures and marches persons of eighty years and older receive per 
person per month one bushel of threshed grain, twenty jin of meat, and five 
dou of wine.  On those of ninety years and older there are bestowed two bolts 
of silk and three jin of silk floss……To persons who have suffered a 
mutilating punishment as well as to those condemned to the punishment of 
shaving off the beard or heavier this Ordinance does not apply.184  
 
This ordinance clarified that all subjects except criminals were able to be the recipient of 
government benefit of one shi of grain per month if they were over eighty years old.   
 However, the ordinance by Emperor Wen was not the first evidence of the 
establishment of the welfare food system for the aged of the Han period. The historical 
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 Han shu (4.113) 
 
183
Dubs, History, vol. 1, 236-237. 
 
184
 Han shu bu zhu (4.7a); Translation from A. F. P. Hulsewé, “Han China: A Proto ‘Welfare State’? 
Fragments of Han Law Discovered in North-West China,” T’     P   73, no. 4/5, Second Series (January 1, 
1987): 271–272. 
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record during the reign of Emperor Wen mentions that before he proclaimed the new 
ordinance he was concerned with the corruption and misbehavior among officials who were 
in charge of “giving grain to those who should receive gruel.”185 This indicates the system of 
giving grain to the aged had been already observed before the ordinance in 179 BCE. 
 It seems that the primitive form of the special care of the ruler for comforting the 
aged with food began with Liu Bang (劉邦, or Emperor Gaozu 高祖, r. 202-195 BCE) 
when he established sanlao (thrice venerable elders 三老) and bestowed upon them wine 
and meats in the tenth month of 205 BCE. However, this first record of food bestowals to 
the elders by Liu Bang was limited to a certain group of elders who were in charge of moral 
leadership.186 Also, it seems that this event occurred irregularly.   
 Recently excavated Han laws among “The Statutes on Enrollment” (Fu lü 傅律) of 
the Statutes and Ordinances of the Second Year (Ernian lülling二年律令) from 
Zhangjiashan, dated ca. 186 BCE confirms that there had been a tradition of distributing 
grain regularly to the aged for making gruel from the early Han period. It reads:  
 
大夫以上[年]九十, 不更九十一, 簪裊九十二, 上造九十三, 公士九十四, 公
卒,士五(伍)九十五以上者, 稟鬻米月一石.187 
 
To those who are at least dafu of ninety years old, bugeng of ninety one, 
zanniao of ninety two, shangzao of ninety three, gongshi of ninety four, 
gongzu and shiwu of ninety five years old and above, one shi of grain for 
making gruel is given every month. 
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 Han shu (4.113); Dubs, 1938, vol.1, 236-237.  
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 Han shu (1.33-34) 
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 “Fu l ” slip no.354, Peng, Zhangjiashan, 230. 
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According to the statutes, both aristocratic rank and age should be considered in 
order to be eligible recipients of grain for gruel. The recipient should be at least ninety years 
old if he holds the fifth aristocratic rank (dafu) or above. If he was of low rank (gongzu) or a 
commoner (shiwu) without any rank, he should be at least ninety-five years old to be a 
recipient.188 (See Table 14 for aristocratic ranks.)     
 
 
Table 14. Aristocratic ranks and titles of the Han period
189
 
 
Aristocratic Rank Title 
20 Che hou 徹候 
19 Guan nei hou 關内候 
18 Da shu zhang 大庶長 
17 Si che shu zhang 駟車庶長 
16 Das shang zao 大上造 
15 Shao shang zao 少上造 
14 You geng 右更 
13 Zhong geng 中更 
12 Zuo geng 左更 
11 You shu zhang 右庶長 
10 Zuo shu zhang左庶長 
9 Wu da fu 五大夫 
8 Gong cheng 公乘 
7 Gong da fu 公大夫 
6 Guan da fu 官大夫 
                                                 
188
 Gongzu and shiwu both indicate those who do not have aristocratic rank. See Itaru Tomiya冨谷至, 
Koryo Chokasan nihyakuyonjunana-go bo shutsudo Kan ritsuryo no kenkyu江陵張家山二四七號墓出土漢律
令の研究 (Kyoto: Hoyu Shoten, 2006), 207, 230. 
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 M. Loewe, “The Orders of Aristocratic Rank of Han China,” T’     P   48, no. 1/3 (January 1, 1960): 
99. Lowe takes gongzu as indicating commoners without rank just as shiwu, but gongzu was a low rank of 
minor status and privilege.  
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5 Dafu 大夫 
4 Bugeng 不更 
3 Zanniao 簪袅 
2 Shang zao 上造 
1 Gongshi 公士 
0.5 Gongzu 公卒 
None  Shiwu 十五 
  
  
 
 If we compare the statute from Zhangjiashan to the ordinance of the Emperor Wen, 
we can notice that there were huge changes in the welfare food system for the aged as 
Emperor Wen proclaimed a new ordinance. First, the minimum age of eligible recipients 
was lowered from ninety to eighty years old. Second, food was given to all elders, except 
criminals, based on age only, regardless of aristocratic rank. Third, they were given not only 
one shi of husked grain for gruel as in the previous law, but also twenty jin of meat and five 
dou of wine monthly. These changes successfully highlighted and manifested the virtue of 
the Emperor as full of filial piety, but at the same time resulted in a financial burden for the 
government and the impracticality of the law.  
 Even though we do not have a census record by age at the time the edict was 
ordered, we can assume that lowering the minimum age requirement from ninety to eighty 
resulted in a significantly increased number of recipients, as shown by a population record 
of Donghai Commandery 東海郡 discovered in Yinwan 尹灣 that records the number of 
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people over ninety years old as 11,670 (0.837% of the population) and the number over 
eighty years old as 33,871 (2.429% of the population) around the year of 10 or 9 BCE.190  
 Abolishing distribution by rank seems not to have brought much change other than 
amplifying the symbolic meaning of benefitting the aged regardless of aristocratic status, 
because older males generally had higher ranks due to the frequent rank bestowals in the 
early Han period. For example, in addition to Liu Bang’s first bestowal of rank to the people 
in the year of 201 BCE, for the ten years from the enthronement of Emperor Hui in 195 BCE 
to the second year of Empress Lü in 186 BCE, there were four instances of rank bestowals 
to every male subject or to the male head-of-household. If the head-of-household had not 
changed for those sixteen years, commoner head-of-households became at least dafu, the 5th 
rank. Since the males who were over eighty years old generally had higher ranks in the early 
Han period, there was little difference in the number of male recipients when they abolished 
the rank requirement. 
 However, there is a possibility that removing conditions based on rank might have 
enlarged eligible recipients to include women. Received texts as well as documents 
discovered about the statutes on welfare food for the aged do not mention specifically the 
rules for aged women. If eligibility is based on aristocratic rank and age, women would 
seem to be excluded from food bestowals because aristocratic ranks were only for male 
subjects. But, some statutes and records on received texts can be interpreted as admitting 
females as legal recipients of food bestowal. According to “The Statutes on Establishment of 
Heirs” (Zhihou lü 置後律) of the Er nian lü ling, married women may “be comparable to her 
                                                 
190
 Lianyun’gang shi bo wu guan, Zhongguo wen wu yan  iu suo, ed., 尹湾汉墓简牍综论 Yinwan han mu 
jian du zong lun (Beijing: Ke xue chu ban she, 1999), 146. However, it has been argued that there is possibility 
of this census figure was fraudulent.     
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husband’s rank.” (女子比其夫爵)191 In fact, this rule of being equivalent to one’s husband’s 
rank had already been mentioned in one of the Confucian classics, Li ji: 
 
凡婦人, 從其夫之爵位.192 
(For the mourning rite) all wives were ranked according to the rank of their 
husband. 
 
故婦人無爵, 從夫之爵, 坐以夫齒.193 
Hence, while the wife had no rank, she was held to be of the rank of her 
husband, and she took her seat according to the position belonging to him. 
 
 These directions are reflected in Han legal cases, in which it appears that “the wife 
holding the Sovereign’s Accomplished rank” (shangzao qi 上造妻) and “the wife holding 
the  night of the Realm rank” (gongshi qi 公士妻) were treated as having the same status as 
their husbands for sentencing in “The Statutes on Composition of Judgments” (Ju lü 具律) 
from Zhangjiashan.194 The same manuscript mentions that the wife cannot use her husband’s 
rank, to which she holds a comparable level, in order to mitigate her sentencing if she 
wounds or murders her husband. (“妻殺傷其夫,不得以夫爵論”)195  
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 “Zhihou l ” slip no.372, Peng, Zhangjiashan, 236. 
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 Li ji zheng yi (juan 41.8, 2:1556) Shi san jing zhu shu. 
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 Li ji zheng yi (juan 26.14, 2:1456) Shi san jing zhu shu. 
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  “Ju l ” slip no. 2 and no. 3, Peng, Zhangjiashan, 123–124; Tomiya, Koryo Chokasan, 59–60. 
 
195 “Ju l ” slip no. 2, Peng, Zhangjiashan, 125; Tomiya, Koryo Chokasan, 60. 
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For food bestowals, however, there is no evidence as yet showing whether the early 
Han emperors also treated wives as holding the equivalent of their husbands’ ranks when 
they bestowed the aged with grain for gruel. Regardless, Emperor Wen’s new ordinance 
abolishing rank as a condition for food bestowals to the aged significantly increases the 
possibility of including old women as recipients during the Han period. Even though the 
ordinance did not indicate the eligibility of females, as Zhao Kai mentions, there seems no 
reason to exclude “mothers,” considering that the emperor intended to realize the virtue of 
filial piety by enacting Confucian virtues.196 Therefore, abolishing rank as a condition for 
regular food distribution to the aged might be understood as a merciful and innovative 
policy of Han expanding the scope of recipients to include elderly women.    
 Because of the imperfectness of excavated document, it is hard to determine that the 
Er nian lü ling from Zhangjiashan regulated one shi of grain only whereas Emperor Wen 
gave meat and wine in addition. However, so far, we cannot find any evidence that indicates 
there existed monthly distribution of meat and wine before the ordinance of Emperor Wen. 
Apart from this issue, let me examine the amount of distributed food to the aged to see if the 
regulation of the food distribution to the aged was established considering reality or just for 
symbolical value.  
 The distributed grain amount declared by Emperor Wen, one shi per month, seems to 
be a reasonable amount for the aged to live on when compared to the grain ration for 
soldiers and their family members as discovered on Juyan 居延 bamboo slips (see Table 11 
in Chapter 2). The distributed grain amount for the aged was about one third of the ration for 
soldiers and adult males (3-3.3 shi) and less than the ration for females of two to six years 
                                                 
196
 Zhao Kai 赵凯, “西汉 '受鬻法' 探论 Xi Han ‘Shou Yu Fa’ Tan Lun”, 中国史研究 Journal of 
Chinese Historical Studies no. 4 (2007): 25. 
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old (1.16 shi), but one shi of grain was enough for a month to make soft gruel, which can be 
two to four or more times the serving amount than normally cooked grain, depending on the 
amount of added water. The monthly amount of wine (5 dou) and meat (20 jin) was about 10 
liters and 4.9 kg, respectively, which comes to about 333ml (11.3 ounces) and 163g (5.75 
ounces) per day.197 These are almost comparable to the standard size of today’s canned beer 
( 2 ounces) and three and a half McDonald’s “Big Mac” burger patties ( .  oz, or 45g, 
approx. uncooked weight).198 This means the aged in the Han society, at least during the 
Emperor Wen’s reign, people over eighty years old would have been able to survive with the 
food from the government only if they actually received it. This means, the amount of 
distributed food was regulated considering daily consumption.  
 However, there have been doubts about the reliability of monthly food bestowals to 
the aged due to the huge amount of governmental expenditure required and the frequency of 
distribution, which covered a vast area.199 For example, according to a record on households 
found in Yinwan, among the 1,394,196 people of the whole population of Donghai 
Commandery during the Yuanyan era (元延, 12-9 BCE) of Emperor Cheng, the number of 
individuals eighty years and older was 33,871, or 2.429% of the population.200 If the 
government bestowed on them one shi of grain per month, Donghai Commandery would 
spend 406,452 shi of grain on welfare food for the aged yearly. This amount is about 97.7% 
of the total annual expenditure of grain in Donghai.201  
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 According to the document from Yinwan, the Donghai jun spent 415,811 shi of grain out of an income 
of 566,337 shi in one year.   
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 According to a record of kitchen expenditures from Xuanquan 悬泉, Dunhuang 敦煌
, meat cost six qian 钱 per jin.202 The Jiuzhang Suanshu 九章算数 mentions that wine cost 
ten to fifty qian per dou, probably depending on its quality, and one hundred qian per shi of 
grain (millet). This means that monthly costs ranged from about 270 to 470 qian to provide 
food to one old person. This was about a half the salary of the lowest two officials, doushi 
and zuoshi (see Han salary list in Table 10).       
 It seems that the financial conditions under Emperor Wen were not so abundant as to 
be able to feed all the aged people in the empire once a month, even though significant 
economic growth occurred during his reign and that of his son Emperor Jing (景帝, r. 157-
141 BCE), due to keeping the heqin 和亲 policy with the Xiongnu and avoiding wasteful 
expenditure. Historical records show that under the reign of Emperor Wen, when the new 
welfare policy was proclaimed, there was not enough grain stocked in the granaries to feed 
even the soldiers in frontier areas, so assistance from the rich was solicited in exchange for 
granting aristocratic ranks: 
匈奴數侵盜北邊，屯戍者多，邊粟不足給食當食者。於是募民能
輸及轉粟於邊者拜爵，爵得至大庶長 . 203 
 
At this time (of Emperor Wen) the Xiongnu were making frequent raids 
across the northern border, and farming garrisons had to be set up along 
the frontier to stop them. The grain produced by these garrisons alone, 
however, was not sufficient to feed all the border troops. The government 
then called upon the people to supply grain, offering honorary ranks to 
those who were prepared to send grain to the frontier. The rank varied 
                                                 
202
 Pingsheng Hu and Defang Zhang, Dunhuang Xuanquan Han jian shi cui (Shanghai: Shanghai gu ji chu 
ban she, 2001), 171. 
203
 Shiji (30:1419) 
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with the amount of grain but reached as high as the eighteenth rank, 
called dashuzhang.204 
 
 This evidence means that the ordinance on giving grain, meat, and wine monthly to 
the aged over eighty years old was probably difficult to observe. It is certain that this 
unprecedented ordinance of Emperor Wen’s was not executed even at the beginning of 
Emperor Wu’s reign when the financial and economic condition was good, as “in the central 
granary of the government, new grain overflowed and piled up outside, where it spoiled and 
became unfit to eat.”205 From a speech in the first year of Emperor Wu that “for those of the 
[common] people who are in their ninetieth year and over, there is already a law that they 
should receive gruel,”206 it is apparent that the government granted grains for making gruel 
to those who were ninety years old and over regardless of their rank. This indicates that 
since before Emperor Wu’s enthronement, the new ordinances proclaimed by Emperor Wen 
were ignored, and instead, the previously regulated policy of limited grain distribution for 
gruel with some revision on age and rank conditions were observed. However, the reliability 
of even this revised grain distribution for people over ninety years old is also doubtful 
because frequent wars led to subsequent financial deficiencies during the reign of Emperor 
Wu. Zhao Kai argues that Donghai commandery could not afford to distribute grains to 
those over ninety years old as the population of ninety years old and over was 11,670 
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 Sima Qian, Records of the Grand Historian: Han Dynasty II, trans. Burton Watson (Hong Kong: 
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 “民年九十以上，已有受鬻法 . ”  Han shu (6.156),  Dubs, History, vol. 1, 29. 
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(0.837% of the population), which would require 140,040 shi of grain (33.7% of annual 
expenditure of the province) around 12-9 BCE.207   
 Regardless of whether the policy of grain distribution to the aged was effective or 
not, the ordinance regarding the monthly food distribution declared by Emperor Wen helped 
demonstrate the ruler’s filial piety and mercy by expanding the scope of beneficiaries and 
attempting to serve them savory food.  Maintaining the tradition of giving grain for gruel to 
the aged also held the symbolic meaning of showing the emperor’s respect for the aged. 
These policies, however, were not applied perfectly in reality, nor were they abolished 
during the Han period, either. Even though rulers already recognized the impracticality of 
the policy as they discontinued obeying Emperor Wen’s ordinance, they could not admit the 
ineffectiveness of food bestowal to the aged because of the symbolic importance of the 
welfare food policy for the aged in a society where the Confucian virtue of feeding the 
elderly with good food was required of a sage ruler. After Emperor Wen’s edict of generous 
bestowal, it is hard to find any additional orders about regular or irregular food distribution 
to the aged. Also, whereas there are some records about silk or clothing bestowals to the 
aged during the Eastern Han period in the official histories, it is hard to find any mention of 
the grain distribution since Emperor Wu proclaimed that “there is already a law that they 
should receive gruel.” It seems that Han emperors pretended the grain distribution for the 
aged was an actual policy. They still had the policy of grain distribution to the aged and 
tacitly treated it as an ongoing tradition even though the government could not afford to 
realize the existing policy.         
                                                 
207
 Zhao  ai, “Xi Han ‘Shou Yu Fa’ Tan Lun,” 2 . 
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2) Food for female heads-of-household 
  
 Females who were registered as head-of-households (nüzi baihu 女子百户,literally 
“women in one hundred households”) were also recipients of the irregularly distributed 
welfare food of ox and wine (牛酒) during the Han period. Food bestowals to nüzi baihu 
were recorded twenty-one times during the Western Han period, once under Wang Mang’s 
rule, and once in the Eastern Han period. It is generally recorded that the rulers distributed 
nüzi baihu an ox and wine (牛酒).208 Even though there have been various interpretations on 
the meaning of nüzi baihu due to the lack of detailed information on this practice as well as 
differing opinions in commentaries made by scholars in received texts such as the Shiji and 
the Han shu, the phrase ci nüzi baihu niujiu (赐女子百户牛酒, literally, “give women in one 
hundred households ox and wine”) was generally understood to indicate “giving an ox and 
ten shi of wine per one hundred female head-of-households.”209     
 Legal documents of the early Han period imply that there were times when women 
could become the head-of-household. According to “The Statutes on Establishment of 
Heirs” (Zhihou lü置後律) from Zhangjiashan script, females, such as the deceased head-of-
household’s mother, wife, daughter, granddaughter, great granddaughter, grandmother, and 
even step sister, were able to succeed the deceased’s position as head-of-household, if 
appropriate male heirs did not exist: 
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死毋子男代戶, 令父若母, 毋父母令寡, 毋寡令女, 毋女令孫, 毋孫令耳孫, 
毋耳孫令大父母, 毋大父母令同産, 子代戶……210 
 
When a person dies without a male offspring to substitute [as the legal head 
of] the household, order the father or the mother [to substitute as head of 
household]; when the person has no [surviving] father or mother, order the 
surviving spouse [to substitute as head of household]; when there is no 
surviving spouse, order a daughter [to substitute as head of household]; 
when there is no daughter, order a grandchild; when there is no grandchild, 
order a great-grandchild; when there is no great-grandchild, order the 
paternal grandfather or grandmother; when there is no paternal grandfather 
or grandmother, order a child of a [sibling] born of the same [mother] to 
substitute [as the legal head of] the household….211 
 
 In fact, the existence of the female head-of-household can be observed even from 
Qin administrative documents recently discovered on-site at Liye, Hunan Province. 
According to the inscribed slips on household registers, the households registered under 
female adults (da nüzi 大女子)or underage males (xiao nanzi 小男子) were eight among a 
total of twenty-five households.212 This indicates that a female head-of-household must have 
not been rare during the Han period, either.  
 According to historical records, giving beef and wine was not the only event for 
these nüzi baihu during the Han period. The aged were occasionally given one ox and ten shi 
of wine per unit of one hundred households. It is also written that a certain amount of beef 
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and wine were given to people of fifty households, one hundred households, or one district 
at special occasions such as imperial celebrations or an emperor’s visit in the early Han 
period.213 However, since the reign of Emperor Wu, historical records show that beef and 
wine were more likely to be given mostly to women.214 Notably, the bestowal of beef and 
wine to the nüzi baihu always coincided with the bestowal of aristocratic ranks on registered 
male head-of-households. 
  Granting beef and wine to the female head-of-households also served to 
symbolically highlight the ruler’s Confucian virtue. Since the first bestowal recorded at the 
enthronement of Emperor Wen in the year of 180 BCE, it is recorded that emperors gave the 
food to the females when they wanted to show themselves renewed with full Confucian 
virtue. The food was given at momentous times such as enthronement, the beginning of a 
new era, sacrificial rituals, imperial tours, and the appearance of auspicious natural 
phenomena or animal prodigies, most of which required symbolic actions from a sage ruler 
to impress his subjects and harmonize with the cosmological order (see Table 15). 
Therefore, unlike the staple food for relief distribution, at these times distributed food itself 
was lofty ritual food – meat and wine. By distributing these symbolic foods to female head-
of-households who could not be the recipients of aristocratic ranks, the emperor aimed to 
extend his mercy to every household in the empire when he needed to show his Confucian 
virtue.  
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Table 15. Food Bestowals to the female head-of-household 
 
No. Emperor Year Reason Reference 
1 Wendi 180BCE Enthronement HS 4.108 
SJ 10.417 
2 Wudi 113 BCE Sacrifice  HS 6.183 
3 110 BCE Start new name of an era HS 6.192 
4 Xuandi 73 BCE Auspicious natural phenomenon  HS 8.242 
5 72 BCE Made temple for emperor Wu HS 8.243 
6 65 BCE Auspicious natural phenomenon 
(super natural bird) 
HS 8.254 
7 64 BCE Auspicious natural phenomenon HS 8.255 
8 63 BCE Auspicious natural phenomenon HS 8.257 
9 62 BCE Auspicious natural phenomenon HS 8.259 
10 61 BCE Auspicious natural phenomenon HS 8.259 
11 58 BCE Auspicious natural phenomenon HS 8.263 
12 55 BCE Auspicious natural phenomenon HS 8.267 
13 52 BCE Auspicious natural phenomenon HS 8.269 
14 Yuandi 47 BCE Visiting, sacrifice HS 9.281 
15 45 BCE Visiting, sacrifice HS 9.285 
16 43 BCE  
(1
st
 month) 
Visiting, sacrifice HS 9.287 
17 43 BCE  
(3rd month) 
General amnesty HS 9.287 
18 42 BCE General amnesty HS 9.288 
19 34 BCE General amnesty HS 9.296 
20 Chengdi 20 BCE  HS  10.315 
21 13 BCE  Visiting, sacrifice HS 10.24 
22 Wang 
Mang 
9 CE New era (lamb and wine) HS 99B.4114 
23 Zhangdi 85 CE Auspicious natural phenomenon HHS 3.152 
 
 
 The gift of food to these women was designed not only to express symbolic meaning, 
but also to fulfill a practical role toward social stability. As seen in the family registration of 
female heads-of-households as well as in the statutes on female heirs from the Qin and early 
Han period, families with female heads seem not to have been rare. This might be related to 
the frequent conscriptions for warfare and for construction work, which resulted in a high 
mortality rate of male adults. It seems that the frequent civil wars and uprisings at the end of 
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the Qin period produced a number of female-headed households. Also, tension with the 
Xiongnu along the northern frontier must have caused many occasions in which families lost 
adult males who were the head-of-household or heirs of priority in their families. By 
examining the Juyan bamboo slips, which consider the environment, climate, dietetic 
conditions, and labor intensity of the northwestern garrison, Gao Kai shows that the female-
headed household of the Han Dynasty was largely caused by the high disease and mortality 
rate of garrison soldiers in the Juyan area.215 Therefore, it can be said that the occasional 
distribution of special food to the female heads was also for comforting the families who had 
lost the male head-of-household. Although women were registered as the head of a family, 
they were excluded from the benefit of general imperial gifts such as the rank bestowals that 
economically benefitted other families. Food bestowals exclusive to the female head-of-
household aimed to comfort the families in distress economically and mentally for the loss 
of their men, who sacrificed themselves for the state. Not only symbolically, but also 
practically, this policy that took care of the families left behind and possibly resulted in 
raising the morale of the army as well.  
 The symbolic as well as practical design of the ox and wine distribution to the female 
heads can also be seen from the amount of food offered. If one ox and ten shi of wine were 
distributed per one hundred households, it can be estimated that each household was given 
one dou 斗 (0.1 shi or 1.996 liters) of wine and one one-hundredth of an ox. According to 
contemporary research on beef grading, the range of weight of beef cattle is 950 to 1500 
pounds (about 430-680 kg) with an average weight of 1150 pounds (522 kg). The dressing 
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percent, which means the meat and skeletal portion of an animal compared to its live weight, 
of steers and heifers is 55-67 percent with an average of 62%.216 If we assume the average 
weight of an ox was 950 pounds (430 kg) with a dressing percent of 55, considering the 
ancient ox’s nutrient condition, the edible part of an ox was about 237 kg. This means each 
household of female heads was supposed to receive about 2.37 kg of meat, which is about 
9.7 jin of meat in Han measure.217 According to the “Statutes of Bestowals” from 
Zhangjiashan (strip no. 297), zuoshi and doushi (or lingshi), officials of the two lowest 
bureaucratic ranks, were supposed to receive eight and ten jin of meant respectively, and one 
dou of wine at the emperor’s food bestowal. The calculated amount of beef and wine to one 
female head-of-household was about the same as the regulated amount of meat and wine 
given as an imperial gift to lower officials. Being treated like lower officials on the occasion 
of special distributions seems reasonable in terms of the symbolic meaning of comforting 
the families of veterans. This shows that food distribution to the female head-of-households 
was designed to coincide with the social ranking system and regulations on food distribution 
to officials. Even though the food amount and the recipients are expressed in symbolic and 
obscure terms in the records without specific numbers or units of measure, the actual amount 
to be distributed to the female heads accords well with the hierarchical scale of food 
distribution discovered in the early Han statutes of Zhangjiashan.     
 Unfortunately, due to the lack of data on the number of female head-of-households 
during the Han period, it is hard to estimate how many cows and how much wine in total 
they needed for this special food distribution. A calculation can be inferred from the 
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numbers on record for a similar custom of giving beef and wine to general subjects and 
households that occasionally occurred during the Han period. For example, each one 
hundred households was bestowed ox and wine (百戶牛酒) in 7 BCE when the Empress 
Dowager was enthroned after Emperor Cheng died.218 Using the census of registered 
households in 2 CE, which numbered 12,366,470,219 we can say that more or less 123,000 
cows and 1,230,000 shi of wine would be needed when they made the special bestowal in 7 
BCE. Slaughtering 123,000 cows and providing 1,230,000 shi of wine for a one-time 
bestowal, however, seems like it could not possibly have been implemented in the Han 
society, where cows were generally used for agriculture and grain was the main staple.     
 Considering the total amounts of beef and wine for distribution, Yu Kunji argues that 
the gifts of beef and wine to the female head-of-households would also be impossible to 
implement as recorded because of the presumed large number of recipients covering a vast 
area. Instead of giving food, he proposes that cash could have been used as an alternative 
method. By converting the ox and wine into the contemporary price, he suggests that each 
female head might have been given 100 qian in cash, which had one tenth to one twentieth 
the value of the rank bestowal.220 According to him, the unit of “one hundred households” 
was used as a unit of distribution instead of a specific amount for each household in order to 
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simplify statistics, since they could record in the account ten thousand qian (萬錢 ) per unit 
of one hundred households was paid.221  
 In fact, newly discovered statutes from Zhangjiashan on the alternative payment of 
cash for imperial bestowals support Yu’s theory: 
 
諸當賜, 官毋其物者, 以平賈(價) 予錢.222 
 
For every bestowal, if the government does not have the item, give cash 
according to its value.  
 
There are also statutes mentioning that the government gave cash to households preparing 
coffins for the dead with different amounts of money according to the aristocratic ranks of 
the dead.223 These indicate that cash was widely used as an alternative to gifted items due to 
easy supply.     
 With insufficient information, however, it is difficult to conclude that the beef and 
wine were replaced by cash in actuality. Whether the imperial order to distribute meat and 
wine to the female head-of-households was replaced by cash payments or not, it is certain 
that the emperor intended to comfort these women by treating them the same as lower 
officials of the first to third aristocratic ranks when he bestowed ranks to males. This welfare 
food distribution seems to have been designed to highlight the symbolic meaning of the 
Confucian virtue of the ruler as well as to pursue social stability by supporting the women 
who had lost a husband or sons.  
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 Food distribution to the female heads mostly occurred during the Western Han 
period; the only event of the Eastern Han for which Emperor Zhang bestowed gifts was in 
85 CE when he also gave three ranks to males and silk to the aged and guan gua gu du when 
auspicious animals appeared in the empire. After this, no record of food bestowal for female 
heads-of-household exists in the Han history. This is probably related to the decreased 
number of female head-of-households, due to less warfare, as well as the decline of the 
social status of women as the Confucian order was consolidated in the society. During the 
Western Han period, especially in early Han, the rulers needed to show their respect to the 
families who had sacrificed their men for the state, and to compensate them with special 
care. Like the welfare food for the aged and the victims of disaster, the distribution of meat 
and wine to the female head-of-households was designed with the purpose of maintaining 
social and political stability and displaying Confucian ideals at the same time. 
   
3) Food for famine relief 
 
Providing food to those in distress after a natural disaster was one of the main 
welfare food policies in Han China. Records on famine relief activities during the Qin and 
Han periods can be observed in descriptions of the events of natural disasters in historical 
literature. Therefore, before examining the relief activities and food distribution for the 
victims, it is necessary to understand the ancient Chinese notion of zaiyi (災異), “disaster” 
and the meaning of it in the received texts.       
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In Chinese, zaiyi indicates a natural disaster or unusual natural phenomena.224 
According to Hanyu da cidian 汉语大词典, the contemporary meaning of zai災 is 
“naturally caused fire” or “general disasters.”225  However, among the various original forms 
of zai from the bone inscriptions of the Shang 商 (c. 1600-1046 BCE) periods, the plural 
wavy lines, which indicate flood, constitue the most common form of zai.226 In Shuo wen jie 
zi 說文解字, the early pictograms of zai indicate not only flood, but also barren lands and 
fire caused by thunder and lightning. In addition to these natural disasters, it is believed that 
zai also includes harm by warfare.227 These show that the ancient Chinese concept of zai was 
deeply related to the concern of both natural and man-made disorders caused by water and 
fire, which could destroy a person’s life as well as their lands for dwellings and agriculture. 
Following these concepts, a Confucian scholar of the Han period, He Xiu 何休 (129-182), 
developed the details in his commentaries on the meaning of zai as “to harm people or 
ob ects” and “to incur damage to more than two kinds of grain.”228    
 On the other hand, the character yi 異 was not originally related to any natural 
phenomena.  The basic meanings of yi are “to divide,” “to apportion” (Shu wen jie zi),229 
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“strange,” or “not usual.”230 It was the Gongyang Commentary (Gongyang zhuan 公羊傳), a 
commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu 春秋), that first used the word yi 
for natural phenomena during the Warring States period (403-221 BCE). The Gongyang 
Commentary called unusual natural phenomena, such as a solar eclipse, lunar eclipse, sleet, 
intense thunder and lightning, warm winter, dry weather, earthquakes, landslides, roaches, 
and so on as yi, while flood, drought, insect pests, and fire are considered zai.231 It seems that 
from the Gongyang perspective, zai was a term indicating severe natural phenomena that 
brought disaster in their wake, while yi was the word of choice to describe unusual natural 
phenomena that imparted less physical harm.232 This interpretation can be extended to say 
that zai was used for both natural and man-made disasters that would cause a year of bad 
harvest, while yi indicated unusual natural phenomena that rarely impacted the agricultural 
yield. 
In addition to the term zaiyi, which broadly indicated natural disaster and famine, 
historical texts of the Han used various words to describe the kinds of disaster, such as flood 
(大水 da shui), drought (旱 han), wind (風 feng), locusts (蝗 huang), epidemics (疫 yi, 疾 
ji), earthquakes (震 zhen), fire (火 huo), and bad harvest (凶作 xiong zuo). The research on 
disasters and climate conditions in ancient China has depended on the analysis of these 
words in historical literature. In the 1930s, Deng Ta concluded that there were eighty-one 
instances of drought and seventy-six of flood that occurred during the Qin and Han 
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periods.233 Yang Zhenhong argues that there were ninety-one cases of drought: thirty-two 
years and fifty-nine years in Western and Eastern Han periods, respectively, and seventy-
nine years with floods: twenty-six during Western Han and fifty-three during Eastern Han.234 
Chen Yexin, in his doctoral dissertation of 2001, suggests that one hundred and eleven 
droughts occurred during the Han period, which would mean that Han China had a year of 
drought every four years.235 He also calculates that the Han Empire had one hundred and five 
years of floods.236 Furthermore, Chen demonstrates the different frequencies and patterns of 
disasters between northern and southern China based on these historical documents.237      
 The previous research by several scholars contributes to the discovery that droughts 
and floods were the most serious and frequent natural disasters during the Qin and Han 
dynasties. However, the discussion on the exact number of years of drought and floods or 
generalizations of disaster patterns according to region based on the written histories are of 
questionable reliability because, as Robin D. S. Yates points out, the received texts and 
documents researchers have used as records of disaster are incomplete and superficial.238 
Nevertheless, these quantitative data are crucial for research on disaster as well as relief 
activities due to the lack of research methods and sources on ancient China. In this section, 
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in order to make up for weak points in the quantitative research, I will also examine the 
context of the written record on disasters and relief activities. 
It has been observed that there are two different patterns of writing on disaster and 
famine in the Shiji, Hanshu, and Hou Hanshu. One is that disaster is mentioned in 
conjunction with political events to highlight social and political disorder. For example, in 
the chapter “Basic Annals of the First Emperor of the Qin” in the Shiji, when the Prefect of 
the Capital, Teng騰, attacked Han 韓 and seized King An 安 of the Han in the year 231 
BCE, it is written that “there was an earthquake” and “the people suffered from severe 
famine.”239 Also, in 228 BCE, when the king of Qin put to death all the persons who had 
been enemies of his mother’s family, “there was severe famine.”240 In addition, the first year 
to the ninth year of the Annals of the First Emperor are full of records on zaiyi, such as 
severe famine, swarms of locusts, pestilence, winter thunder, comets, floods, and severe 
cold, along with the records of disorder created by the First Emperor of Qin. There are also 
numerous records on yi from the Han dynasty, particularly under Empress L ’s (d.  0 BCE) 
rule. In this pattern, the records on natural disaster always accompany social and political 
chaos. Also, it is rare to find any mention of relief activities in the aftermath of the recorded 
disaster. 
Another pattern of record into disasters in historical literature is to give detailed 
information on the ensuing damage and on relief policies. Rather than simply mentioning 
the disaster itself and political events, this is usually accompanied by a report on the cause of 
disaster, the damaged area, and the degree of damage. Mostly, relief activities proclaimed by 
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the ruler in order to help the victims are recorded. These records focus on the efforts of 
rulers who tried to restore universal order by relieving their subjects in distress after a 
disaster. For example, the record during the second year of Emperor Ping ( 平帝, r. 1-6 CE) 
describes in detail what the emperor did after the disaster:  
  
郡國大旱，蝗，青州尤甚，民流亡。安漢公、四輔、三公、卿大
夫、吏民為百〔姓〕困乏獻其田宅者  二百三十人，  以口賦貧民。  
遣使者捕蝗，民捕蝗詣吏，以石 受錢。  天下民貲不滿二萬，及
被災之郡不滿十萬，勿租稅。民疾疫者，舍空邸第，為置醫藥。  
賜死者一家六尸以上葬錢五千，四尸以上三千，二尸以上二千。
罷安定呼池苑，以為安民縣，  起官寺巿里，募徙貧民，縣次給食。
至徙所，賜田宅什器，假與犂、牛、種、食。又起五里於長安城
中，宅二百區，以居貧民 . 241 
 
In the commanderies and kingdoms there was a great drought and plague of 
locusts in Qing Province it was especially severe, so that its common 
people became vagrants. The high ministers, grandees, officials and 
common people, 230 persons in all, presented their fields and residences on 
behalf of suffering and indigent people in accordance with their number. 
Messengers were sent to catch the locusts; the common people who caught 
locusts and brought them to the officials received cash in accordance with 
the weight or number. The common people of the empire whose property 
was not as much as 20,000 cash, together with those in the commanderies 
which suffered from the visitation whose property was not as much as 
100,000 cash were not to pay the land tax or poll taxes. The common 
people who suffered from the epidemic were lodged in the empty lodges 
and residences and physicians and medicines were provided for them. 
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Grants were made for the dead; for six corpses or over in one family. Five 
thousand cash for burial; for four corpses or over, three thousand; and for 
two corpses or over, two thousand cash….In the counties where they 
lodged as they were moving, they were given food, and when they reached 
the places to which they were removed, they were granted fields, 
residences, productive instruments, and were made loan of oxen for 
plowing, and of seed and food. Five hamlets were also built within the city 
of Chang’an with two hundred residences, for the poor people to dwell in.242 
 
 
 The frequency of the second pattern of disaster, which was recorded with related 
policies, increased towards the end of Western Han and during the Eastern Han period. Also, 
the Han shu and the Hou Hanshu tend to contain more relief records with detailed 
information on disasters, while Shiji contains more descriptions of related political events 
that occurred with a given disaster. It could be said that the increase of reporting on damage 
and relief activities in histories indicates an increased number of disasters in various regions 
as well as the development of administrative procedures for the investigation of disasters 
and relief activities during the Han dynasty.243 However, in addition to examining the 
information as it is written in the histories, these two different patterns of writing on famine 
should be analyzed in the context of the ideologies that influenced the writing of history in 
this period.  
 Writing about disaster with political criticism seems to be related to the tradition of 
Confucianism, which views natural disasters as deeply related to political events and the 
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virtue of rulers. The connection between natural disaster and politics was addressed by 
Confucian scholar Dong Zhungshu (董仲舒,179-104 BCE) during the early Han period. 
According to Dong, historical literature records the phenomena of natural disasters in order 
to show the intimate relationship between heaven and the court:  
 
故春秋之所譏，災害之所加也；春秋之所惡，怪異之所施也。
書邦家之過，兼災異之變，以此見人之所為，其美惡之極，乃與
天地流通而往來相應，此亦言天之一端也 . 244 
 
Therefore, it has been emphasized that the event criticized in the Chunqiu 
(Spring and Autumn Annals) was accompanied by disaster, and the event 
disliked by Chunqiu occurred in conjunction with a strange phenomenon. 
The misbehavior of the state is recorded along with natural disasters to 
show that the extremes of good and bad things done by people have direct 
intercourse with Heaven and influence each other; this is one aspect of 
Heaven. 
 
 By pointing out that in the Spring and Autumn Annals the misdeed of the Duchess of 
Qi (齊,1046-221 BCE) had disturbed cosmic harmonies and incited a major disaster in the 
year  74 BCE, Dong makes the claim that the ruler’s lewd behavior caused the natural 
disaster.
245
 Around 128 BCE, Dong was sentenced to death (he was later pardoned) because 
of his Zaiyi zhi ji 災異之記, Record on Disasters and Anomalies, a text that interpreted 
natural disasters as indications of disorder in Empeor Wu’s court and government. Even 
                                                 
244
 Han shu (8.2515). 
 
245
 Anne Kinney, Representations of Childhood and Youth in Early China (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003), 143.  
 131 
 
though Dong no longer dared to express his views about the meaning of portents after this 
event, his theory on the connection between disasters and the court (zaiyi lun 災異論) was 
reflected in other historical literature, too. It seems that Sima Qian (司馬遷, ca. 145 or 135-
86 BCE) followed Dong’s interpretation of the reason for natural disasters and he used signs 
in the heavens to criticize the misbehavior of rulers who did not follow Confucian virtue. 
The fact that his father, Sima Tan (司馬談, ca. 165-110 BCE), who was an official in charge 
of astronomy and the calendar (taishi ling 太史令), began the writing of the history implies 
that he must have intended to relate the natural phenomena to political events when 
explaining the patterns of Chinese history.  
While some records on disaster reflect the Confucian notion of zaiyi lun, connecting 
natural disasters with political criticism, the other pattern of informative reports seems to 
have been largely influenced by Legalist-leaning Confucian Xunzi’s (荀子, ca. 312-230 
BCE) view on disaster, which sees the course of nature as irrelevant to government practices:  
 
The course of nature is constant: it does not survive because of the action of 
the King Yao; it does not perish because of the actions of the King Jie. If you 
respond to the constancy of Nature’s course with good government, there will 
be good fortune.…If you conform to the Way and are not of two minds, then 
Nature cannot bring about calamity. Accordingly, flood and drought cannot 
cause famine, cold and heat cannot cause sickness, an inauspicious and freak 
event cannot cause misfortune.246 
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Xunzi’s view on nature was followed by early Han political advisors such as Jia Yi (
賈誼, 200-169 BCE) and Chao Cuo (晁錯, 200-154 BCE), who insisted on the importance 
of the administration’s role in preventing calamity by encouraging agriculture. Chao Cuo 
further suggested detailed relief policies, such as local amnesty, rank bestowal, farmer’s tax 
exemption for offering of grains, an immigration policy of sending the poor to the frontier, 
and a grain circulation system from surplus areas to insufficient areas.247 His proposals are 
clearly reflected in the relief policies recorded in historical documents such as the following:   
 
孝景二年，令民半出田租，三十而稅一也。其後，上郡以西旱，
復修賣爵令，而裁其賈以招民；  及徒復作，得輸粟於縣官以除
罪 . 248 
 
In the second year of the reign of the emperor Jing (156/155 BCE), [by 
imperial edict] it was ordered that the people pay half of their [former] 
produce tax zu on their fields, [that is] one-thirtieth [of their crops; but at 
the same time the size of the acre was legally recognized to be two and 
four-tenths larger than the Zhou acre]. When sometime afterwards, in the 
province of Shang and to the westward, there was a drought, the ordinance 
for sale of rank was again revised, its cost, however, being cut in order to 
attract the people; while exiles condemned to guard duty on the frontiers for 
one year, together with the women of their families sentenced to menial 
service in government building for the year, were allowed to transport grain 
su to the central government xianguan in order to be pardoned for their 
crimes.249  
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 Relief policies based on Xunzi’s view of disasters and the importance of agriculture 
developed through the Han period with the adoption of various policies. According to the 
records, Han emperors tried to aid disaster victims and the hungry by opening granaries, 
mountains, marshes, and sometimes imperial parks, reducing taxes, moving people to other 
places, allowing the selling of ranks, prohibiting brewing, and distributing or lending relief 
food and seeds.
250 
   
In addition to these realistic relief policies that were directly related to the people’s 
survival, Han emperors tried to select new officials with Confucian virtue after major natural 
disasters in order to correct the disorder.
251
 During the reign of Emperor Xuan (宣帝, r. 74-
49 BCE), frequent natural disasters induced the emperor to order the selection of new 
officials full of Confucian virtue to solve the problem. This tradition of seeking new officials 
of Confucian virtue after disasters continued to the end of the Han period.
252
 This proves 
that Han emperors still believed that the disorder following a disaster could be reversed by 
hiring officials who had the Confucian virtue of obeying the heavenly order.   
  In the same context, it seems that relief policies which accorded to Confucian 
lessons were believed to be one of the solutions for repairing the distorted harmony between 
the heavens and the court. Therefore, the recorded famines and relief policies focus on 
demonstrating the efforts of rulers to reestablish harmony by expanding their mercy and 
soothing the people’s suffering. This may be another case of the influence of zaiyi lun in 
history. Even though historians no longer used the famine itself as a means of political 
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criticism, they introduced and propagandized the merciful relief policies of sage rulers after 
natural disasters. For example, the record on the mercifulness of Emperor Wen after the 
drought and famine of  5  BCE emphasizes the emperor’s intention to restore cosmological 
order by conducting merciful policies: 
 
天下旱 ,  蝗 ,  帝加惠：令諸侯毋入貢 , 弛山澤 ,  減諸服御狗馬 ,  損郎
吏員 ,  發倉庾  以振貧民 ,  民得賣爵 .253 
       
The empire was afflicted by drought and locusts.  The emperor (Emperor 
Wen) showed his mercy by ordering the feudal lords not to send their usual 
offerings of tribute, relaxing the laws which prohibited the use of the natural 
resources of mountains and lakes, economizing on the imperial robes, 
carriages, dogs, and horses, reducing the number of palace attendants and 
officials, and opening the store houses and granaries in order to relieve the 
suffering of the poor.  He also allowed the people to buy and sell noble 
ranks.254    
 
 
 Even though it seems that Xunzi’s realistic view on natural disaster is strongly 
reflected in the Han relief policies, Han emperors seem to have believed that showing the 
emperor’s mercy in caring for the people with relief policies in itself was effective in 
restoring cosmological balance after a disaster. Also, Han historians mentioned the event of 
relief not only to record what happened but also for demonstrating the Confucian virtues of 
the emperor. No merciful activity is mentioned during the Qin period or the period of Wang 
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Mang’s rule (AD  -23) in historical literature, while a series of relief policies for comforting 
and relieving people in distress as recorded in each reign of the Han period.   
The symbolic importance of relief activities in governance and the role of writing on 
relief policies are enough to raise doubts on the implementation and the effectiveness of the 
relief policies during the Han period. Hiranaka Reiji 平中苓次 and Nishijima Sadao 西島定
生 argue that Han relief policies after disasters were not for benefiting the poor victims but 
for displaying the emperor’s virtue. According to them, the most frequently proclaimed 
relief policy of land-tax reduction to each household, in particular, was not beneficial to 
tenants, the most vulnerable farmers who do not have their own land.255 Even though A.F.P. 
Hulsewé sees the exemption from taxation and statutory services as much easier to realize, 
he also doubts the implementation of the distribution of relief food during the Han period 
because of the frequent occurrences and the large number of eligible recipients across such a 
huge territory.256 
However, if the government relief system was not as effective during the Han period 
as some scholars argue, it would have brought large numbers of refugees every few years 
across a vast area, since there were frequent and severe disasters during the Han period. This 
would have directly influenced the security of the empire with an increased number of 
bandits as well as a decreased population. In fact, emperors and politicians were always 
worried about the problem of bandits when they encountered disaster and famine. With such 
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frequent disasters, it is hard to imagine that Han China was able to exist over four hundred 
years without an effective system of famine relief.   
Among the various relief policies which were designed to rescue starving people 
both directly and indirectly, I argue that grain distribution, one of the frequently appearing 
relief policies in written histories, was the most effective method that was actually installed 
and practiced in order to save the able-bodied peasants and prevent them from becoming 
bandits. In order to support this argument, it should be followed by an examination of the 
development of disaster reporting and the relief system during the Qin and Han dynasties.          
The regulations on famine investigations and relief processes described in bamboo 
manuscripts as well as in the received texts suggest that a solid system of famine relief had 
been established since the Qin period. According to “The Statutes on Agriculture” (Tian lü 
田律) from Shuihudi, each county (xian) was required to report in writing the size of 
damaged fields and deliver this to the central government using light-footed runners or 
courier service by the eighth month.257 According to this statute, each county was in charge 
of reporting the damage to the central government. This statute was originally established 
for taxation during the Qin period, but it seems that this reporting system was also observed 
as the first step of relief procedures until the reign of Emperor Jing (景帝, r. 157-141 BCE) 
of the Han.  
From the reign of Emperor Wu, information on disasters and damaged areas was 
collected by commissioners dispatched from the central government. The commissioners 
were in charge of reporting the situation as well as distributing the relief grain: 
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河內失火，延燒千餘家，上使黯往視之 .還報曰：「家人失火，屋比
延燒，不足憂也 .臣過河南，河南貧人傷水旱萬餘家，或父子相食，
臣謹以便宜，持節發河南倉粟以振貧民 .臣請歸節，伏矯制之罪 .」上
賢而釋之，遷為滎陽令 . 258 
 
(138 BCE) When a great fire broke out in Henei and destroyed over 1,000 
houses, the emperor (Wu) once more sent Ji An to observe the situation.  
On his return he reported, “The roofs of the houses were so close together 
that the fire spread from one to another; that is why so many homes were 
burned.  It is nothing to worry about.  As I passed through Henan on my 
way, however, I noted that the inhabitants were very poor, and over 10,000 
families had suffered so greatly from floods and droughts that fathers and 
sons were reduced to eating each other.  I therefore took it upon myself to 
use the imperial seals to open the granaries of Henan and relieve the 
distress of the people. I herewith return the seals and await punishment for 
overstepping my authority in this fashion.” The emperor, impressed with 
the wisdom he had shown, overlooked the irregularity of his action and 
transferred him to the post of governor of Xingyang.259   
 
其明年，山東被水災，民多飢乏，於是天子遣使虛郡國倉廩以振貧 . 260 
 
The following year (120 BCE) the land lying east of the mountain (Hua) 
suffered floods and calamities, when the greater part of inhabitants became 
destitute and starving for lack of food. Thereupon, the Son of Heaven sent 
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commissioners to empty government granaries and roofed depots in the 
provinces and fiefs for relief of the poor.261 
 
 By the reign of Emperor Cheng (r. 33-7 BCE), the relief system by commissioners 
changed into a system of cooperation between the commissioners and the commanderies. 
The dispatched commissioners were responsible for the investigation of the damaged area in 
order to determine whether the commanderies had reported the situation correctly. The 
commissioners also supervised the relief activities performed by commanderies, and 
sometimes they worked together to distribute relief grain to the victims.262  
 The practice of distributing relief grains to people in damaged areas as well as tax 
remission frequently appears as one of the main relief policies. Even though there is a phrase 
in the records that Emperor Wen “opened the granaries” to feed the victims in   3 BCE, it 
was during the reign of Emperor Cheng that food distribution began to be adopted as a 
general relief policy after disasters.   
Unfortunately, it is impossible to calculate the total amount of grain used for relief in 
a certain area at a certain time because historical records rarely mention the number of 
recipients precisely. With the fragmentary documents, it appears that victims were given two 
or three hu of grain,263 an amount that would allow a person to survive up to several months 
by consuming it in the form of porridge. Even though we do not know how much grain the 
government expended to relieve the victims, it is not difficult to imagine that not a little 
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amount would be needed to feed hundreds or thousands of starving people for several 
months.  
According to historical literature, grain distribution to the starving people after a 
ma or disaster was generally executed by “opening the granary (開倉).” The granary system 
was well established by the Qin and Han periods, as we can see from legal documents 
regulating the procedure of deposit, storage, and delivery of grain from the granary. Also, 
the “ever-normal granaries” (chang ping cang 常平倉) were established in the first century 
BCE in order to prepare for bad harvests and famine (see Chapter 1 for granary system and 
legal documents). The responsibility of opening the granary was laid only on the emperor 
and commissioners who were given the authority to relieve the people. As it was believed 
that sage rulers should save extra grain in the granaries to prepare for a year of bad harvest, 
the description of “opening the granaries” by emperors frequently appears in the history as 
highlighting the emperor’s virtue of benevolence.  
However, it seems that the grain in the granaries was not always enough to feed the 
people in distress. Sometimes, the government called upon the very rich to make loans when 
the government did not have enough grain to feed the starving people after a disaster: 
 
其明年，山東被水災，民多飢乏，於是天子遣使虛郡國倉廩以振
貧。猶不足，又募豪富人相假貸 . 264 
 
The following year (120BCE) the land lying east of the mountain (Hua) 
suffered floods and calamities, when the greater part of inhabitants became 
destitute and starving for lack of food. Thereupon, the Son of Heaven sent 
commissioners to empty government granaries and roofed depots in the 
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provinces and fiefs for relief of the poor. Still there was not enough. 
Furthermore, the government called upon the very rich to make loans. 
265
 
 
 Historical records show that the rich, commoners as well as officials, were expected 
to contribute with cash or grain to assist the government in helping and succoring the poor, 
“following moral principles.”  
 
關東比歲不登 ,  吏民以義收食貧民、入穀物助縣官振贍者，已賜直 . 266 
 
East of Pass for successive years there has not been a harvest. To those 
officials and common people who, spurred by moral principles, have 
gathered and fed poverty-stricken people or have contributed grain or goods 
to assist the imperial government in helping and succoring the poor, they 
have already been granted the value of their contributions.267 
 
 This tradition must have been adapted in order to solve the problem of lack of grain 
in the granaries. Even though the historical record describes the contributors as those who 
“follow moral principles,” the Han government already had a generous compensation 
system. When people donated money and goods, they were granted aristocratic ranks, 
official positions, promotions, or tax remission for one to three years according to the value 
of their contribution. For example, in 15 BCE, Emperor Cheng ordered that commoners who 
donated from ten thousand to a million in cash be given aristocratic ranks, official positions, 
and tax remission according to the amount of contribution. If they were officials, they were 
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promoted two steps in addition to the grant of aristocratic rank when they contributed more 
than three hundred thousand in cash.268 It seems that commissioners were in charge of 
reporting to the central government the name of contributors who voluntarily helped the 
victims so that the government could grant them gifts commensurate with the value of their 
contribution.269  
Except the information about contributions by the rich, there is not enough on record 
about how the imperial government and each commandery acquired grain when they did not 
have enough in the granaries. The historical records frequently mention the distribution of 
relief food by loan or for free by opening the granaries, but they do not specify how much 
grain they distributed or if the opened granaries had enough grain to feed the victims for 
several months. It seems that the emperor’s order to open the granary was declared under the 
assumption that there would be enough grain in the granaries whenever the emperor or the 
commissioners wanted to open them for relief. However, excluding the period from 
Emperor Wen’s reign to the early days of Emperor Wu, when granaries overflowed, there 
seems to have been no such period when they had abundant grain in the granaries in Han 
times. Moreover, according to the received texts, when the emperor or the commissioners 
opened the granaries in the commanderies and distributed the relief grain, there was no 
practical assistance from the central government to commanderies that might have needed 
extra support with grains and goods from the capital. Except the policy of tax remission, 
there is little record regarding the mechanism of providing grain, such as transferring grains 
from the central to the provincial granaries to assist relief activities. This is why the frequent 
benevolent gesture of “opening granaries” has been seen as merely a symbolic policy 
                                                 
268
 Han shu (10.321); Ibid. 
 
269
 Han shu (6.182) 
 142 
 
providing a Confucian lesson, one which was not able to be implemented effectively enough 
to save the people. 
However, a new interpretation on the recipients of tax remission raises the possibility 
of an effectively implemented relief policy of grain distribution during the Han period. In 
order to distribute and lend the relief grain, it is necessary to define the recipients clearly. 
According to historical documents, until the reign of Emperor Yuan (49-33 BCE) the 
eligible recipients of assistance were indicated as “those who are badly damaged by disaster 
被災甚者.” From the period of Emperor Cheng, when the tax remission policy was 
frequently employed, the definition of recipients as “more than four out of ten 什四以上” 
significantly increased in the historical literature.270 The commentaries by Yan Shigu explain 
the meaning of “more than four out of ten” as “damaged more than 40% of the agricultural 
yield”271 or “lost four out of ten.”272 As we can see from Hiranaka, the eligibility of “more 
than four out of ten” has been believed to apply to each household when the government 
investigated the damage done after a disaster in order to decide which households would be 
eligible to receive the benefit of tax remission, a policy he believed to have been 
ineffective.273  
However, Seok-Woo  im sees that “four out of ten” was applied to the whole 
commandery under disaster, not each household. According to him, “four out of ten” or “not 
full 不滿,” expressions indicating the degree of damage, were to measure the damage of the 
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whole commandery, which had a duty to send taxes collected in the form of grain and hay to 
the central government annually. Therefore, according to his interpretation, those 
commanderies which were estimated to have incurred damage to more than 40% of annual 
yield were discharged from the duty of sending the collected land or poll taxes to the central 
government.274 This could result in the damaged commanderies saving grain in their 
provincial granaries, which is where commissioners sent from the central government 
obtained the grain for relief. From this perspective, the tax remission policies, which were 
frequently executed during the Han period, could have been implemented very effectively as 
a means of providing resources for distributing grain to victims in each commandery 
suffering from famine. Also, with this mechanism of providing grain for the provincial 
granaries, the relief policy of grain distribution could prevent victims from turning to 
banditry, which might lead to dynastic change.  
According to the received texts, it is likely that there was no discrimination by rank 
or age when conducting relief activities. Commissioner Ji An’s report in the year of  3  
BCE under Emperor Wu (see above) asserts that all victims in a damaged area were 
considered in need of assistance, regardless of their political or social status. Generally, 
historical texts indicated food recipients as the poor, the starving, or victims of disaster, 
without mention of rank or age.  
 
[和帝 十二年] 六月舞陽大水，賜被水尤贫者穀, 人三斛.275  
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The sixth month of the twelfth year of Hedi (100 CE) there was flood in 
Wuyang commandery, and three hu of grain each was bestowed on poor 
flood victims. 
 
 
 [獻帝興平元年七月]帝使侍御史侯汶出太倉米豆，爲飢人作糜粥...276 
 
[On the seventh month of the first year of Xingping of Xiandi (194 CE)] 
The emperor had the Assistant to the Imperial Oversight Advisor Houwen 
draw rice and soybeans from the imperial granary and make porridge 
for the starving people…   
 
  
 In terms of food distribution, it appears that there was no favoritism toward those 
who held aristocratic ranks.277 Rather, a few records show that Han rulers seemed to give 
special care to the poorest social groups, such as guan gua gu du 鰥寡孤獨,or widowers, 
widows, the childless, and orphans. In the Han histories, the group guan gua gu du, usually 
along with the aged, frequently appear as recipients of the emperors’ irregular bestowals of 
silk or clothes since they were the most vulnerable people even during non-emergency 
situations in the Han society. In particular, widows, the childless (actually, those with no 
sons), and orphans were excluded from the emperor’s benefits and gifts to the head-of-
household unless they inherited the rank from husbands or fathers. In Confucian Han 
society,  ust as feeding the aged shows the emperor’s filial piety, taking care of these poorest 
                                                 
276
 Xu Tianlin 徐天麟, 東漢會要 Dong han hui yao, Di 1 ban (Shanghai: Shanghai gu ji chu ban she: Xin 
hua shu dian Shanghai fa xing suo fa xing, 1978), 443. 
 
277
 There were several occasions in which all the male subjects were bestowed with one or two ranks after 
a natural disaster. This rank bestowal seems to have been aimed at helping the victims by allowing them to sell 
the ranks during a famine. 
 145 
 
groups represents the virtue of the sage ruler. Therefore, mention of the poorest groups in 
the emperor’s edict on food bestowal during a famine was possibly intended to represent the 
poor in general rather than to delimit the recipients of relief food to those specific groups 
only. This from the imperial edict proclaimed in the year 55: 
 
 [建武] 三十一年夏五月， 大水。戊辰，賜天下男子爵,人二級, 鰥,寡,孤,獨,
篤癃，贫不能自存者粟，人六斛.278 
 
Summer of the fifth month of the thirty-first year of Jianwu, flood. On the 
day of wuchen, bestowed all males under heaven two ranks each, and gave 
widows, widowers, orphans, the childless, the sick, and the poor who 
cannot sustain themselves six hu of millet each.   
   
 Meanwhile, in spite of the emperor’s efforts to display his Confucian virtue through 
relief policies, ancient Chinese rulers were more worried about population decline and loss 
of a work force than realizing Confucian ideals during an emergency situation. From the 
Han histories it is hard to find a record that mentions feeding the aged first during an 
emergency situation even though it had been somewhat conventional to give silk or clothing 
to the aged as well as to the guan gua gu du group when Han emperors made irregular 
bestowals to celebrate imperial events or to comfort them in normal situations. Considering 
how sincerely the rulers tried to take care of the aged during ordinary situations, it is 
surprising that special care for the aged rarely appears in times of disaster. Even though it 
was believed that the sage ruler should show his filial piety according to Confucian 
teachings, the aged were rarely mentioned as the main recipients in the records on relief 
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food distribution during a famine. This indicates that the rulers were more interested in 
saving able-bodied peasants than in demonstrating filial piety when confronted with an 
emergency situation. This could be related to realistic demands for workers in agricultural 
and industrial production as well as to prevent large groups of healthy persons from turning 
into potential flashpoints for riot. There is a similar case in the relief policies of India, where 
it was traditionally the able-bodied young adults of both sexes who were favored in times of 
famine so that they might survive to reproduce another generation.279 Therefore, it can be 
said that the Han relief food policies that seemed to be manipulated and recorded in order to 
highlight the Confucian virtue of rulers were actually aimed to pursue social stability by 
preventing social mobility and unrest.   
 Welfare food policies during the Han period were designed to achieve two purposes: 
to display the ideal virtue of the rulers and to maintain social stability. However, both goals 
were not always able to be fulfilled perfectly. It seems that sometimes the declared 
ordinances were overly idealistic, so that they could not be implemented properly. At times, 
rulers pursued their social and political needs rather than an ideological direction, but even 
in these cases, they tried to disguise their mundane purposes with ideological principals. 
Too, historical records tended to emphasize a ruler’s Confucian virtue whenever relief 
policies were mentioned. Food distribution as a form of welfare was systemically designed 
in order to achieve ideological goals as well as fulfill realistic needs in Han China. 
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IV. Feasting for Redistribution 
 
 Feasts are generally defined as “a form of public ritual activity centered around the 
communal consumption of food and drink.”280 Under this definition of feasts, studies on 
ancient feasting and feasting behavior are highly dependent on discoveries from 
archaeological sites. Brian Hayden suggests that there are fifteen signatures of feasts from 
archaeological remains: food, preparation vessels, serving vessels, food preparation 
facilities, special food-disposal features, feasting facilities, special locations, associated 
prestige items, ritualized items of etiquette, paraphernalia for public rituals, existence of an 
aggrandizer, recordkeeping devices, pictorial and written records of feasts, food-storage 
facilities, and resource characteristics.281 These material indicators help us to identify 
feasting events from the past. As we can see from the suggested signatures, feasting is 
related not only to food itself but also to a certain form of ritual that followed food sharing. 
This is the reason feasting has often been discussed in the context of the nature and ideology 
of the ritual rather than the impact of the feast itself on the people in and out of the banquet 
place.  
 For example, ancient Chinese feasting during the Shang and Zhou eras has been 
studied with a focus on food sharing in a mortuary context due to the fact that archaeological 
evidence has been limited to bronze vessels and oracle bones discovered in and around 
graves. Due to the significance of ancestral worship and the existence of bronze vessels used 
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for food and beer offered to the dead, Chinese feasts from the Neolithic to the Bronze Age 
have been generally considered rituals for the dead.282 According to current evidence, it is 
believed that feasting during the Shang and Zhou periods was conducted by the living in 
above-ground temples, and by the deceased in their below-ground tombs, both directed at 
providing nourishment to the ancestral spirits. On the contrary, feasts among the living, 
which possibly occurred after offerings to ancestors and spirits, have not received much 
academic attention, despite the fact that, as Dietler points out, the religious ritual for 
communicating with gods, ancestors, and spirits was also simultaneously directed toward an 
audience of living humans through the form of a feast.283 It is certain that ancient Shang and 
Zhou Chinese frequently enjoyed feasts among the living, as Shijing (詩經, The Book of 
Songs) and Chu ci (楚辭,The Songs of the South) describe banquets among imperial 
families, nobles, friends, clans, and community members; but due to the lack of 
archaeological evidence, less is known about feasting outside of grave sites. Without further 
study, it has generally been assumed that Shang and Zhou secular feasts, such as palace 
feasts, would have been similar to the mortuary practices of these periods.  
 Despite limited information, however, the nature of ancient Chinese feasts has been 
widely discussed, from the physical setup and procedures to the cultural and sociopolitical 
impact on society in the context of Confucianism. As the Liji, a Confucian ritual canon of 
the late Zhou describes, there were directions for dining etiquette ranging from basic table 
manners to the welcoming of visitors and guests, the spatial distribution of dishes, the order 
and sequence in which dishes were to be served and eaten, to close-up descriptions of 
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drinking, toasting, and even methods of chewing.284 The specific guidelines in the literature 
imply that Zhou feasts (as possibly Shang feasts as well if we can extend the Zhou evidence 
back in time) were serious social business governed by strict rules. As a Zhou poet said of 
an ancestral sacrifice-feast, “every custom and rite is observed, every smile, every word is in 
place.” 285  
 In many societies feasts occur throughout the year for various reasons and purposes 
under very complicated economic and sociopolitical mechanisms. For the past couple of 
decades, scholars have tried to establish models and theories of feasting which can generally 
apply to various forms of feasting, from ancient to contemporary and from historical, 
anthropological, and ethnographical perspectives in order to analyze the importance of 
commensal politics in various societies.286 For example, the role of feasting in Mycenae, 
Mesopotamia, ancient Egypt, and the Inca, Maya and Aztec states has been reexamined as a 
political tool in the emergence and expansion of early states.287 
 Like the recent studies on feasts in other early states and civilizations, Chinese 
mortuary feasts and offerings have also been discussed in the context of commensal politics 
as a means of reconfirming discriminative status and the ties between the ruler and the elite 
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group.288 However, this sociopolitical and anthropological approach also has strong ties with 
the concept of Confucian ideology. The Chinese sacrificial banquet feast is regarded as one 
of the public instruments of ostentation that demonstrates the emperor’s virtue and ability. A 
passage in the Guoyu (國語, Discourses of the States) declares:  
 
When kings, dukes and feudal lords set up a banquet it was in order to discuss 
of affairs (of state) and perfect their eminence. It was to establish great virtue 
and to display grand ritual vessels. In this way they set up and complete their 
sacrificial offerings. They banqueted to display their ritual vessels and feasted 
in order to promote harmony and friendship.289 
 
 
Due to the ritualized procedure and the manner of the feasts, which were established to 
demonstrate the virtue and righteousness of the host and the guests and to reconfirm the 
hierarchical order, it has been conventional to examine ancient Chinese feasts through the 
lens of the Confucian ideal and rarely to consider them beyond that ideological frame.  
 This research trend focusing on feasts for ancestors in the ideological context 
continues and has been further highlighted in the context of Han feasting due to the 
excitement surrounding the archaeological discoveries of food from tomb no. 1 at 
Mawangdui and enhanced by research on feasting scenes depicted in Han tombs and shrines. 
Historical literature from the Han also stresses Confucian virtue and Daoist conventions 
when it describe the events of court banquets, domestic feasts, and afterlife feasts. These 
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conditions have led researchers to focus on the ideological significance of Han feasts in 
highlighting the uniqueness of Chinese culture under the strong influence of Confucianism 
and Daoism.290  
 However, it seems that the attempt to achieve and display ideal virtue and order was 
not the only purpose of the Qin and Han feasts. Feasts were veiled in the guise of religious 
ceremony and ideological virtue; but practical benefits, economic, political, and symbolic, 
were also pursued through feasting. In particular, in addition to highlighting the political and 
social power of the host, feasting itself also worked as a supplementary method for feeding 
people of inferior status during the Qin and the Han periods. In this chapter, I would like to 
reexamine the nature of Qin and Han feasts, focusing on their role as a supplementary 
feeding method for convicted criminals who were supposed to survive with regulated 
rations.  
 As Dietler points out, when we talk about feasts, the first question must be whether 
we are “all talking about the same thing when we use the word feast.”291 Therefore, before 
examining the role of feasts for convicted laborers, I will discuss the general features of Qin 
and Han feasts and then analyze them by applying currently-established theories and 
models. This will clarify the significance of feasting in the food redistribution system during 
the Qin and Han periods. 
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1) Han Court Feasts: Exclusive and Inclusive 
  
 Ancient Chinese practices of food and drink sharing that are often mentioned in 
historical literature can be also explained by the general concept of feast conceiving the 
nature of “communal consumption” (Dietler) and “unusual occasion accompanied by an 
unusual shared meal” (Hayden).292 There were two different types of communal food sharing 
in ancient China: the yan宴 feast, more ritualistic exclusive feast among guests who are 
invited to a prepared banquet, and the pu 酺 feast, inclusive, often state-wide, unusual 
communal consumption of distributed food and drink for up to several days among all the 
subjects of the empire. 
             
a. Ritualistic Banquet among Exclusive Guests: The Yan Feast 
 Accompanying the grand music produced by percussion and wind instruments, balls, 
knives, dishes, and wheels are being spun in the air by acrobats such as a “ball-playing” man 
(Nongwan ren 弄丸人) and a “knife-playing” (man) (Nongjian(ren) 弄劍(人)).  A giant 
(Chang ren 長人), a dwarf (Hui ren 篲人, or broom man), a child (Xiao er 小兒), a female 
warrior (Wu nü 武女), and other people wearing turtle and monkey costumes are dancing 
and parading. Three acrobats are performing on the top of a cross-like pole as a man holds it.  
Four females are bending their bodies on the mat like snakes.  
  A male and a female on duty (zhi men ren 值門人，nü zhi shi女值使) are standing 
by the Gate of the Grand Provisioner (Taiguan men 太官門), and two men are carrying a 
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table through this gate with dishes in special utensils (taiguan shi ju, 太官食具). The 
imperial guards, called Feathered Forest soldiers (Yulin lang 羽林郎), are lined up  in a row, 
holding bows and arrows in the corner.   
 Under the wondrous canopy, the drunken Emperor is hugging two concubines, one 
in each arm, as one female servant attends them. Outside of the canopy, the Empress is 
about to rush to the Emperor and the concubines, and her son Prince Ben (子本) is trying to 
stop her by pulling her arms. The Empress, the son, and several couples, including the 
Marquis of Pingle (平樂侯) and his wife, the Marquis of Dunting (都亭侯) and his wife, and 
the  Marquis of Changsha (長沙侯) and his wife, are sitting on the mat with their own short-
legged, round trays laden with dishes in front of them. One of these couples is fighting and 
another is kissing.   
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Figure 6. Narrow Table from Zhu Ran Tomb at Yushan Ma’anshan293 
 
 
 
 This vivid, riotous, and sometimes bawdy scene is depicted on  a painted lacquer 
narrow table unearthed in 1984 from Zhu Ran tomb at Yushan 雨山 district in Ma’anshan 
馬鞍山 city, located on the south bend of the Yangzi River, east of Anhui Province, 
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bordering on Nanjing.294 The scene of an imperial feast painted on the table portrays a vivid 
picture of the excitement found in this party with its fifty-five drunken people, myriad 
performers, and food arrangements. Historical literature generally named this kind of court 
banquet among the imperial family, nobles, ministers, or elders of society in a palace, 
courtyard or yamen as a “yan 宴.” A yan feast can be defined as a splendid ritualized 
banquet with guests who were invited to a certain place where they were served with food 
and entertainment for a relatively short time, such as for a meal or two. This highly 
ritualized yan feast seems to have been open exclusively to certain elite groups. 
 The lacquer table just described was discovered in the tomb of Zhu Ran, a general of 
Wu 吳 in Three Kingdoms period (Sanguo 三國 222-263 A.D.), and the depicted image and 
official titles next to the personae can be possibly interpreted as those of the Wei Dynasty 
that often used the same official titles at court as the Han Dynasty. However, the scene of 
this feast is very similar to descriptions of feasts found in Han guan yi 宦官儀 (Han Official 
Observances), a monograph on official posts during the Eastern Han period.295 In the passage 
below, a New Year banquet at the De Yang hall during the Eastern Han period is described: 
  
正月旦，天子幸德陽殿，临轩. 公、卿、将、大夫、百官各陪朝賀。蛮、貊、
胡、羌朝貢毕，見属郡計吏，皆陛觐，庭燎. 宗室诸劉雜会，萬人以上，立西
面. 位定，公纳荐，太官赐食酒，西入東出。既定，上寿. 計吏中庭北面立，
太官上食，赐群臣酒食. 貢事御史四人执法殿下，虎贲、羽林弧弓撮矢。 陛
戟左右，戎头逼胫启前向後，左、右中郎将住东西.  羽林、虎贲将住东北，
五官將住中央，悉坐就赐. 作九宾彻樂. 從西方来，戏于庭极，乃畢入殿前，
激水化爲比目魚，跳跃就水. 障日. 毕，化成黄龙，長八丈，出水游戏于庭。
炫燿日光. 以两大丝绳系两柱中头閑，相去数丈，两倡女對舞，行于绳上，對
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面道逢，切肩不倾，又蹋局出身。 藏形于斗中。钟磬并作，樂毕，作魚龍曼
延. 小黄門吹三通。 谒者引公卿群臣以次拜，微行出，罢。卑官在前，尊官
在後.296 
 
On the morning of the first day of the first month, the Son of Heaven favors 
the De Yang palace with a visit. The Three Lords, the Nine Ministers, the 
generals, grandees, and officials in genral all attend the audience to offer 
their felicitations. After the presentation of tribute by Man (southern 
barbarians), Mo (northern barbarians), Hu (northern and western barbarians), 
and Qiang (western barbarians), the Accounts Officials of the dependent 
commaderies are received. Everyone enters the imperial presence admist the 
courtyard torches. The various members of the Imperial House of Liu, and 
the other miscellaneous members of the assembly, amounting to more than 
ten thousand persons, stand facing the west. When they have assumed their 
positions, the Three Lords submit offerings, and the Grand Provisionor 
bestows on them food and wine. They enter by the west and depart by the 
east. On the conclusion of this, offers wishes for long life to the Emperor.  
The Accounts Officials stand in the center of the court, facing north. The 
Grand Provisioner offiers food and wine to the Emperor and food and wine 
are bestowed upon the host of subjects. The four Imperial Clerks for Tribute 
Affairs maintain order in the lower part of the hall. Brave warriors and 
imperial guards carried bows and arrows. To the right and left of the steps to 
the emperor’s hall, they carried weapons. The Left and Right Generals of the 
Palace Gentlemen are posted on the east and west sides, the Generals of the 
As-Rapid-As-Tigers Guards (Hufen Jiang) and Feathered Forest Guards 
(Yulin) on the south and north, and the Generals of All Purpose (Wuguan 
Jiang) in the center. Everyone sits down and proceeds to the food and drink 
which has been bestowed, and music is performed for the hierarchy of 
guests. The Han-li beast comes from the west. It besports itself in the 
courtyard, where, having extended itself to the utmost, it desists. Then it 
                                                 
296
 Sun Xingyan, ed., Han Guan Liu Zhong 宦官六種 (Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju chu ban, 1990), 210. 
 
 157 
 
enteres the coursing water in front of the hall, where it transforms itself into a 
“fish with mutual eyes.” This  umps and leaps about in the coursing water, 
thereby making vapor that obscures the sun. When this is over, it transforms 
itself into a yellow dragon, eight feet long, which emerges from the water 
and amuses itself in the courtyard, where it gleams and scintillates in the 
light of the sun. Two large ropes suspended between two pillars several tens 
of feet apart. On them two singing girls walk and dance facing each other. 
Meeting one another in their course, they rub shoulders without falling off. 
Or again, by crooking their steps and contracting their bodies, they hide 
themselves within a bushel measure, while bells and stone chimes are played. 
At the conclusion of the music, a procession of fish and dragons is formed. 
But when the Attendence of the Lesser Yellow Gates blow three round on 
their trumpets, the Three Lords, Nine Ministers, and assembled subjects 
successively bow and little by little file out, the lesser officials in front, the 
more important ones behind.297  
 
 According to this description, the court banquet was conducted exclusively among 
an elite group and some of the invited non-elite guests, such as clerks and barbarian chiefs, 
following a complicated protocol of specific partakers, presenting order, facing direction, 
and performance procedure. By going through this symbolic, ritualistic ceremony at the 
banquet, the emperor and guests were able to confirm the hierarchy of their relationships. 
Derk Bodde points out that the New Year court ceremony in early Chinese civilization was 
“to reinforce the ties of loyalty on the one hand and benevolence on the other between the 
emperor and his subjects, and to symbolize his position at the center of the civilized 
universe.”298 
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 The ritualized protocol at a banquet was not a new invention for Han court feasts. 
Guidelines for proper manners as host and guests at both ritual and secular banquets already 
existed before the Han period, as described in the Liji, which was compiled during the first 
century BCE from various documents of different periods as early as Western Zhou. Among 
the detailed dining rules, in particular, the manner of greeting of the guests and entering to 
the banquet are described in great detail, like a play script:  
 
Whenever a host has received and is entering with a guest, at every door 
he should give place to him. When the guest arrives at the innermost door, 
the host will ask to be allowed to enter first and arrange the mats. Having 
done this, he will come out to receive the guest, who will refuse firmly to 
enter first. The host having made a low bow to him, they will enter together. 
When they have entered the door, the host moves to the right, and the guest to 
the left, the former going to the steps on the east, and the latter to those on the 
west. If the guest be of the lower rank, he goes to the steps of the host. The 
host firmly declines this, and he returned to the other steps on the west. They 
then offer to each other the precedence in going up, but the host commences 
first, followed immediately by the other. They bring their feet together on 
every step, thus ascending by successive paces. He who ascends by the steps 
on the east should move his right foot first, and the other at the western steps 
his left foot….299 
 
 
Also, the Liji offers detailed directions on dining etiquette according to status, as in the 
following for young attendants and lower-ranking guests: 
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If a guest be of lower rank (than his entertainer), he should take up the 
rice, rise and decline (the honor he is receiving). The host then rises and 
refuses to allow the guest to retire. After this the guest will resume his 
seat…When a youth is in attendance on an elder at a meal, if the host gives 
anything to him with his own hand, he should bow to him and eat it. If he 
does not so give him anything, he should eat without bowing.300  
 
These rules for feasting found in the classic text as well as in the image and description 
of a Han court banquet indicate that all the participants were supposed to acknowledge the 
specific rules and etiquette when they dined together at such feasts. It shows that court 
banquets and elite feasts were exclusive dining among those who knew the rules or those 
who could quickly be instructed with them, and could thus confirm their status in society as 
well as the hierarchy among them. 
  
b. Inclusive Feast: The Pu Feast and Food Distribution 
 
 While exclusive groups were invited to court banquets or elite feasts to celebrate 
imperial events and seasonal divisions, common people outside of the court also enjoyed 
these moments. During the Han period, there were pu 酺 feasts, or puyan 酺宴, a statewide 
drinking party inviting all the registered subjects of the empire. Recent research shows that a 
puyan was an administrative and political means for the emperor to show his kindness 
during the Northern Wei (386-535) and the Tang (618-907) periods.301 However, it seems 
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that the pu had already been established as a form of imperial policy during the Han period, 
as it is written that a pu was “bestowed” (cipu 赐酺) by the emperor when he celebrated an 
imperial event like the beginning of a new era or an enthronement. In Han historical 
literature, it is usually written that “(The emperor) ordered a great pu feast throughout the 
empire (令天下大酺)” or “(The emperor) bestowed upon the people a five-day pu feast (赐
民大酺五日).”302 As the term pu indicates “a specially bestowed gathering of drinking for 
the sub ects,”303 we can assume that when Han emperors allowed their sub ects to “en oy the 
moment,” they may have bestowed liquor and food, as the Northern Wei emperors did.304 
Because in Han society a penalty of four coins was imposed if people drank along with more 
than three other persons without any special reason,305 allowing people to drink together for 
several days while providing food and liquor for the feast was perceived as an especially 
merciful policy that could effectively display the emperor’s virtue and reconfirm the loyalty 
of society members.  
 In addition to the pu feast, there are documents showing that Han emperors opened 
the great granaries and distributed stored wealth and foodstuffs to officials as well as 
commoners as they celebrated imperial events such as enthronements, weddings, emperors’ 
or heir’s coming-of-age, births, the completion of palaces, and so on. According to the 
Eastern Metropolitan Rhapsody (“Dong ing fu”東京賦) written by Zhang Heng (張衡, 78-
139), cooked meats and live sacrificial animals were distributed to family dependents of 
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officials on the occasion of imperial feasting.
306
 In addition, food such as meat and liquor 
were often bestowed “to each, proportionately (各有差)” at the moment of the imperial 
celebration.  
 
四年春正月丁亥，帝加元服 ,  見于高廟 .  賜諸侯王、丞相、大將軍、
列侯、宗室下至吏民金帛牛酒各有差 . 307 
 
In the fourth year, in the spring, the first month, on the dinghai day, the 
Emperor put on the bonnet of virility and was presented in the Temple of 
Emperor Gao. He granted to the vassal kings, to the Chancellor, to the 
General-in-chief, to the marquises, to the members of imperial house, on 
down to the officials and common people, money, silk, oxen, and beer, to 
each proportionately.308  
  
 
 
 As I mentioned in a previous chapter, the “Statutes on Bestowals,” Cilü, legal 
documents discovered in Zhangjiashan tomb no. 247, clearly demonstrate how food was 
distributed to each person proportionately, according to aristocratic rank as well as based on 
salary-grades from the highest rank, lie hou, or 2,000 shi salary-grade officials, to the lowest 
slaves and convicts (sikou, tuli). The “Statutes on Bestowals” from Zhangjiashan can also be 
interpreted as a guideline for food distribution during a statewide feast while there was 
exclusive banqueting at the court. According to the statutes, all the people of the empire, 
even convicts, were guaranteed to receive at least a certain amount of grain, meat, liquor and 
condiments. Details on this food distribution will be discussed in the next section. 
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 Considering the feasting forms of yan and pu as well as the imperial gift that 
occurred at the moment of palace feasting, the definition of feasting in the Qin and Han 
dynasties should include these events of statewide food distribution for celebration, which 
created for the sub ects “a form of public ritual activity centered around the communal 
consumption of food and drink” while exclusive members were invited to banquet at the 
court. Spatiotemporal restrictions are not applicable in the discourse of Qin and Han 
feasting.  
 
 
2) The Purpose and Role of Feasting: Three Modes of Commensal Politics 
 
 Scholars have discussed and analyzed feasts in various societies and cultures by 
categorizing the types of feasts in order to establish models and theories with cross-cultural 
perspectives. For example, focusing on the benefit and role of feasting, Brian Hayden 
suggests nine basic feast types: those held to 1) mobilize labor; 2) create cooperative 
relationships within groups or conversely, exclude different groups; 3) create cooperative 
alliance between social groups; 4) invest surpluses and generate profits; 5) attract desirable 
mates, labor, allies, or wealth exchanges by advertising the success of the group; 6) create 
political power through the creation of a network of reciprocal debts; 7) extract surplus 
produce from the general populace for elite use; 8) solicit favors; and 9) compensate for 
transgression.309 He further argues that except for work, solicitation, and penalty feasts, all 
other benefits of feasting revolve around “the creation or maintenance of important social 
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relationships.”310 The significance of feasts in the context of the function of social 
relationships is reconfirmed as Dietler proposes three representative models of feasting that 
can be observed from anthropological, ethnographical, archaeological, and historical 
research. According to Dietler, the purpose or social function of feasts can be theoretically 
encapsulated within three groups:  ) “empowering feasts” or “competition” to acquire and 
maintain certain forms of symbolic and economic capital, 2) “diacritical feasts” or 
“hierarchy” to naturalize and reify ranked differences in the status of social orders of classes 
by using differentiated cuisine and styles of consumptions as a symbolic device, and 3) 
“patron-role feasts” or “redistribution” to symbolically reiterate and legitimize 
institutionalized relations of asymmetrical social power by using commensal hospitality.311  
The three feasting modes indicate not a series of successive evolutionary stages, but an 
expansive repertoire of forms of political action through feasting with overlapping areas. 
Therefore, while some societies only show one mode of feasting, others can display two or 
three forms at the same time.312 Also, a certain feature of feasting can be analyzed with more 
than one model of feasting theory applied. The nature of ancient Chinese feasts can also be 
analyzed by applying these three models highlighting the features of social relationships. In 
particular, we can also interpret the imperial food distribution mentioned in the “Statutes on 
Bestowals” from the Zhang iashan law using Dietler’s three models of feasting. 
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a. Empowering Feasts: “Displaying Power and Authority” 
Hosting feasts generally works for confirming and acquiring high rank in societies. 
From the view of the nature of “empowering feasts,” feasting is a ma or means of imbuing 
moral authority, which enables a host to acquire and maintain the respect and prestige 
necessary to exercise leadership, acting also as a means of showing one’s ability to acquire 
the necessary symbolic and economic capital for the rank. This feature of “empowering 
feasts” is often mentioned in ethnographic research on African feasts. For example, among 
the Dorze of Ethiopia, there is a tradition that an elevated political status requires the hosting 
of lavish feasts. Becoming a member of high-ranking status in the society of the Koma of 
Cameroon also requires the sponsorship of a special feast with a great deal of millet and 
sorghum beer and beef.313 This feature can be found in Chinese court feasting as well when 
emperors hosted a luxurious court banquet to celebrate their enthronement. Feasting was a 
means of displaying the symbolic and economic power of the new emperor.  
 In Han China, the amount and type of food distributed to those of high aristocratic 
and bureaucratic rank implies that one of the ways the emperor supported them was by 
providing food enough for them to host a feast that would confirm and display their abilities 
and high positions in society, thus creating a mutually reinforcing hierarchy of power by 
allowing them to do on a smaller scale what the emperor does by providing a feast for their 
underlings. According to the “Ci l ,” those who were in the highest bureaucratic rank of 
2,000 shi, or comparable aristocratic ranks (Lie hou, Guanneihou, and Gongzhu), were given 
240 jin (approx. 58.56 kg) of meat and 20 dou of beer that could be used for feasts hosted by 
them in their places. It can be estimated that 240 jin of meat make approximately 200 to 300 
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dishes, assuming that one serving has about 200g (7.1 oz) to 250g (8.8 oz) of meat. (see 
Table 16) With this distributed food, officials and aristocrats of the highest rank were able to 
host a banquet not only for their families, clans, and friends, but also for community 
members. One sheng of mustard, which was bestowed exclusively to the highest two ranks, 
indicates that a communal feast hosted by officials and aristocrats possibly continued for 
several days, as mustard sauce was used to preserve food for several days.  
 The size of the banquet officials and aristocrats could host would have been 
proportional to the amount of food they were bestowed, which then demonstrated the power 
they could display. For example, 1,000 shi officials or those of 10th aristocratic ranks were 
bestowed 120 jin of meat and 10 dou of beer, a half of what 2,000 shi officials and 
comparable aristocrats were given. The lowest official, zuoshi, was to be bestowed 8 jin 
(approx. 2 kg or 4.3 lb.) of meat and 0.7 dou (approx. 1.4 L) of beer with which they could 
enjoy feasting probably just with their family, since they had no subordinates to bestow food 
upon, thus no power to display with/from food. 
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Table 16. Food distribution amount according to bureaucratic rank 
 
Aristocr
atic rank 
Salary Grade Grain Meat Liquor 
20 
19 
2000 shi 3 cheng 
(4.5 dou 
unhusked) 
240 jin314 
(58.56 kg) 
20 dou315 
(40 liters) 
10 1000 shi  
2 cheng 
(3 dou 
unhusked) 
120 jin 
(29.28 kg) 
10 dou 
(20 L) 
9 800 shi 96 jin 
(23.424 kg) 
8 dou 
(16 L) 
8 600 shi 72 jin 
(12.568 kg) 
6 dou 
(12L) 
7 
6 
500 shi  
1 cheng 
(1.5 dou  
unhusked) 
 
60 jin 
(14.64 kg) 
5 dou 
(10 L) 
5 300 shi 36 jin 
(8.784 kg) 
3 dou 
(6 L) 
3 Officials 
whose salaries are 
in terms of dou 
10 jin 
(2.44 kg) 
- 
2 
1 
Accessory 
Clerks 
 8 jin 
(1.952 kg) 
0.7 dou  
(1.4L) 
   
 
b. The Diacritical Feast: “Confirm Social Relationships and Hierarchies”  
 As we can read from the etiquette and protocol of an ancient Chinese banquet, 
ritualized conventions such as seating location, presenting order, and eating order according 
to the ranks, position and age at court feasts as well as elite feasts worked to demonstrate 
social relationships and hierarchies. In this way, the use of differentiated cuisine and style of 
consumption at feasts works to naturalize and reify concepts of ranked differences in the 
social order of classes. Feasts which involve this feature are called by Dietler “diacritical 
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feasts.” 316 In this mode of commensal politics, the symbolic force for demonstrating the 
social hierarchy occurs from the style and taste of served food, rather than the difference of 
food quantity. Diacritical stylistic distinctions can be found in the imperial food distribution 
to bestow different styles of food and condiments according to social status. According to 
the “Statutes on Bestowals” from Zhang iashan tomb no. 247, those of aristocratic rank were 
given grain in a different unit of measure, cheng (盛, “servings”), a term also indicating the 
vessels in which sacrificial offerings were served. Based on the discoveries from 
Mawangdui tomb no. 1, where the same measurement words were found on funerary 
inventory slips and corresponding cooked cuisine was presented in vessels, we can assume 
that the grain exclusively given to officials and aristocrats in the form of cheng was cooked 
grain.317 The fact that at the same time commoners and people of inferior status were given 
cooked grain (fan 飯) supports this. Even though we do not know if the officials and 
aristocrats were given the cooked grain in vessels which had once been prepared for 
sacrificial offerings, the different unit of measure indicates a different style with the 
symbolic power of discrimination.  
 Not only the grain, but also the quality of distributed beer was different in the system 
of food bestowal. Officials who were above the salary grade 600 shi or aristocrats above the 
eighth rank were given shangzun (上尊 ,“upper quality”) beer, whereas officials below 500 
shi and aristocrats below the seventh rank were given xiazun (下尊 ,“low quality”) beer. 
Commoners and convicts were bestowed hejiu (和酒 ,  “flavored liquor”).    
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賜吏六百石以上以上尊 ,  五百石以下以下尊 ,  無爵以和酒 .318 
For bestowals on officials: [for those with a] salary grade of six-hundred 
bushels on up, use the “upper quality ” [for those with a salary grade of] 
five-hundred bushels on down, use the “lower quality ” for those without 
rank use flavored liquor.
319
 
  
  
 The interpretation of different grain liquor grades and terms is controversial. The 
grain liquor grade of shangzun “upper quality” appears in the Han shu. According to the 
commentary written by Ru Shun, the three quality levels of liquor were determined by the 
type of grain fermented: rice (dao 稻, oryza sativa) for upper quality, panicled millet (ji稷, 
panicum miliaceum) for middle quality, and foxtail millet (su 粟, setaria italica) for lower 
quality.320 However, according to a commentary written by Yan Shigu, the quality depends 
on the process of manufacture and the level of thickness, not the kind of cereal with which it 
was made.321 The meaning of hejiu is also controversial: Yates and Barbieri-Low follow 
Peng Hao, who sees it as an adulterated liquor, probably an unfiltered type with dregs, or 
one mixed with water,322 while the preliminary report on Zhangjiashan strips glosses hejiu as 
“liquor with mixed-in additives” (hunhe jiu 混合酒).323 In spite of the various interpretations 
                                                 
318
 Peng, Zhangjiashan, 214. 
 
319 
Barbieri-Low and Yates, ibid. 
 
320
 Zhangjiashan er si qi hao Han mu zhu jian zheng li xiao zu, Zhangjiashan Han mu zhu jian (er si qi hao 
mu) (Beijing: Wen wu chu ban she, 2001), 50; Peng, Zhangjiashan, 214. 
 
321
 Han shu (71.3051); Chang, Food in Chinese Culture, 69; Barbieri-Low and Yates, ibid., fn.85. 
 
322
 Peng, Zhangjiashan, 214,n.2.; Barbieri-Low and Yates, ibid. 
323
 Zhangjiashan er si qi hao Han mu zhu jian zheng li xiao zu Zhangjiashan, 張家山漢墓竹簡二四七號
墓 Z            H     Z   J             Q  H    , Di 1 ban (Beijing: Wen wu chu ban she, 2006), 50. 
 169 
 
on the terms and grades of liquor, it is certain that liquor of different quality and taste was 
bestowed according to status, again reconfirming the social hierarchy.  
 Condiments bestowed with discrimination imply the nature of the diacritical feast, 
too. Mustard was given only to officials at the highest level of salary grade, vinegar was for 
those above 600 shi, fermented sauce was for all grades of officials and commoners, and salt 
was for convicts. These different condiments resulted in differences in the taste and style of 
cuisine that could be enjoyed with the bestowed food.  
 
 
Table 17. Difference of distributed food in kind and style according to status 
 
Aristocratic 
rank 
Bureaucratic 
rank 
Grain  Liquor Mustard Vinegar Fermente
d sauce 
Salt 
20 
19 
2,000shi 3 cheng High 
Quality 
1 sheng 2 sheng 2 sheng  
10 1,000shi 2 cheng  1 sheng 1 sheng 
9 800shi 
8 600shi 
7 
6 
500shi 1 cheng Low 
Quality 
 1/2 
sheng 
5 300shi 
4  
3 Doushi  
2 
1 
Zuoshi 
Commoners  1 dou Flavored 
Liquor 
1/3 
sheng 
Convicts  1 dou  1/20 
sheng 
 
c. Patron-role Feast: “Confirming Hierarchical Relationships” 
 Feasts and food gifts in Han China can also be analyzed in terms of a major mode of 
commensal politics known as “patron-role feasts,” a term indicating “the formalized use of 
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commensal hospitality to symbolically reiterate and legitimize institutionalized relations of 
asymmetrical social power.” 324  Traditionally, this aspect of feast has been called 
“redistribution” in the literature of economic anthropology. According to this theoretical 
model, the expected generosity of feasts and gifts is regularly used for confirming the 
unequal relationship between patron and client, or ruler and subject. The custom of feeding 
all those who provided tribute work on corvée projects to the patron represents this model. 
For example, Dietler introduces a practice of the Bemba of Zambia where the chief was 
responsible for providing food and beer for at least one day for 561 men and 324 women 
who provided labor. Instead of laborers working for agricultural yield on construction 
projects, they are given food by their patron or ruler.325    
 This is also observed in the practice of feeding subjects, including officials, 
commoners, government slaves, and convict laborers, who provided their labor for the ruler 
and government in the Qin and Han period. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the salary 
system for officials and the ration system for those who served in the military and the labor 
camps could be administratively developed forms of redistribution originating from the 
same concept of the patron-role feast.  
 In this mode of redistribution, it seems that feasting or the practice of giving food is 
not necessarily an adaptive means to provide balanced food security for a population.326 
Nourishing the laborers with a balanced diet is not the issue for the distributer. Apart from 
concern for the dietary condition and nutritional balance of the beneficiary, leaders use this 
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practice as a politico-symbolic device for legitimizing status differences. During the Qin and 
Han period the feeding system for convicted criminals involved in labor clearly shows this 
feature. According to the Qin legal texts from Shuihudi, the government guaranteed a certain 
amount of food for the labor providers according to their workload, gender, and age, but 
they only provided grain, in the form of cooked grain or porridge, without any additional 
dishes of meat or vegetables. According to my previous research, the amount of the 
redistributed grain in the form of rations guaranteed by Qin law was enough for convict 
laborers to survive, but provided an unbalanced, high-carbohydrate diet.327 The Qin and Han 
policy of redistributing food to those who provided labor demonstrates the features of the 
patron-role model of feasting, but it does not fit the model perfectly, because the Qin and 
Han ration system for the convicted criminal did not seem to express the hospitality of the 
patron. However, if we consider the food gift as a macro form of feast, we find that 
commoners who were supposed to be regularly conscripted for corvée labor up to a certain 
age and convicted criminals who were sentenced to work for the government for a certain 
period were also treated with the favored symbolic food of cooked grain, meat, beer, and 
condiments in feasting mode.  
 The impact of the feast on laborers has been generally discussed in the context of 
labor mobilization. According to current scholarship, the practice of providing food to 
workers or corvée laborers in the mode of patron-role feast is analyzed as one of the 
methods for mobilizing labor. In this context, the ration system for corvée as well as convict 
laborers of the Qin and Han period can be understood as a developed form of the feast for 
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mobilization and redistribution. Also, the tradition of hosting feasts for workers might form 
the ideological foundation of the ration system. 
 
3) The Impact of Leftovers on Convicted Criminals 
 
“I                               d   ’  b   d   d                  d   .”  
“     L  d.”        d  “b    v       d               mb       f    f  m       
m     ’    b  .”      
        (Matthew 15:26-27) 
 
 Feasts or ritual banquets required many laborers to prepare the banquet, serve the 
food, and clean up. Usually, under the management of the women of the host family or 
officials in charge, slaves and convicts who were to work as slaves prepared food for 
feasting and ritual banquets. A passage from the “Contract for a Slave” (tongyue, 僮约) 
dated 59 BCE by Wang Bao 王褒 (date unknown, late Western Han period)328 implies that 
slaves were expected to prepare feasts for guests in a household: 
 
When there are guests in the house he shall carry a kettle and go after beer; 
draw water and prepare the evening meal; wash bowls and arrange food 
trays; pluck garlic from the garden; chop vegetables and slice meat; pound 
meat and make soup of tubers; stew fish and roast turtle; boil tea and fill the 
utensils. When the dinner is over he shall cover and put away leftovers.
329
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 This description matches the pictorial evidence from tomb reliefs and paintings 
that show people of the lowest status working in the kitchen for butchering, brewing, and 
cooking in order to prepare for sacrificial rituals and feasts. Kitchen scenes from Han tombs 
show that people of inferior status, who wear tight pants and simple, short robes rather than 
the long robes with a wide hem and the long sleeves of the upper class, work in the process 
of food preparation (see figure 7-10). They might be butchers, slaves, or convicted criminals 
sentenced to work for local governments.     
 
 
Figure 7. Kitchen Scene from a late Eastern Han Tomb at Pangtaizitun in Liaoyang, Liaoning
330 
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Figure 8. Han Brick Rubbing of Kitchen Scene from Chengdu, Sichuan
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Figure 9. Brick Painting of Kitchen Scene at the Tomb from Jiayuguan, Gansu 
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Figure 10. Food Preparation Scene from Wuliang Shrine, Shandong
333 
 
 
 Even though people of inferior status like convict laborers and slaves were involved 
in food preparation for offerings and feasts, scholars have held that they were not allowed to 
participate in the fenzuo 分胙, “parting of the sacrificial meat.”334 This would mean that 
those of inferior status in Qin and Han were not able to share the food after a sacrificial 
ritual.  
 However, recently discovered Qin texts from Liye concerning sacrifices to Xiannong 
(先農,Ancestral Agriculturalist) indicate that the Qin had a system for dealing with 
leftovers, from which convicted criminals could benefit. According to these texts, local 
officials sold the remaining food from a sacrificial ritual to Wall-Down Laborers or other 
convicted criminals for some cash on May 9th, 215 BCE, which seemed to be the day after a 
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sacrificial ritual to the Ancestral Agriculturalist.335 One and a half dou (about 3 liters) of 
remaining beer was sold to a convict laborer named Zui 冣 for one coin. One and a half dou 
(3 liter) of remaining piglet meat was sold to another convict laborer named He 赫 for four 
coins. The convict labor He also bought one head of lamb for two coins and four hooves of 
lamb for two coins. These transactions were executed, inspected, and recorded by local 
officials in charge. 
 
卅二年三月丁丑朔丙申, 倉是佐狗出祠[先]農餘徹酒一斗半斗賣于城旦冣 
所,取錢一,率之一斗半斗一錢. 令史尚視平. 狗手. (1.14.650;1.14.652) 
 
On the bingshen day of the third month, whose first day falls on a dingchou 
day, in the 32nd year [of the reign of Ying Zheng, King of Qin] (May 9th, 
215 BCE), The Granary [Overseer], Shi, and his Assistant, Gou, disbursed 
one and one-half dou of remaining beer [3 liters] from a sacrifice to the 
Ancestral Agriculturalist, and sold it to the Wall-Dawn Laborer Zui’s place, 
and took away one cash. Determining the unit price; each one and a half dou 
is one cash. The Foreman Clerk, Shang, inspected the fairness [of the 
transaction]. Gou wrote [this]. 
 
 
卅二年三月丁丑朔丙申, 倉是佐狗出祠[先]農餘徹豚肉一斗半斗賣于(於)
城旦赫所,取錢四. 令史尚視平. 狗手. (1.14.649;1.14.679) 
 
On the bingshen day of the third month, whose first day falls on a dingchou 
day, in the 32nd year [of the reign of Ying Zheng, King of Qin] (May 9th, 
215 BCE), The Granary [Overseer], Shi, and his Assistant, Gou, disbursed 
one and one-half dou of remaining piglet meat [3 liters] from a sacrifice to 
the Ancestral Agriculturalist, and sold it to the Wall-Dawn Laborer He’s 
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place, and took away four cash. The Foreman Clerk, Shang, inspected the 
fairness [of the transaction].  Gou wrote [this]. 
 
 
卅二年三月丁丑朔丙申, 倉是佐狗雜出祠先農餘徹羊頭一足四賣于(於)城
旦赫所,取錢四◇ (1.14.300;1.14.764) 
 
On the bingshen day of the third month, whose first day falls on a dingchou 
day, in the 32nd year [of the reign of Ying Zheng, King of Qin] (May 9th, 
215 BCE), The Granary [Overseer], Shi, and his Assistant, Gou, together, 
disbursed one head and four hooves of remaining lamb from a sacrifice to 
the Ancestral Agriculturalist, and sold it to the Wall-Dawn Laborer He’s 
place, and took away four cash... 
 
 
◇頭一足四賣于(於)城旦赫所,取錢四. 率之頭一二錢四足□錢. 令史尚視平. 
(1.14.641) 
 
…one head and four hooves [of a sheep], and sold it to the Wall-Dawn 
Laborer He’s place, and took away four cash. Determining the unit price; 
each one head is two cash, and the four hooves are [two] cash.  The 
Foreman Clerk, Shang, inspected the fairness [of the transaction].  
 
 
卅二年三月丁丑朔丙申, 倉是佐狗出祠[先]農餘肉汁二斗賣于(於)城旦□所◇ 
(14.654) 
 
On the bingshen day of the third month, whose first day falls on a dingchou 
day, in the 32nd year [of the reign of Ying Zheng, King of Qin] (May 9th, 
215 BCE), The Granary [Overseer], Shi, and his Assistant, Gou, disbursed 
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two dou of remaining meat broth [4 liters] from a sacrifice to the [Ancestral] 
Agriculturalist, and sold it to the Wall-Dawn Laborer X’s place.... 336 
 
 
According to these strips, the food mentioned was from the altar, or from the 
sacrifice (chuci 出祠). However, it does not seem that the food was the meat or beer that 
was first offered to the god and later shared with the participants. According to the Liji, it 
seems that the sacrificial meats – beef, lamb, and pork – were shared with the guests, and the 
leftovers from the table of the banquet were supposed to taken by or sent to the guests: 
 
曾子曰 .  吾子不見大饗乎 .  夫大饗既饗 .  卷三牲之俎 .  歸于賓館 . 337 
 
Zhengzi says “Have you not seen what is done at a great feast? At a great 
feast, given by a Great officer, after all have partaken, he rolls up what is 
left on the stands for the three animals (for offering), and sends it to the 
lodgings of his guest….”338  
 
 As Barbieri-Low argues, the rou肉 (“pork”) or tunrou豚肉 (“piglet meat”) being 
sold here did not include the whole hunks of meat which had been placed on the altar, but 
consisted of byproducts, like pork guts, fat, and blood from the piglet, which were not used 
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in either sacrificial offerings or banquets.339 This can be supported by the fact that the piglet 
meat was sold by volume, dou, not by jin, the unit of weight generally used for meat. 
Moreover, the price, three liters (approx. 101oz) for four coins, was too cheap to be whole 
hunks of meat; the normal price of pork, as seen in an account from Xuanqian, Dunhuang, 
where one jin (245g, or 8.6oz) of pork cost six coins.340 The other items, such as lamb’s head 
and hooves, were also far from the edible meats that could be offered and shared with the 
ritual participants for feasting after the offering. Also, the pork broth (rouzhi 肉汁) they sold 
was likely not the stew, but the byproduct water in which the pork meat had been boiled, 
which was supposed to be discarded. The Meishifang, the discovered bamboo strips of 
ancient food recipes, indicates as much:  
 
…煮.熟,绁出去其洎.摇更以牛甘洎入酒，盐，肉酱汁，姜，木兰其中. 
复煮之. 熟绁出进之. 为马濡，羊濡，鹿濡方如此.  
       (fragment 3,slip bing 10) 
 
…boil. When done, lift it out and discard the broth. Shake…take the fresh 
sweet beef broth and add beer, salt, meat sauce liquid, ginger, and magnolia. 
Boil it again. When done, lift it out and serve. The recipe for making boiled 
horse, boiled lamb, and boiled deer is like this.341 
 
According to this recipe, making boiled meat produced first a broth that was supposed to be 
discarded, and second a flavored broth in which a husk of meat had been boiled. The meat 
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and meat broth they sold to convicts at such a low price may have consisted of this 
byproduct, which was not used for offerings or feasts.  
 I further argue that the beer which was sold to convicts was liquor left over after the 
feast rather than that which was offered and then cleared from the alter (出祠先農餘徹酒), 
as the document literally reads. As Qi min yao shu 齊民要術, the earliest ancient Chinese 
agricultural text completed in the sixth century, indicates, no matter what the differences in 
the raw materials and fermentation process, once beer was fermented in a jar, the highest 
quality of clearest beer (qingjiu 淸酒) was obtained by filtering the liquor from the 
uppermost portion of the jar.342 For rituals, the clearest and purist liquor with the least dregs 
was certainly offered on the altar first, after which it would all be consumed by the ritual 
participants or guests, just as the sacrificial meat was shared with the participants after the 
offering. In addition to this highest quality beer, mid-quality liquor remained in the jar 
without dregs would be consumed by regular guests during the banquet. When this was all 
consumed, they would have brewed the lowest quality by adding water to the dregs (zhuojiu 
濁酒). Considering the significance of alcohol in the nature of ritual and feasting, not only 
clear beer for the offering and banquet, but also plenty of lesser-quality beer must have been 
consumed during the feast. This custom is observed in the Korean traditional culture: when 
all the liquid was consumed during feast, they added water into the jar and mixed it with the 
dregs on the bottom to make more beer of lesser quality for inferiors. We might speculate 
that a similar practice was conducted during the Qin and Han periods. Therefore, the beer 
they sold the day after the sacrificial offering was probably not the liquor from the altar but 
the leftover liquor, the low-quality beer mixed with water and the remaining dregs.  
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 According to the Jiuzhang suanshu (九章算術, Nine Chapters on the Mathematical 
Art), the earliest specialized mathematical work, composed around 200 BCE, one dou of 
beer cost ten to fifty qian during the Han period.343 One and one-half dou of beer for one 
coin is too cheap to be believed for fine beer, even though it was believed to have been 
offered to the altar first. In ancient China, beer was generally made from barley, millet, 
wheat and rice. While rice beer prevailed in Southern China, beer made of millet, barley, 
and wheat was more common in northern China until the late Han period. According to the 
reconstruction of ancient liquor production, beer made with barley and wheat was difficult 
to store. While rice beer could be stored up to several years, beer of barley and wheat would 
keep only for a very short time, no longer than a week.344 The short shelf life of beer means 
that once they used the beer for the ritual and feast, they needed to dispose of the remaining 
liquor immediately because it could not be used for the next event. Furthermore, if the 
leftover beer was of a poor quality, made by adding water to the dregs, the preservation time 
would become even shorter. Therefore, it is reasonable that the day after the feast the beer 
leftover from the feast, which would be that of poor quality mixed with dregs and would 
have been thrown away in a few days, would be sold for a low price to people of inferior 
status.   
 According to these fragments from Liye, convicted criminals would have a chance to 
intake more food if they or maybe their family could afford to pay for the food. Considering 
that most convict laborers experienced malnutrition or at least an unbalanced diet from 
distributed rations, the food left over after ancestral offerings and feasts worked as a 
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supplementary way to solve nutritional problems by providing protein, fat, and essential 
minerals such as iron. Considering that local officials of Qin and Han seem to have 
conducted sacrifices to Xiannong five or six times per year, and they were supposed to 
routinely make sacrifices to Fengbo 風伯 and Yushi 雨師 with sheep and pigs as often as to 
Xiannong,345 the convict laborers could have the chance at least once or twice a month to 
buy supplemental food from the local sacrificial rituals.  
 In this chapter, I examined the forms and the nature of feasting and the impact of 
food sharing related to feasts during the Qin and Han period, applying current theories of 
feasting in order to find whether ancient Chinese feasts could be discussed within the 
framework of anthropological models. Here, I would like to point out some theoretical 
issues on feasts we need to consider in order to understand ancient Chinese feasting within 
the framework of current models.    
 According to Dietler, a feast is a form of public ritual activity centered around the 
communal consumption of food and drink. However, if we see current scholars’ analysis on 
the roles of feasts in various societies, we notice that they, consciously or unconsciously, 
confine the meaning of feast to having food and drink among living participants or between 
a living host and guests. They do not consider the “communal consumption of food and 
drink” among the physically invisible beings of the community: spirits and people outside 
the banquet place. It seems that most scholars consider food sharing with the deities and 
ancestors as a part of religious ritual, not as a form of feasting, even though religious 
offerings are followed by communal feasting. However, in ancient China, sharing food with 
ancestors and the deceased is viewed as feasting. As Denise Schmandt-Besserat, who 
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examines ancient Near Eastern feasts, argues that the delivery of the offering may be 
regarded as the most significant aspect of feasting,346 the practice of food sharing with gods, 
deities, ancestors and even people outside the banquet place can be considered in the context 
of feasting, and.     
 Another theoretical issue is the limitation of time and space for the feast. 
Unconsciously, scholars assume that feasting is communal eating for a moment held in a 
certain place in the presence of the host. They assume that guests must gather in a certain 
place, mostly palaces and courts, for food sharing at a certain moment for it to be called 
feasting. I have called this kind of feasting an “exclusive feast,” which was en oyed among 
elite groups and related people under strict rules of etiquette and protocol. However, the 
“inclusive feasting” of the general public happened state-wide, as the emperor distributed 
food for subjects to celebrate the moment together. I argue that the food distribution practice 
for those who do not participate in the physical setting in the court should be counted as an 
extended concept of the feast when we consider the purpose and the role of feasting. 
Sub ects who were given food from the emperor were able to  oin the “communal food 
sharing” for the same purpose as the exclusive feasting at the court even though they were 
not in the same place. 
 In this chapter, I examined food redistribution in the form of a feast, focusing on the 
nature of feasts for laborers. I related the concept of feasts for labor mobilization to the 
nature of the food rationing system for convicted laborers during the Qin and Han period, 
and examined the impact of feasts on the nutritional and dietary conditions of convicted 
criminals. The management of food for offerings and the feasts that followed, both 
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preparation and disposal, was systemically regulated in the laws. In particular, Qin legal 
documents from Liye indicate that they even controlled everything left from feasts, using the 
leftovers and byproducts efficiently to feed people of inferior status who were in a poor 
dietary condition. 
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Conclusion 
 
 During the Qin and Han periods, food was given by the emperor to his subjects 
through various redistribution systems: salaries, rations, relief, gifts, and feasts. Over the 
course of chapters one to four, I introduced each form of food redistribution that directly and 
indirectly influenced food consumption and the dietary conditions of people of various 
statuses and situations: officials, soldiers, elders, widows, victims of natural disaster, and 
convicts.  
 An examination of the food redistribution system that takes into consideration the 
prevailing political ideology, the established legal statement and ordinances and related to 
food redistribution, and the actual implementation of the policies reveals that the state’s 
politics were not necessarily reflected in the laws, and that policies were not always 
observed when local officials redistributed resources. For example, the Confucian concept of 
propriety, or the Legalistic belief of discriminative awards according to one’s contribution to 
the state, was certainly reflected in the salary and rationing system of the Qin and Han. 
Meanwhile, comfort food policies for elders based on Confucianism seem not to have been 
realized, since the proclaimed laws remained impractical. The fact that Han relief food 
policies for victims of natural disaster did not seem to prioritize elders as recipients of 
governmental assistance also supports the finding that there were discrepancies between 
ideal philosophies and actual policies. The discordance between ideology and policy seems 
to have been caused by the realistic need to maintain social stability rather than pursue ideal 
virtue.   
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 The accordance and discordance between policies and their implementation was able 
to be analyzed due to recently discovered Qin and Han legal documents and administrative 
records. The examination of Qin and Han laws from Shuihudi and Zhangjiashan and the 
local administrative documents and accounts from Liye and Xuanquan proves that rules on 
the reporting process and responsibility system seem to have been observed well at the local 
government level as rules to follow, while the details of food distribution, in terms of the 
amount, kind, and recipients, were not in actuality executed according to the established 
rules. It may have been a challenge to observe the expected discrimination according to 
aristocratic rank and salary grade when the local government gave food to officials who 
visited the conveyance stations, even though the laws clearly stipulated different treatment 
with different amounts and kinds of food according to social status. Moreover, it is certain 
that the recorded amounts of rations given to convict laborers by local governments were 
generally much less than the regulated amount. It can be assumed that convicts laborers 
were not provided even as much as the amount on record as having been actually given, not 
only based on a comparison of the law and the accounts, but also from historical records 
containing statements of those who had worked as convicts and received rations from the 
government. Research on calories from the rations indicates that the issued amount of 
rations to a convict laborer, though less than the regulation, was still enough for a person 
engaged in hard work, but a source cited to relate the experience of being a convict laborer 
testified that they were fed poorly. Each chapter in this dissertation revealed details 
demonstrating the reality of the food redistribution system in the Qin and Han periods.     
 What, then, are the probable causes as to why there was a discrepancy between 
regulation and implementation on the ground? The reasons can be analyzed from three 
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angles: the nature and purpose of Qin and Han laws, corruption among officials, and the 
alternative method of cash payment. First, since the purpose of the laws on the granary and 
rationing system was to safeguard government property from abuse rather than to guarantee 
a certain amount of rations to the recipients, issuing smaller amounts seems not to have been 
illegal. Even though detailed records on food distribution written by local administrators and 
granary keepers were reported to the central government, it does not seem that they had any 
problem with the matter of issuing a smaller amount of rations than called for by regulation. 
Examination of the nature of the statutes on granaries, which aimed to prevent abuse of 
governmental property, shows that the regulated amount actually meant the maximum 
amount the local government was allowed to provide to recipients. Also, as we can see from 
the comparison between the Qin and the Han statutes on food rations at conveyance stations, 
the Han statutes became less discriminative than the Qin regulations in terms of the amount 
and kind given to the recipients of different social statuses. This tendency of less 
discrimination appeared in the records on actual food expense for visiting officials during 
the Han period, which shows that, without any legal problem, sometimes the same amount 
and kind of food was given to recipients regardless of their social or bureaucratic status. 
Provided it did not cause an abuse of government property or defamation of the purpose of 
the regulation, it seems that officials were allowed some flexibility in applying legal 
guidance to food distribution. In fact, the laws on the punishment of officials’ malpractice of 
food distribution were only for cases of abuse of government property. 
 The second possible reason for discrepancies between the regulation and reality is 
corruption. As we can see from Emperor Wen’s proclamation of a new ordinance on food 
distribution when officials distributed stale millet to the aged, the problem of official 
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corruption in the process of food distribution was already recognized by the Han emperors, 
and the rulers tried to prevent it by establishing strict laws regarding the procedure of 
distribution. Although Bielenstein argues that corruption was motivated more by greed than 
economic necessity,347 it is eminently plausible that the poor economic condition of low-
ranking officials may have led them to be tempted to embezzle goods. Already in 59 BCE 
Emperor Xuan ordered an increase in salaries by 50% for those ranking 100 shi or less, as he 
worried about poor officials who could charge customary fees or increase tax quotas to 
squeeze more income out of the people.348 The salary increases that occurred in 7 BCE for 
officials ranking 300 shi or less and in 50 CE for officials ranking 600 shi or less would be 
related to concerns about corruption among poor officials.349 In light of the social status of 
convict laborers and the evidence from literature and bone analysis, it is not unlikely that 
officials involved in distributing rations to convicts embezzled goods easily and frequently. 
If convict laborers had been fed with the regulated amount of grain, they would have 
maintained a sound diet, even though they may have incurred some problems caused by 
nutritional imbalances.350 But the problem of dietary balance could be solved more or less by 
consuming leftover food from feasts and offerings. We can surmise that since corrupt 
officials gave stale millet to the aged, they probably gave convict laborers rations full of 
chaff and grit, which caused malnutrition, while the officials kept the grain for themselves. 
 The discordance between the regulations and actual practice could be also stem from 
the possible alternative method of cash payment, which was prescribed in the “Statutes on 
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Bestowals” from Zhang iashan. Slip number 2 0 clearly states, “In all cases that match a 
bestowal but the office does not possess the actual objects, give cash according to the fair 
market price.” With this statute, we can assume that not only gift food but also other forms 
of food redistribution were plausibly converted to cash, since not every county could access 
all the food resources it needed as stipulated in the statutes. In particular, the event of 
bestowing a cow per certain number of households seems to have been more likely 
converted to cash payment because of the scarcity and the significance of working cows in 
the agricultural society. Therefore, even though people were supposed to be given food by 
the regulations, they frequently received cash instead. However, since the value of “fair 
market price” was not fixed and determined by the local authorities, it can be assumed that 
there were possible manipulations in the process of estimating and matching market price, 
which resulted in distributing less than the regulation and leaving more for the court instead.   
 The examination of the food redistribution system in early imperial China shows that 
it was ideally designed to benefit all the people under heaven “equally” within the 
framework of the social hierarchy, as well as providing extra sources to those of lower status 
and to people in distress. However, it seems that the ideal and the effectiveness of the 
regulations were frequently out of sync, as the laws were applied flexibly, and human greed 
worked every possible step of food redistribution. Nevertheless, the food redistribution 
system established during the Qin and Han periods contributed to keeping Han society stable 
for more than four hundred years without ma or chaos caused by “unequal” redistribution, 
since rulers used food to control as well as comfort all the people in the empire.    
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